


**ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT STRATEGIES**  
**IRREGULAR WARFARE**  
**ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**2 JUNE 2011**




**United States Army Special Operations Command**



**ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT STRATEGIES**

**IRREGULAR WARFARE**

**ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY**



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## IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) INTRODUCTION

In a 2011 speech to West Point cadets, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the changing operational environment facing U.S. military forces and the shifts needed in military doctrine to successfully meet these challenges. He pinpointed the necessity of military advisement and speculated that large-scale COIN operations such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq will be relics of the past. The future focus, instead, will be on naval and air engagements as well as short-term counterterrorism strikes and disaster relief.<sup>1</sup> Secretary Gates is, in part, describing a security environment that is characterized by irregular warfare, or IW.

The term IW first gained widespread attention after its inclusion and importance in the *Quadrennial Defense Review 2006* (QDR 2006), a document that “[helps] shape the process of change to provide the United States of America with strong, sound, and effective warfighting capabilities in the decades ahead.” The QDR 2006 described the operational environment as one dominated by IW, requiring extended unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; counterterrorism; and security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, one of the fundamental imperatives of the U.S. military as described in the publication was to “reorient the [DoD’s] capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges . . . .”<sup>3</sup> The Pentagon’s “execution roadmap” for IW was intended to combat the growing threat from enemy actions beyond the conventional, “state-to-state military conflict.”<sup>4</sup> IW has gained more prominence after the Bush Administration launched the GWOT, which, to date, has significantly involved features of IW. Since 2005, Special Operations Forces (SOF) skill sets have launched SOF to the forefront of the GWOT and warfare in a security environment dominated by IW.

IW as a term has been used as interchangeable with non-doctrinal concepts such as fourth generation warfare, asymmetric warfare, or unrestricted warfare, but it retains important distinctions from those concepts. At its core, IW is a departure from military-to-military warfare to operations that seek

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<sup>1</sup> Greg Jaffe, “In One of Final Addresses to Army, Gates Describes Vision for Military’s Future,” *Washington Post*, February 25, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 36. However, SSTR operations are typically not SOF tasks. See also U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 5.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Jeffrey Hasler, “Defining War: New Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional, and Unconventional Warfare,” *Small Wars Journal* 20, no. 2 (2007): 18.

to gain popular support and favors “indirect, asymmetric methods”<sup>5</sup> and protracted warfare in order to “erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”<sup>6</sup> JP 3-0 defines IW as “marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.” IW may take several forms, “including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking)”<sup>7</sup> and non-state, state, or other actors:

The continued growth and power of non-state actors will remain a key feature of the environment. Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovation and global information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the previous century remained largely the purview of the state.<sup>8</sup>

The operational landscape in which the U.S. Armed Forces engage has experienced significant shifts. The dominance of U.S. conventional forces has encouraged outgunned adversaries to employ methods that offset our conventional advantages. “From non-state actors using highly advanced military technology and sophisticated information operations to states employing unconventional technologies, our current adversaries have shown that they will tailor their strategies and employ their capabilities in sophisticated ways.”<sup>9</sup> The concept of “hybrid warfare” captures this complexity, highlighting the blurring of traditional conflict categories, with state adversaries adopting unconventional, or protracted warfare strategies while some non-state actors adopting sophisticated or “high-end capabilities” heretofore exclusive to sovereign states. Furthermore, adversaries will possibly employ a number of other novel methods, including the use of criminal and terrorist networks, manipulation of the information environment, or preventing access to resource and energy markets.<sup>10</sup>

As its complexity suggests, IW does not rely on military prowess alone, but also “the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social

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<sup>5</sup> Bryan H. Cannady, “Irregular Warfare: Special Operations Joint Professional Military Education Transformation” (thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 42.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), xi.

<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, VII-7.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 7.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 8.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 8.



networks, religious influences, and cultural mores.”<sup>11</sup> Its constituent activities, of which only several are discussed here—unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism<sup>12</sup>—reflect the necessity of engaging the population in order to align popular support with U.S. objectives in the state or region.

Policy analysts, military leaders, and scholars continue to debate the importance of the emerging threat of IW. In particular, to what extent the U.S. military forces should adapt to irregular warfare in addition to the continued emphasis on conventional warfare. BG Bennett Sacolick endorsed the need to develop conventional forces to be more “SOF-like,” as U.S. Army Special Forces are specially trained in IW, in careful consideration of the adversaries the U.S. is likely to face in the 21st-century. This sentiment was repeated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who noted that “the one requirement that jumps off the page is the requirement for all services to be SOF-like—to be netted, to be much more flexible, adaptive, faster, lethal, and precise.”<sup>13</sup> However, others, including executives within the Army, do not endorse a similar position. An April 2006 White Paper issued by the Chief of Staff of the Army argued that “warfare is warfare,” whether conventional, irregular, or hybrid. The capabilities used in one can and must be adapted for use in the other— “Shifting our aim is not exchanging one “Either-Or” position for another. Aiming at the center of the conflict spectrum will enable us to respond quickly and effectively to these hybrid threats *across* the spectrum, as the situation and mission dictate.”<sup>14</sup>

The following annotated bibliography is arranged according to the core tasks associated with IW: foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and counterinsurgency. Each bibliography is meant to act as a stand-alone document, thus many sources are repeated in each section as many sources address issues pertinent to the spectrum of the core tasks discussed here. Additionally, each source provides a link to large library database, WorldCat. Using the link when searching for a source will ensure that the correct one is accessed and give information on the nearest library holding the document or book. In the event that the source is available online, WorldCat also provides a link. In the rare event that a document was not listed in the extensive WorldCat database, a general link is used for the source.

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<sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Unconventional Warfare* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), I-5.

<sup>12</sup> USSOCOM lists these four tasks as four of eleven core SOF activities. USSOCOM Public Affairs, *Fact Book, 2011*, <http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/documents/fact%20book%202011.pdf> (accessed May 23, 2011).

<sup>13</sup> Bennett Sacolick, “SOF vs. SOF-like,” *Small Wars Journal*, April 30, 2009, <http://smallwars-journal.com/blog/2009/04/sof-vs-soflike/>.

<sup>14</sup> Chief of Staff of the Army, *Adapting our Aim: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy*, April 2009, 6, [http://asc.army.mil/docs/divisions/rm/CSA\\_White\\_Paper.pdf](http://asc.army.mil/docs/divisions/rm/CSA_White_Paper.pdf) (accessed March 3, 2011).

The aim of this bibliography is to provide readers an offering of both a more traditional military perspective as well as perspectives from social scientists, including political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists studying similar phenomena. The following sources include general history and analysis related to each core task; operational or “how-to” guides; and works discussing particular insurgencies. Additionally, while by no means comprehensive, the social science literature included in the following bibliographies addresses questions and concerns common in academia. Social science is the study of society and human behavior and unlike some hard sciences rarely provides definitive answers on what are undoubtedly highly complex matters. For example, to date, social scientists have not unearthed any hard and fast answers addressing the necessary and sufficient conditions for rebellion or the termination of insurgencies. Instead, the following sources present the scope of the debate surrounding conflict and contention, offering differing theories, oftentimes accompanied by empirical evidence, on the nature of resistance movements and insurgencies; motivations for rebellion; the dynamics of collective action; and the changing international system, among others.

# I. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)

## INTRODUCTION

Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, is a legislatively mandated task of SOF since the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. It includes programs which encompass “the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”<sup>15</sup> Traditionally, such assistance has concentrated on helping a host nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the legitimate government authority in line with the host nation’s strategy, known as the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).<sup>16</sup> However, FID operations also address other threats to host national security such as “civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.” JP 3-0 *Joint Operations* notes that it is these latter concentrations which may predominate in the future.<sup>17</sup> Both conventional and special forces engage in FID operations. After the Cold War, it was typically SOF that led FID operations, sometimes augmented by conventional forces. After the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), however, general purpose forces (GPF) have increasingly played a role in FID operations. Attention to SOF FID doctrine has increased accordingly.<sup>18</sup> The JP 3-05 *Doctrine for Special Operations* identifies two key tasks performed by SOF in FID-related activity, host nation military assistance and population security. The former, as the name suggests, involves the training host nation military personnel in “tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills.” In addition, SOF also provides advice to military leaders and provides training necessary to protect the host nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

The term Security Force Assistance (SFA) is also frequently used to describe host nation military assistance tasks.<sup>19</sup> SFA is a relatively newly designated task in light of increased conventional force involvement under the large-scale Nation Assistance (NA) umbrella, defined by JP 3-0 as including FID, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), antiter-

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, VII-7.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas R. Matelski, *Developing Security Force Assistance: Lessons from Foreign Internal Defense* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 6.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, VII-7.

<sup>18</sup> Matelski, *Developing Security Force Assistance*, 2.

<sup>19</sup> The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, or JCISFA, states that SFA was coined in 2006 in part to clarify and distinguish military advisement operations. FID is primarily concerned with countering internal threats, while SFA doctrine can address a variety of threats. “SFA was coined to fix this problem by including all the activities done to support FSF [Foreign Service Forces] development yet avoiding a complete rewrite of existing doctrine.” JCISFA, <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/jointtext.aspx> (accessed March 15, 2011).

rorism, and counterdrug operations (CD), among others. The long-term goal of NA is regional stability.<sup>20</sup>

However, the contexts in which SFA and FID are applied do suggest qualitative differences. FID is generally regarded as a mission conducted in the context of IW, which focuses on swaying populations to favorable positions while successfully engaging enemy combatants. In addition, FID mission are typically concerned with neutralizing internal threats exclusive of external threats. SFA, in contrast, while similar to FID, combines aspects of IW, major combat operations (MCO), SSTR, and involves neutralizing internal and external threats.<sup>21</sup> In addition, SFA also includes training of security forces, not just military personnel, as does FID, including police, border guards, and others.<sup>22</sup>

Prior to 9/11, FID operations supported or assisted existing host nation military infrastructure, typically states with capable militaries, in accordance with its IDAD.<sup>23</sup> In the post-9/11 operating environment and the GWOT, the U.S. military has responded to the changing security environment by providing support to failing or failed states that have little or poor existing military infrastructure as the importance of non-state combatants increased. Such states often do not have the resources or capability to produce a viable IDAD. Both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were conducted in such circumstances. The scale of effort involved in developing a nation's military infrastructure from ground level has made for challenging FID operations.<sup>24</sup> FID operations have also traditionally focused on developing the host nation's capability to deter internal, not external, threats in their initial phases. With the activation of AFRICOM, the potential for SOF involvement in FID operations in African states has likewise increased, including failing and failed states that have may or may not have a viable IDAD strategy, and have numerous active insurgencies past the initial phase. In such cases, may be advisable to direct the efforts to conventional forces to conduct SFA operations.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, VII-6.

<sup>21</sup> Matelski, *Developing Security Force Assistance*, 12.

<sup>22</sup> Matelski, *Developing Security Force Assistance*, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Jeffrey N. James, *Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense and Military Advisement: Not Just a Semantic Exercise* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 4. An IDAD (Internal Development and Defense) strategy is a "preemptive strategy but can be active in order to combat and insurgency, illicit drugs, terror, or other internal threats."

<sup>24</sup> James, "Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense," 6-7.

<sup>25</sup> James, "Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense," 8.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**Alinsky, Saul David. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/611392318>.**

Alinsky was a radical, and successful, community organizer who compiled these controversial organizational tactics in the 1970s. This primer is *The Prince* for the have-nots—it is firmly grounded in the politics of power with minimal ethical considerations. Several generations of community organizers from across the ideological spectrum have now utilized these tactics to help achieve their objectives. Alinsky explains that the first task of an outside organizer is overcoming suspicion and establishing credibility among the local population. After this first step has been accomplished, the organizer must then agitate the local population by stirring resentments and hostilities in order to overcome apathy and encourage participation. Recruitment is most successfully accomplished through established networks, like unions, gangs, churches, or other extant organizations. Lastly, Alinsky lists 13 “rules” for organizers that act more as general guidelines than hard and fast directives.

**Ang, Cheng Guan. *The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective*. London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940>.**

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet sources.

**Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365>.**

This collection of essays describes how the “bad guys,” whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requisite suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The authors in the volume discuss the tactics used

by anti-World Trade Organization demonstrators during the 1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet and international crime; “hactivism,” or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen. “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/86384874>.**

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because rebels no longer have access to government or state backing, many have turned to looting and other profit-seeking behavior.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785>.**

This edited volume identifies the economic and social factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The authors consider the economic rationality of conflict for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites find war to be more profitable than peace.

**Brittain, James J. *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*. London; New York: Pluto Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/424560012>.**

Brittain offers an insider’s account of the Colombian Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary Colombia.

**Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/472893615>.**

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors

back these movements. In addition, they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.

**Caporaso, James A. “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty.” *International Studies Review* 2, no. 2 (2000): 1–28, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478871654>.**

In this article, Caporaso discusses the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 by the major European powers. The Treaty is significant for modern politics because it was an important first step in the establishment of the modern state system, which was born in Europe after centuries of religious turmoil and comprises a multiplicity of states, each with its own territory and sovereignty. He identifies and clarifies four concepts that together undergird the state system: authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. Lastly, he discusses, using Britain as an example, how this international system is changing in the contemporary era.

**Cassidy, Robert M. “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency.” *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (2006): 47–62, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/109440694>.**

Cassidy describes a shift in national strategic interest to small-scale, protracted warfare emphasizing bolstering local security forces. As early as 2006, national security personnel began to adopt the term “long war” in describing contemporary efforts against insurgents and terrorists. This protracted form of warfare may be replacing large-scale conventional war, giving way to small-scale insurgency operations. As a result, many national strategic documents emphasize the need to build the operational capacity of indigenous security forces of allied partners.

**Clark, Todd. “Forging the Sword: Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) Forces.” *Armor* 115, no. 5 (2006), <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/103749224>.**

Clark discusses his experiences and recommendations in training security forces in Iraq.

**Cobban, Helena. *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629>.**

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources and first-hand recollections.

**Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War.” World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf>**

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one participates in their procurement. On the other hand, collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking behavior because it can potentially provide incentives for participation in armed conflict by the promise of private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war episodes from 1965 to 1995, they find that the risk of conflict does not appear to be significantly increased by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective action presented by the source of grievances, like social fractionalization or government repression, appear to reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in looting rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep profiting from the local population and exploiting resources they have captured.

**Corum, James S. *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/69241012>.**

The author discusses the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies



provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces was generally ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.

**Crawford, George A. *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/465191240>.**

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy would allow the military to counter threats without the expense and turbulence of major military operations. Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.

**Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43095934>.**

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the problems of policing in a divided society. The authors trace the history of Northern Ireland's primary police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its inception in 1922 until its reorganization following the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sympathetic to the insurgent's nationalist demands, affecting how everyday policing was conducted in the region. The authors also discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence in 1969 and the RUC's reorganization in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force in a divided

society while offering alternative models of policing such as community policing and local control.

**English, Richard.** *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51266166>.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

**Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin.** "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096>.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Conventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal war is the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the post-Cold War international system. When per capita income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political instability; rough terrain; and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

**Felbab-Brown, Vanda.** *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515>.

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. Conven-

tional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular support. The author examines Peru's Shining Path, the FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents' popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

**Fukuyama, Francis. "The Imperative of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (2004): 17–31, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/362130890>.**

Weak or failed states are at the root of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS, to drug trafficking and terrorism, to the failure of democracies. While much is known about state-building, transferring strong public institutions to the developing world is difficult. In assessing the capacity of state institutions, Fukuyama distinguishes between the scope of the state, which addresses the breadth of its activities, and the strength of the state, which addresses the ability of the state to achieve its policy objectives. Disentangling the two concepts gives observers a more accurate understanding of the institutional capacity of a given state.

**Gant, Jim. *One Tribe at a Time*. Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/471953295>.**

Major Gant's piece narrates his experiences training, and becoming an integral part of, the fighting force of an Afghan tribe. In what he calls tribal engagement, Gant and his Special Operations team integrated closely with the tribe, becoming "trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families." Gant argues that his foreign internal defense operation in Afghanistan offers a successful blueprint for future efforts with important strategic implications for the U.S. effort in that country and elsewhere.

**Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Berkley Books, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062>.**

Gunaratna's work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al Qaeda's internal operations and personnel. The author includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden's ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of the group's global and Asian networks. Gunaratna's evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

**Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833>.**

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a discrepancy between what men and women think they deserve and what they can actually get in society. The resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

**Hammes, Thomas X. *Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61322326>.**

Hammes argues that fourth-generation warfare, a modern form of insurgency, characterizes the conflicts playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth-generation practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat. Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains focused on changing the minds of decision makers. Politically, it involves transnational, national, and subnational organizations and networks. Operationally, it uses different messages for different audiences, all of which focus on breaking an opponent's political will. Tactically, it utilizes materi-

als present in the society under attack to include industrial chemicals, liquefied natural gas, or fertilizers. Although these modern insurgencies are the only type of war that the United States has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), Hammes notes that they can be overcome, as such successes in the conflicts in Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El Salvador (1980s) indicate.

**Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967>.**

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of pragmatic politics.

**Herbst, J. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa.” *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517>.**

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. In particular, those movements that face competent national militaries will have to evolve into viable armies while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and pursue economic agendas.

**Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37923319>.**

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the *Leviathan* is among the most influential works of political theory written in the modern era. In it, Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which encourages them to contract, or

consent, with one another to form political society. A strong sovereign, whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

**Hopgood, Stephen.** “*Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.*” In *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860>.

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

**Horowitz, Donald L.** *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982>.

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic identities may be particularly salient because alternative common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is in some circumstances malleable.

**Hudson, Rex A.** “*Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.*” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53312538>.

This report assesses the activities of organized crime groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics related to the issue of the transnational criminal and terror nexus.

**Jones, D. “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter.” Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/128284158>.**

In this thesis, Jones addresses the ongoing debate within the Special Forces community regarding whether unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are applicable in contemporary and future Special Operations environments as they are currently defined and operationalized. In regard to unconventional warfare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching term for efforts against nonstate actors in the Global War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign internal defense. His thesis argues that unconventional warfare needs a clear and concise definition and furthermore that it should not be transformed to fight global insurgency. He identifies a transitional point between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense signifying the change from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense. Moreover, the operational preparation of the environment is not unconventional warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own doctrine. Lastly, these three concepts, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational preparation of the environment, will be the dominate Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.

**Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/12975032>.**

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

**Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” *Political Geography* 20, no. 5 (2001): 561–84, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247>.**

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, timber, or gems

to substitute for dwindling Cold War sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources. Le Billon examines theories of relationships between resources and armed conflicts and the historical processes in which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the risks of violence linked to the conflictuality of natural resource political economies, and the opportunities for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of resources.

**Lichbach, Mark Irving. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471>.**

The rebel's dilemma holds that according to the theory of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the free rider. Lichbach's book is largely about the solutions used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective dissent, including when they are adopted and when they are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel's dilemma within the context of the market, community, contract, and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify collective action problems, a struggle constituting the primary political struggle between opposition and the state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the processes used in overcoming the problem of collective action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action in any given situation, not just conflict.

**Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Translated by Harvey Claflin Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11623750>.**



Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, especially those founders of new regimes and orders. In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how it actually manifests in human society. The result is a text that recommends princes and politicians to use all means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. The text is considered by some to be the first modern treatment of the science of politics.

**Malaquias, Assis. “Diamonds are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy.” *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478629614>.**

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, Malaquias suggests that control of important diamond-producing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national and international levels. The author also highlights the political and military miscalculations committed by the rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large sums of money into rebel coffers.

**Maley, William, ed. *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. New York: New York University Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38130751>.**

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its military capabilities and tactics, external support, and the failures of the pre-Taliban government. Following sections include pieces on the role of outside actors in relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a Western model.

**Manwaring, Max G.** *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59823190>.

The author explains the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs to insurgency in terms of the instability it wreaks upon government and its challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency.

**McCuen, John J.** *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency.* London: Faber, 1966, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2423079>.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the long term, and the counterinsurgent government must maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

**Piazza, James.** “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343>.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and regional

cleavages in society—is positively related to incidences of terrorist activity.

**Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343>.**

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. national security from terrorist and other extremist organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by groups that embrace Al Qaeda's worldview but are not formally part of the organization; threats posed by other extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

**Ramsey, Robert D. *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71845317>.**

Ramsey observes the FID lessons learned by the U.S. Army in their advising capacity in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Among the key points are the need for advisors to have extensive language and cultural training and technical and tactical skills training, although the latter ranks less in importance than the former. Additionally, a successful mission requires that the host nation actively support performance-based selection, training, and promotion.

**Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43840039>.**

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic fundamentalism, explaining how the organization rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the "Great Game" of Central Asia; the role of regional and international powers; the historical tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

**Reed, B. “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.”** *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (2007): 19–30, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/161784355>.

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author argues that conventional understanding and strategies need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, units, and organizations among armed groups.

**Rotberg, Robert I., ed. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557>.**

A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of state failure by the editor as well as prescriptions for both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

**Rubin, Barnett. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888>.**

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the Afghan state from its early 19th-century roots. From the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, sources. The result was a state divided from its society. The following communist revolution “from above” left the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin movement against the Soviet incursions, whose development Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth account of state-building, civil war, and the context of the international system.

**Rubin, Barry M. *Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849>.**

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin catalogues the PLO's evolving method of operations, from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

**Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177>.**

Ghorayeb provides an insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

**Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53972026>.**

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the web of interconnections that link its members. Using social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among "cliques" of young Muslims who encourage one another to wage jihad and the "strength of the weaker ties," or the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

**Saskiewicz, Paul E. *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal Enterprise*. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166>.**

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC's criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of its base.

**Shelley, Louise. "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11 (2005): 101-12, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040>.**

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship between the state, transnational organized crime, and terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom operate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.

**Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill. *Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism*. National Institute of Justice, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62713393>.**

Researchers commonly believe that the link between criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the authors develop a methodology for identifying crime-terror interactions derived from a standard intelligence framework that has proven useful in law enforcement investigations.

**Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763>.**

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is often interwoven with the local organization of society. In the non-Western world, this often means confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics suitable for the operating environment. The authors provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed

groups into more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.

**Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer. *Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/58451801>.**

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplinary framework of analysis for improving understanding of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

**Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution 1978*, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/243910663>.**

Tilly's work attempts to understand and explain the process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he develops a theory of political opportunity structure to explain how and why collective action develops. The theory of political opportunity structures evaluates the extent to which existing political systems facilitate independent organization and collective action by the citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence their development, their immediate outcomes, and their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred by those choices in the political and social world in which they find themselves. The relationship between political opportunity structure and collective action is described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are to engage in collective action because less costly and difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether

organizational or cognitive, to engage in collective action. As a result, collective action is most likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between neither too much repression nor too much openness that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.

———. **“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”** In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11785182>.

Tilly, a prominent sociologist, describes a model for the development of the state analogous to the maturation of organized crime syndicates. In Europe, the state and war making capabilities developed out of organizations resembling protection rackets. However, vigorous resistance by local populations modulated the state’s harmful effects. By contrast, states developing in the contemporary area have little constraints placed on their actions by the population, making the organized crime analogy more apt. This points to a key divergence in the experience of state formation in the European and developing world systems.

**Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63807665>.**

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying social movements propose here to unite the previously fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, public claim-making of groups where the government is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms of contention are studied under the same framework. What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse events have universal, or common laws, explaining their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways across the spectrum of contentious politics,



with different combinations producing different results. Such mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or relational (or working on connections among groups, people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms include: mobilization, political identity formation, and elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and research social contention.

**Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. *Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/273816706>.**

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some terrorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance their activities.

**Urban, Mark. *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*. London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31242701>.**

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how the British executed tasks in the field.

**Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217>.**

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences to understand relationships among social entities rather than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social network analysis methodology highlights actors and their actions as interdependent; relational ties among actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial resources; and network models that map the constraints and opportunities provided by the network structural environment.

**West, Bing. *The Village*. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51491677>.**

As a first-hand observer, West recounts the experiences of a small Marine unit sent to a village in Vietnam as military advisors to defend and train local militiamen.

**Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Knopf, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193>.**

Wright's work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI's counterterrorist chief John O'Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial information that could have potentially averted 9/11.

## II. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT)

### INTRODUCTION

The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* cites success in counterterrorism operations as necessary “whole-of-government capability” in light of analyses of the future security environment. Such operations were largely left to law enforcement agencies and SOF before the events of 9/11. Since those attacks, and the subsequent launch of the GWOT, CT efforts have also become the domain of conventional forces. Terrorist groups have evolved and adapted to operate more effectively in the contemporary security environment. Previously, nationalist and secular groups were largely responsible for the use of terror tactics, supported by state sponsors such as the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, terrorist groups initially declined but shortly thereafter made a precipitous rise. Terrorists, or any group or using terror tactics, can be found among the ranks of local insurgents, organized criminal syndicates, or part of a larger international terrorist network. Moreover, terrorist groups have increasingly also adopted terrorism not only as a tactic to induce fear in target populations, but have elevated terrorism to a “transnational threat of strategic proportion.”<sup>26</sup> CT is recognized as a part of IW and, as such, is directed not only to neutralizing enemy combatants but also to erode popular support for extremist ideologies. Central to the CT doctrine is the recognition that unfulfillment of basic human needs is often a motivating factor in support of terrorist activities. Men and women, regardless of their national, cultural, or religious affiliations desire security; control over their social and political order; a meaningful and viable livelihood; and a society that reflects their cherished values.<sup>27</sup>

Counterterrorism or CT refers to a set of tasks falling under the larger umbrella of combating terrorism, or CbT. CbT is defined as “actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.”<sup>28</sup> CT is a narrower mission, one in which “actions [are] taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” CT operations comprise both direct and indirect approaches to “prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” SOF involvement in CT includes, but is not limited to, intelligence operations,

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<sup>26</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-26 Counterterrorism* (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 2009), I-1.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, I-11–I-12.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, I-2.

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attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructure, and other non-kinetic activities associated with defeating extremist ideologies that nurture terrorist organizations.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), II-9.

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**‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169>.**

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The essays included in the volume highlight the salience of the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms of political and social institutions.

**Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857>.**

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, and suicide attacks.

**Abrahms, Max. “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy.” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 78–105, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366012473>.**

Counterterrorism cannot be successful without understanding what terrorists “really want.” The strategic model, the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies, holds that terrorists become terrorists when their calculations predict the expected political gains of terrorist action minus the costs outweigh the benefits of any other possible form of protest. As a result, counterterrorists attempt to defeat terrorists by minimizing their political gains. However, this model has not been tested. In this article, Abrahms tests the validity of the argument, finding that terrorists use terrorism primarily to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists.

**Alexander, Yonah. *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/65203744>.**

In this edited volume, experts examine the counterterrorist strategies of six nations for successes and failures. The counterterrorist strategies of the United States against Al Qaeda, Italy against the Red Brigade, Germany against the Red Army faction, France's struggle against various separatist and international terrorists, Sri Lanka's long battle with the Tamil Tigers, and Egypt's experience with Islamic terrorism are analyzed and compared.

**Ang, Cheng Guan. *The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940>.**

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet sources.

**Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Networks: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365>.**

This collection of essays describes how the "bad guys," whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requisite suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The authors in the volume discuss the tactics used by anti-World Trade Organization demonstrators during the 1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet and international crime; "hactivism," or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.

**Aussaresses, Paul. *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957*. Translated by Robert L. Miller. New York: Enigma Books, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49396263>.**

General Paul Aussaresses' memoir details the brutal counterterrorist campaign against Algerian insurgents during the Algerian War. His controversial, and some argue failed, methods include torture and summary execution.

**Bell, J. Bowyer.** *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38248965>.

Bell offers an analysis of the underground world of insurgent and terrorist networks, drawing on examples from the IRA, Holy Jihad, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian fedayeen, among others. Utilizing decades of research experience in the midst of armed struggles, Bell offers a look at the subtle, inner dynamics of violent political movements. He emphasizes the theatricality of terrorist tactics; the normality and sometimes reluctance of the gunman; and the difficulties of mixing political pragmatism with the utopian goals of many insurgent movements.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen.** “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/86384874>.

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because rebels no longer have access to government or state backing, many have turned to looting and other profit-seeking behavior.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds.** *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785>.

This edited volume identifies the economic and social factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The authors consider the economic rationality of conflict for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites find war to be more profitable than peace.

**Bowman, James.** *Honor: A History*. New York: Encounter Books, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867>.

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman argues, is crucial to under-

standing the culture of the Islamic world and its grievances against the West.

**Bremer, L. Paul III.** *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.* Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorism, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/45700058>.

This article, presented by the National Commission on Terrorism, discusses the changing threat of international terrorism, intelligence as a weapon against international terrorism, and aggressive strategies against terrorism.

**Brittain, James J.** *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP.* London; New York: Pluto Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/424560012>.

Brittain offers an insider's account of the Colombian Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary Colombia.

**Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan.** *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/472893615>.

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back these movements. In addition, they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.

**Choueiri, Youssef M.** *Islamic Fundamentalism.* London: Continuum, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/249033120>.

By viewing Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to modern civilizations and political structure, the author presents an analysis of how and why Islamic values have become such a potent contemporary political force. This book presents a definition of Islamic fundamentalism that links it to Muslim traditions since the 18th century from diverse areas such as Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Choueiri examines how these traditions have played out in contemporary Islamic movements like Hamas, the Taliban, and Egyptian Islamist Association.



**Cline, Lawrence.** “Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 10 (2007): 889–99, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/211195507>.

The authors discuss terrorism and the GSPC, or the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. The group has maintained a small but significant level of terrorist unrest in the countries of the Sahel for a number of years. Although GSPC activities have been rather small-scale, they have added to the host of other security failures plaguing the region. The U.S. has begun devoting more attention to the regional security gaps and has started to implement an overall strategy in response. Cline maintains that the more broadly based approaches to dealing with security, economic, and political problems show promise, but only if their focus remains on the long term.

**Cobban, Helena.** *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629>.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing on the central role played by Al-Fatch, Cobban describes the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources and first-hand recollections.

**Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler.** “Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War.” World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf>.

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one participates in their procurement. On the other hand, collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking behavior because it can potentially provide incentives for participation in armed conflict by the promise of private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war episodes from 1965 to

1995, they find that the risk of conflict does not appear to be significantly increased by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective action presented by the source of grievances, like social fractionalization or government repression, appear to reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in looting rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep profiting from the local population and exploiting resources they have captured.

**Crawford, George A. *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/465191240>.**

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy would allow the military to counter threats without the expense and turbulence of major military operations. Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.

**Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478049995>.**

In investigating the underlying causes of terrorist activity, Crenshaw highlights the political and social contexts in which terrorism is likely to arise. She argues that terrorist groups are drawn from disaffected segments of elite population, rather than from mass discontent or deep societal cleavages, that take it upon themselves to act for a majority. In the centralized modern state, such disaffection is unlikely to be effectively addressed, leaving terrorism as an attractive strategy to achieve their objectives. Lastly, while motivations for terrorism vary widely, the psychological mechanisms of group interactions, like commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty,

and revenge, are better explanations of terrorist activity than individual psychological makeup.

———. **“The Causes of Terrorism, Past and Present.”** In *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles W. Kegley. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50198425>.

In examining terrorist behavior, Crenshaw argues that beginning from the characteristics required of terrorist activity is more fruitful than looking for common personality types. She notes that in addition to acceptance of extreme personal danger, terrorist activity requires group solidarity, pointing to the necessity of a study of group dynamics rather than individual psychology, for best explaining terrorist behavior. Groups establish and reaffirm notions of self-righteousness, the image of a hostile world, and a sense of mission.

———. **“The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.”** *Political Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2000): 405–20, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/482569425>.

Crenshaw reviews terrorist and counterterrorist research and points to salutary ways of thinking about the definition of terrorism, the psychology of terrorism, and forms of terrorism. In her review of the psychology of terrorism, she argues that the motivations for terrorism are best understood in terms of group solidarity and shared ideological commitment rather than as a result of specific “terrorist profiles” or psychological disorders. In addition, she cautions analysts against theorizing a rise of a “new” terrorism in the contemporary era.

**Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52962946>.**

This edited volume is a compilation of essays on terrorism and counterterrorism by leading scholars and policy makers in the field. The first section includes articles on the sources of contemporary terrorism (Audrey K. Cronin), the four waves of modern terrorism (David C. Rapoport), and U.S. strategies for deterring terrorism (Martha Crenshaw). The next section details counterterrorist deterrence from a number of perspectives such as diplomacy (Michael A. Sheehan), intelligence (Paul Pillar), military force (Timothy D. Hoyt),

and others. Concluding sections detail a comprehensive counterterrorist “grand strategy.”

**Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43095934>.**

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the problems of policing in a divided society. The authors trace the history of Northern Ireland’s primary police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its inception in 1922 until its reorganization following the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sympathetic to the insurgent’s nationalist demands, affecting how everyday policing was conducted in the region. The authors also discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence in 1969 and the RUC’s reorganization in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force in a divided society while offering alternative models of policing such as community policing and local control.

**English, Richard. *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51266166>.**

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

**Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. *America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38856210>.**

This book focuses on the vulnerability of all open societies to terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons share three characteristics: immense lethality, portability, and accessibility. A covert NBC attack could be carried out in peacetime or during war and could target civilians, military forces, or infrastructure. The nature of nonstate violence is changing in a way that strongly suggests risking NBC risks. The consequences of covert NBC attacks and terrorism are massive casualties, contamination, panic, degraded response capabilities, economic damage, loss of strategic position, and social-psychological damage and political change. Recommendations to reduce the vulnerability of the United States included establishing an NBC response center; reinvigorating the intelligence community; improving the detection of small-scale NBC weapons programs; and improving capability for post-attack attribution.

**Felbab-Brown, Vanda. *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515>.**

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. Conventional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular support. The author examines Peru's Shining Path, the FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents' popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

**Forest, James J. F., ed. *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/230811941>.**

This edited series includes three volumes of essays by scholars, military, and intelligence personnel on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The series addresses understanding and defeating terrorist and insurgent threats. The first volume, *Strategic and Tactical Considerations*, considers the use of differing instruments of national power through which states pursue counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts—hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence. The next volume in the series, *Sources and Facilitators*, covers state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, networks of trade and trafficking, and various societal issues. The final volume, *Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency*, includes a number of case studies, including singular terrorist operations such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as long-term counterinsurgent and counterterrorist efforts like ETA, the LTTE, the Shining Path, and Israeli efforts against numerous Palestinian organizations.

**Ganor, Boaz, ed. *Countering Suicide Terrorism*. Herzliya, Israel: Interdisciplinary Center Projects Pub. House, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49911201>.**

This edited volume is a compilation of conference proceedings presided over by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Leading scholars and intelligence experts on terrorism, including Martha Crenshaw and Ehud Shprinzak, contributed research on suicide terrorism. The contributors provide historical perspective on suicide terrorism and address the phenomena of suicide attacks in different regions in the world, with a focus on Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Lebanon, and Turkey.

**Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Berkley Books, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062>.**

Gunaratna's work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al Qaeda's internal operations and personnel. The author includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden's ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of the group's global and Asian networks. Gunaratna's evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

**Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833>.**

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a discrepancy between what men and women think they deserve and what they can actually get in society. The resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

**Hafez, Mohammed. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 1 (2007): 95–115, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/102978918>.**

Jihadists in Iraq are adept at using various media to construct myths of heroic martyrdom, demonize intended targets, and appeal to potential recruits across the Muslim world. The jihadists use three primary narratives in service of these goals: humiliation of Muslims at hands of foreigners; impotence of official Muslim governments; and redemption through faithful sacrifice.

**Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967>.**

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of pragmatic politics.

**Herbst, J. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa.” *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517>.**

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. In particular, those movements that face competent national militaries will have to evolve into

viable armies while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and pursue economic agendas.

**Heymann, Philip B. *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52418129>.**

Heymann argues that diplomacy, intelligence, and international law should play a larger role than military action in U.S. counterterrorism policy. Rather than waging “war” against terrorism, the United States needs a broader range of policies. Heymann believes that many of the policies adopted since September 11—including trials before military tribunals, secret detentions, and the subcontracting of interrogation to countries where torture is routine—are at odds with American political and legal traditions and create disturbing precedents. He argues that these policies are the logical consequences of the government declaring its response to terrorism to be a “war.” Unlike conventional wars with more or less clearly defined beginnings, ends, and enemies, the fight against terrorism is open-ended and conducted on multiple fronts against a loosely confederated international network of groups and individuals.

**Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37923319>.**

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the *Leviathan* is among the most influential works of political theory written in the modern era. In it, Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which encourages them to contract, or consent, with one another to form political society. A strong sovereign, whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

**Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21026149>.**



Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of mass movements, and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also details the behavior of mass movements once they have formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer's book has remained an influential and widely read work since its publication in the early 1950s.

**Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/39085494>.**

Hoffman provides a solid introduction to the study of terrorism in this volume. Early chapters explore the definition of terrorism and its evolution into contemporary forms. Hoffman also examines the connection between religion and terrorism; the internationalization of terrorism; and how terrorist groups have developed and used sophisticated communications campaigns to further their objectives.

**Hoffman, Bruce, and Gordon H. McCormick. "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 4 (2004): 243–81, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/363940862>.**

The authors examine the strategic utility of suicide terrorism, arguing it can be thought of as a form of strategic "signaling." They define terrorism as a signaling game in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group's character and objectives to a set of target audiences. This is followed by an examination of the utility of suicide attacks as a signaling tactic. The relative effectiveness of suicide operations is evaluated in relation to other tactical options that are traditionally available to terrorist organizations. They conclude by examining the institutional and social context of suicide terrorism, in particular the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

**Hopgood, Stephen. "Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002." In *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860>.**

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

**Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982>.**

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic identities may be particularly salient because alternative common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is in some circumstances malleable.

**Hudson, Rex A. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53312538>.**

This report assesses the activities of organized crime groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics related to the issue of the transnational criminal and terror nexus.

**Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/231745621>.**

While many researchers address the origins of terrorist groups, Jones and Libicki research the most effective methods for ending terrorist groups. Using statistical analysis of 650 terrorist groups, the authors conclude that the most effective methods involve arrest and killing of key members by local police and intelligence agencies and inclusion of terrorist groups in the political process. They argue that policing and

intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against Al Qaeda.

**Juergensmeyer, Mark.** *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52109207>.

The author undertakes a comparative study of religious terrorism using extensive interviews with participants. Juergensmeyer compares Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Sikh, and Buddhist advocates of religiously inspired violence. His analysis indicates that within the logic of religious violence, violence takes on symbolic rather than strictly strategic significance. Those participating in the acts regard them as religious performances in a cosmic war of good against evil. In sociological terms, these performances also empower the alienated and marginalized in society. Juergensmeyer concludes by suggesting solutions to the problem of religious violence by providing more outlets for religion in public life.

**Kilcullen, David.** *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/221155251>.

Kilcullen offers a perspective on modern warfare that distinguishes localized conflict from global conflicts like the War on Terror. He argues that the U.S. military often erroneously conflates these localized struggles, the “accidental guerrilla,” with worldwide terror networks.

———. “Countering Global Insurgency.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/356605661>.

Kilcullen was among the first to suggest that the War on Terrorism was a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency. In order to be effective, counterinsurgent and counterterrorism tactics should be adapted to this new phenomenon to include “disaggregation,” breaking or dismantling the links of the global jihad.

**Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malecková.** “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/479675285>.

Policymakers and scholars have frequently called for increased aid and educational assistance to combat terror-

ism. Krueger and Malecková argue, however, that low market opportunities or poor education have little to do with participation in terrorist activity. Instead, they point to the importance of political conditions and feelings of “indignity and frustration” as better markers for terrorist participation.

**Laqueur, Walter.** *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Laqueur investigates the evolution of terrorist activity from ancient times until the present.

**Le Billon, Philippe.** “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” *Political Geography* 20, no. 5 (2001): 561–84, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247>.

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources. Le Billon examines theories of relationships between resources and armed conflicts and the historical processes in which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the risks of violence linked to the conflictuality of natural resource political economies, and the opportunities for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of resources.

**Leiken, Robert S.** “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2005): 120–35, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480358539>.

Radical Islam is spreading across Europe among descendants of Muslim immigrants. Leiken discusses how, disenfranchised and disillusioned by the failure of integration, some European Muslims are taking up jihad against the West.

**Lewis, Bernard.** *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East.* New York: Schocken Books, 1999, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052>.

Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the domestic, regional, and international tensions of the modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. *The Political Language of Islam.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191>.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis traces the growth and development of Islamic political language from the Prophet and the promulgation of the Qur'an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse in modern times.

**Lichbach, Mark Irving.** *The Rebel's Dilemma.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471>.

The rebel's dilemma holds that according to the theory of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the free rider. Lichbach's book is largely about the solutions used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective dissent, including when they are adopted and when they are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel's dilemma within the context of the market, community, contract, and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify collective action problems, a struggle constituting the primary political struggle between opposition and the state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the processes

used in overcoming the problem of collective action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action in any given situation, not just conflict.

**Lynch, Marc. "Al-Qaeda's Media Strategies: Jihad Is as Virtual as It Is Real." *The National Interest* no. 83 (2006), <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/101299221>.**

Al Qaeda has exploited the potentials of Arab media to communicate its message to followers and potential recruits since its inception. However, Lynch argues that the media environment in the Arab world has changed dramatically since the onset of Al Qaeda's global insurgency. In particular, Al-Jazeera has increasingly offered an alternative voice to radical Islamists dominating the air and cyber waves. Often misunderstood as simply anti-Israeli, anti-American, and unqualified supporters of radical Islamists like Al Qaeda in the West, Al-Jazeera's programs are also anchored by unveiled women, include talk show hosts vociferously opposed to bin Laden's ideology, and feature favorable coverage of democratic elections and developments in the Middle East. Other Arab media outlets have followed suit. The most important combatants of the jihadists is not, as some think, U.S. propaganda, but the ideas of Arab nationalists and moderate Islamists who offer a compelling, and homegrown, alternative to the political discourse of the jihadists.

**Macdonald, Douglas J. *The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy*. Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/634910022>.**

Macdonald argues that the "clash of civilizations" is not yet occurring but rather is the goal of radical Islamist grand strategy. Like the fascist and communist totalitarians before them, they cannot allow alternative value systems to flourish in areas under their control. Instead, they seek to spread their totalitarian beliefs to Muslim societies to encourage a violent "clash" with non-Muslim societies. As a result, little room for negotiation exists between the West and radical Islamists of the totalitarian ilk.

**Makiya, Kanan. *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38079204>.**

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, Makiya describes how the Ba'athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly refined techniques of fear used by the Ba'athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success of the Ba'athist regime can be understood against this backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.

**Maley, William, ed. *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. New York: New York University Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38130751>.**

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its military capabilities and tactics, external support, and the failures of the pre-Taliban government. The following sections include pieces on the role of outside actors in relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a Western model.

**McCallister, William. "The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion." *First Monday* 10, no. 3 (2005), <http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215>.**

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and the Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the motivations and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

**McCuen, John J. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency*. London: Faber, 1966, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2423079>.**

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the long term, and the counterinsurgent government must maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

**Oberschall, Anthony.** “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory.” *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/485995310>.

Terrorism is an extreme, violent response to a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues. Applying the theory of collective action, the author explains the dynamic of violence escalation and persistence. Recent Islamist terrorism stems from the conviction that a theocracy is the only answer to the multiple problems of Middle Eastern and Muslim countries. Checks on terrorism result both from external social control and from the internal contradictions of theocratic states.

**Olson, Mancur.** *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909>.

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory of collective action. According to his theory, rational, self-interested individuals will not pursue collective goods, or those that will be of benefit to all in society, because of the problem of “free riding,” or the logic that supposes the collective goods will be available to one through the work of others whether or not one actually expends efforts in procuring them. Olson argues that because of the problem of free riding, mobilization, or collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, or distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the group is small enough that the benefits will be worth the expended cost to procure them.

**O’Neill, Bard E.** *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57465511>.

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case studies include insurgencies in the past several decades as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

**Packer, George.** “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of Insurgency.” *The New Yorker* (2006), <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/101605816>.



Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate. Both discuss the importance of “knowing the enemy” and the key role social science can play in this strategy. Highlights include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in insurgent participation.

**Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”** *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 343–61, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365004917>.

To advance understanding of the growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism, Pape analyzes the universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, 188 in all. He shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Moreover, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it works. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. As a result, Western democracies should pursue policies that teach terrorists that the lesson of the 1980s and 1990s no longer applies, policies which in practice may have more to do with improving homeland security than with offensive military action.

**Pelletiere, Stephen C. *A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/33372632>.**

Pelletiere examines the origins of numerous fundamentalist groups posing a security threat to some of the most adept security services in the world. Developing a theory of fundamentalism, Pelletiere maintains that the most appropriate method to quell the groups’ influence is not repression, which has not proved successful, but exploiting divisions within the movements between the more socially constructive and violent elements.

**Petraeus, D. H. “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” *Military Review* 86 (2006): 45–55, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/204243520>.**

Highlighting that the U.S.’s superior conventional power makes it likely that future threats will be asymmetrical, Petraeus catalogs 14 observations gathered from his experiences during the Iraq counterinsurgency efforts.

**Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343>.**

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages in society—is positively related to incidences of terrorist activity.

**Pillar, Paul R. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/637306727>.**

Pillar analyzes whether the tenets of U.S. official counterterrorist policy—make no concessions; bring them to justice for their crimes; isolate and pressure state terrorist sponsors; and others—are effective deterrents. In looking at the nature of varying terrorist groups, he determines the most effective policies appropriate for each. Pillar also examines states that sponsor, or enable, terrorist activity, why the United States is a prime terrorist target, and other crucial aspects of terrorism, concluding with recommendations for amendments to U.S. counterterrorist policy.

**Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343>.**

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. national security from terrorist and other extremist organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by groups that embrace Al Qaeda's worldview but are not formally part of the organization; threats posed by other extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

**Rapoport, David C., ed. *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16832545>.**

In this edited volume, the contributors outline the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations, their patterns of organizational behavior, and sources of ideological inspiration. Authors examine, in turn, the "instrumental approach" to terrorist organizations that focuses on the group as intentional, strategic actors pursuing ideological goals. Other contributors approach terrorist groups from an "organizational" perspective that see terrorist behavior as a complex amalgam of personal intentions and organizational motives such as factional conflict, the cost of entering and exiting the group, and others. Terrorist groups covered include the Quebec Liberation Front, the Shining Path, the PLO, Gush Emunim, Sikh terrorism, and Armenian terrorism.

**Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43840039>.**

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic fundamentalism, explaining how the organization rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the "Great Game" of Central Asia; the role of regional and international powers; the

historical tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

**Reed, B. "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency." *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (2007): 19–30, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/161784355>.**

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author argues that conventional understanding and strategies need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, units, and organizations among armed groups.

**Reuter, Christoph. *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53901226>.**

Many theories exist as to why an individual would wish to become a suicide bomber. Popular views portray them as crazed fanatics or brainwashed. Using extensive interviews with the friends, relatives, and trainers of suicide bombers, and "would-be" martyrs, Reuters argues that the primary motivation of suicide bombing is a heroic dynamic. Individuals appear to be more concerned with making a "mark," and how their lives will be remembered, than the promise of eternal reward.

**Richardson, Louise. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*. New York: Random House, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64771109>.**

The author argues that while terrorist movements have differing ideologies and goals, they often follow similar paths. Their beginnings, the strata of society drawn to political violence, and participant motivations, especially a sense of injustice, are among the commonalities. Richardson also discusses general methods of countering terrorist activity.

**Rotberg, Robert I., ed. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557>.**

A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of state failure by

the editor as well as prescriptions for both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

**Rubin, Barnett.** *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888>.

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the Afghan state from its early 19th-century roots. From the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, sources. The result was a state divided from its society. The following communist revolution “from above” left the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin movement against the Soviet incursions, whose development Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth account of state-building, civil war, and the context of the international system.

**Rubin, Barry M.** *Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849>.

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

**Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal.** *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion.* London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177>.

Ghorayeb provides an insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

**Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53972026>.**

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the web of interconnections that link its members. Using social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among “cliques” of young Muslims who encourage one another to wage jihad and the “strength of the weaker ties,” or the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

**Saskiewicz, Paul E. *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise*. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166>.**

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of its base.

**Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21375275>.**

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate groups of society against the powerful despite their often public displays of deference to domination. Such groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations between the power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics different, but no less

important, than more overt forms of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

**Shelley, Louise.** “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11 (2005): 101–12, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040>.

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship between the state, transnational organized crime, and terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom operate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.

**Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill.** *Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism*. National Institute of Justice, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62713393>.

Researchers commonly believe that the link between criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the authors develop a methodology for identifying crime-terror interactions derived from a standard intelligence framework that has proven useful in law enforcement investigations.

**Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew.** *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763>.

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is

often interwoven with the local organization of society. In the non-Western world, this often means confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics suitable for the operating environment. The authors provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed groups into more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.

**Silke, Andrew. "Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research." *Psychology, Crime, and Law* 4, no. 1 (1998): 51–70, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/211281236>.**

Silke examines the long-running attempt to apply a psychopathology label to terrorists, particularly antisocial, narcissistic, and paranoid personality disorders. However, the research findings supporting the pathology model are rare and generally of poor quality. In contrast, the evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both more plentiful and of better quality.

———. *Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences*. Chichester, West Sussex, England; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50959030>.

In this edited volume, the contributors investigate terrorist activity from a psychological perspective rather than a political, ethnic, or religious one. The essays examine individual psychology of terrorists, such as family, societal, and personality influences; the impact of terrorist activity on victims and society; and proper methods of responding to terrorism from this psychological perspective.

**Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480862154>.**

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for collective action, or social movements. They claim that not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and



transmit and diffuse their interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, or “schematas of interpretation,” that help individuals explain occurrences and events within the context of their lives and the world at large. In doing so, frames make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement organizations strategically align their frames with the values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in order to encourage participation in collective action. The underlying premise is that some sort of frame alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The authors identify and explain four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

**Stern, Jessica. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: Ecco, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52030499>.**

Relying on extensive interviews with extremists adhering to various religions and ideologies, the author finds that extremist movements, whether Islamic or Christian, have much in common. She explains how terrorist organizations are formed by opportunistic leaders who recruit the disenfranchised using religion as motivation and justification. That moral fervor is then transformed in organizations that strive for money, power, and attention.

**Taillon, J. Paul de B. *The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43977888>.**

Elite military forces have been at the forefront of security threats from low-intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist activity. In this volume, Taillon writes an account of the development of U.S. and British Special Forces counterterrorist roles. Taillon examines British Special Forces activities in Malaya, Borneo, Oman, and Northern Ireland and other missions such as the Iranian Embassy siege in London. He takes U.S. operations in Greece, Korea, and Vietnam and others such as Operation Eagle Claw under consideration. Taillon compiles a list of necessary requirements for successful hostage rescue missions; intergovernmental cooperation in intelligence gathering and dissemination; forward basing of counterterrorist assets; and others. While British forces

often met these full requirements, U.S. forces did not, leading to the former's relative successes and the latter's failures.

**Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer.** *Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/58451801>.

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplinary framework of analysis for improving understanding of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

**Tilly, Charles.** *From Mobilization to Revolution 1978*, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/243910663>.

Tilly's work attempts to understand and explain the process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he develops a theory of political opportunity structure to explain how and why collective action develops. The theory of political opportunity structures evaluates the extent to which existing political systems facilitate independent organization and collective action by the citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence their development, their immediate outcomes, and their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred by those choices in the political and social world in which they find themselves. The relationship between political opportunity structure and collective action is described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are to engage in collective action because less costly and difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether

organizational or cognitive, to engage in collective action. As a result, collective action is most likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between neither too much repression nor too much openness that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.

**Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63807665>.**

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying social movements propose here to unite the previously fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, public claim-making of groups where the government is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms of contention are studied under the same framework. What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse events have universal, or common laws, explaining their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or relational (or working on connections among groups, people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms include: mobilization, political identity formation, and elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and research social contention.

**Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. *Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/273816706>.**

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the globe in one area

of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some terrorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance their activities.

**Urban, Mark. *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*. London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31242701>.**

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how the British executed tasks in the field.

**Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217>.**

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences to understand relationships among social entities rather than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social network analysis methodology highlights actors and their actions as interdependent; relational ties among actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial resources; and network models that map the constraints and opportunities provided by the network structural environment.

**Weinberg, Leonard. "Turning to Terror: The Conditions Under which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (1991): 423–38, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478063493>.**

Political parties are often regarded as benign institutions critical to democratic political order. Yet, in recent decades, as in the case of Hizbullah, political parties have often been associated with organizations committed to terrorist activity.

Weinberg examines the relationship between the two seemingly dissimilar organizations. He notes that links between the two have increased. The appearance and disappearance of terrorist organizations, furthermore, is often linked to developments internal to political parties alongside those in the political system in which they operate. Additionally, political parties likely to spawn or harbor terrorist organizations often have grandiose goals, sometimes which meet little success at the polls, and a commitment to the illegitimacy of the prevailing political order.

**Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Knopf, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193>.**

Wright's work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI's counterterrorist chief John O'Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial information that could have potentially averted 9/11.



### III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)

#### INTRODUCTION

Secretary Gates called UW the “soul of the Special Forces,” a “uniquely” Special Forces mission. However, settling on an exact definition of unconventional warfare and what activities constitute it has not been without controversy. As the environment in which SOF operates changes, so too has the understanding of UW altered. Most recently, in a January 2011 publication, the Army established the following definition of UW, describing it as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operations through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area.”<sup>30</sup> UW operations also usually occur as part of a larger mission undertaken by conventional forces or other U.S. government agencies. The focus on UW activity, as opposed to a specific operation, brings attention to the fact that UW is not something practiced solely by the U.S., or even by SOF. Rather, the concept describes activities - the enabling of resistance movements - taking place across the globe. In this regard, UW is conducted by numerous organizations, from Hizbullah in Lebanon to FARC in Colombia, among a host of others.<sup>31</sup>

UW encompasses a broad range of military activities. As a careful reading of the definition notes, UW is more than the overthrowing of governments as it can also aim to “coerce and disrupt” legitimate powers without necessarily replacing them.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, UWs’ practitioners develop not only

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<sup>30</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, January 2011* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-1. As suggested by the definition participants of the resistance are always indigenous. Foreign fighters and UW practitioners are not technically considered part of the insurgency. *Ibid.*, 2-1.

<sup>31</sup> David S. Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional Warfare? Why Is It So Important? A Quick Response to Robert Haddick,” *Small Wars Journal*, April 25, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/why-does-special-forces-train/> (accessed May 5, 2011). Maxwell even notes that while the War on Terror and against other violent extremists is often thought of in terms of counterinsurgency, that what in fact is taking place is a countering of unconventional warfare operations. Additionally, he notes that the updated definition listed may not sufficiently address threats to U.S. interests increasingly posed by non-state actors. Practitioners of UW might find themselves confronting organizations, like Hizbullah in Lebanon, that are quasi-states residing within a traditional sovereign state. These quasi-states provide many of the same services to their “citizens” as does the traditional state in addition to holding similar, or even superior, resources, such as advanced military capabilities. However, such actors do not necessarily fall under the current UW definition, which describes only legitimate states and occupying powers. Others, like Col. David Witt, more doctrinally purist, argue that confronting such enemies falls under other SOF missions such as counterterrorism. See the engaging discussion regarding the updated UW definition at the *Small Wars Journal* website, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/this-week-at-war-do-we-still-n/>.

<sup>32</sup> Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train?”

the guerrilla force, or the traditional fighting force, but also the underground as well as supporting auxiliaries for both.<sup>33</sup> These combined efforts serve to produce the end result of UW campaigns.<sup>34</sup> UW operations have historically occurred in both general war scenarios, as in Kuwait in 1990-1991, or in limited war scenarios, such as in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Additionally, although UW is frequently associated with guerrilla warfare, *JP 3-05 Joint Special Operations* also cites the subversion of the military, economic, psychological, or moral well-being of a given nation; the sabotage of preferred targets; intelligence gathering and assessment; and unconventional assisted recovery operations which “seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control” as falling under UW operations.<sup>35</sup> Although the terms FID and UW are often used interchangeably, UW activities are differentiated from FID by the support of irregular forces in the latter and the support of the regular forces of the legitimate governing power in the former.<sup>36</sup> Finally, the goals of UW are usually understood more broadly than purely military objectives within a strategic context which recognizes the geopolitical impact support of a given resistance movement will engender and the resulting effects on U.S. national interests.<sup>37</sup>

UW activities can manifest in several ways. In situations in which an overt U.S. military presence is undesirable, UW activities can take the form of indirect support through a “coalition partner or a third-country location.” In such cases, support is limited to logistical aid and training. Where overt support is less controversial, SOF provide direct support, offering a “wider scope of logistical support, training, and advisory assistance.” Lastly, SOF support can entail combat support, encompassing both indirect and direct support as well as combat operations.<sup>38</sup>

Determining the fit of a resistance movement with the overall U.S. national strategy as well as the feasibility of gaining the stated objectives of an UW mission is a critical component of the planning process. In doing so, UW practitioners consider not only the physical terrain in which the operations will take place, but also the human one. UW practitioners must examine the predominant ideology, the objectives and capabilities of resistance leaders, the source of the cohesion of resistance forces, and fractures within society and governing structures, among others, to determine the possibility of a successful operation that aligns resistance behavior with U.S.

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<sup>33</sup> See Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-1–1-2 for a discussion of the definition and role of undergrounds and auxiliaries.

<sup>34</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-1.

<sup>35</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-05*, II-8.

<sup>36</sup> Department of the Army, FM 3-05.137, *Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense*, June 2008 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-1.

<sup>37</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-2–1-3.

<sup>38</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-2–1-3.



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objectives.<sup>39</sup> An expanded understanding of the doctrines of war, insurgencies, and the dynamics of conflict in general, as well as what motivates men and women to rebel, are all useful tools in this regard.

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<sup>39</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-2-1-7.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169>.**

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The essays included in the volume highlight the salience of the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms of political and social institutions.

**Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857>.**

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, and suicide attacks.

**Alinsky, Saul David. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/611392318>.**

Alinsky was a radical, and successful, community organizer who compiled these controversial organizational tactics in the 1970s. This primer is *The Prince* for the have-nots—it is firmly grounded in the politics of power with minimal ethical considerations. Several generations of community organizers from across the ideological spectrum have now utilized these tactics to help achieve their objectives. Alinsky explains that the first task of an outside organizer is overcoming suspicion and establishing credibility among the local population. After this first step has been accomplished, the organizer must then agitate the local population by stirring resentments and hostilities in order to overcome apathy and encourage participation. Recruitment is most successfully accomplished through established networks, like unions, gangs, churches, or other extant organizations. Lastly, Alinsky lists 13 “rules” for organizers that act more as general guidelines than hard and fast directives.

**Ang, Cheng Guan.** *The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective.* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940>.

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet sources.

**Arendt, Hannah.** *On Revolution.* London: Penguin, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/315071889>.

A philosophical and historical analysis of the importance, and meaning, of revolution in the contemporary world. Arendt analyzes the French and American Revolutions to highlight the successes in the latter and the failures in the more radical French struggle. She argues that the most important outcome of the American Revolution was its emphasis on the creation of an enduring republic that encouraged a politically active citizenry. The French revolutionaries, by contrast, overemphasized issues of social inequality to their detriment.

**Asprey, Robert B.** *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.* Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318410521>.

An in-depth survey of unconventional warfare throughout history. Beginning with the ancient world and ending with the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, Asprey also discusses unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, launching a trenchant critique of U.S. military's leaders' knowledge of guerrilla warfare during Vietnam.

**Bowman, James.** *Honor: A History.* New York: Encounter Books, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867>.

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to the West's Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman argues, is crucial to understanding the culture of the Islamic world and its grievances against the West.

**Brittain, James J.** *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP.* London; New York: Pluto Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/424560012>.

Brittain offers an insider's account of the Colombian Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary Colombia.

**Caporaso, James A.** "Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 2 (2000): 1-28, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478871654>.

In this article, Caporaso discusses the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 by the major European powers. The Treaty is significant for modern politics because it was an important first step in the establishment of the modern state system, which was born in Europe after centuries of religious turmoil and comprises a multiplicity of states, each with its own territory and sovereignty. He identifies and clarifies four concepts that together undergird the state system: authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. Lastly, he discusses, using Britain as an example, how this international system is changing in the contemporary era.

**Clausewitz, Carl von.** *On War.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2428983>.

Clausewitz's 19th-century work was one of the first, and most influential, books written in the modern Western world to systematically and philosophically examine the phenomenon of war. Some of the commonly circulated ideas he originally espoused include the inherent advantage of the defense; strategic and operational centers of gravity; and the fog of war. His dialectical method of instruction renders quick distillations of his theory challenging.

**Cobban, Helena.** *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics.* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629>.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes the evolu-

tion of the PLO using documentary sources and first-hand recollections.

**Collier, Paul.** *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/76073943>.

Collier argues that one of the most pressing threats in the 21st century is the “bottom billion,” or the poorest segments of the world’s population occupying mostly failing states, the majority of which are in Africa. He identifies several “traps” facing these states: armed conflict, dependence on natural-resource extraction, poor governance, and geographic isolation from good markets. Armed conflict in these areas, while often characterized as ethnic strife, is more often the result of profiteering and resource grabbing. Greed, rather than grievances or ideology, is the primary motivating factor for political violence in these poverty-stricken areas.

**English, Richard.** *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51266166>.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

**Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin.** “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096>.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Conventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal

war is the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the post-Cold War international system. When per capita income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political instability; rough terrain; and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

**Ganguly, Sumit. “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay.” *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 76–107, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/482429668>.**

Ganguly traces the rise of the insurgency in Kashmir to the failure of the Kashmir state to properly address the political and social demands of its ethnic classes. In addition, when discontent first arose, state institutions were ill-prepared to offer political solutions and instead adopted coercive and military strategies to quell the emerging conflict.

**Gant, Jim. *One Tribe at a Time*. Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/471953295>.**

Maj. Gant’s piece narrates his experiences training, and becoming an integral part of, the fighting force of an Afghan tribe. In what he calls tribal engagement, Gant and his Special Operations team integrated closely with the tribe, becoming “trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families.” Gant argues that his foreign internal defense operation in Afghanistan offers a successful blueprint for future efforts with important strategic implications for the U.S. effort in that country and elsewhere.

**Guevara, Ernesto. *Guerrilla Warfare*. United States: BN Publishing, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/315888777>.**

Considered a classic treatise on the how-to of guerrilla warfare, socialist revolutionary “Che” Guevara describes the hit-and-run tactics he used to overthrow the Cuban government and install the Castro regime. Guevara’s guerrilla doctrine is oriented strategies and tactics of small, rural-based guerrilla forces.

**Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833>.**

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a discrepancy between what men and women think they deserve and what they can actually get in society. The resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

**Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967>.**

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of pragmatic politics.

**Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37923319>.**

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the *Leviathan* is among the most influential works of political theory written in the modern era. In it, Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which encourages them to contract, or consent, with one another to form political society. A strong sovereign, whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

**Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21026149>.**

Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of mass movements,

and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also details the behavior of mass movements once they have formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer's book has remained an influential and widely read work since its publication in the early 1950s.

**Hopgood, Stephen. "Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002." In *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860>.**

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

**Hopper, Rex D. "Indicators of Revolutionary Potential: Transcript of Dr. Hopper's Presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, Rock Island, May 1964." Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/22699470>.**

A transcript of Hopper's presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, 1964, discussing the role of social science in studying internal war and his own research in isolating indicators of revolutionary potential, or anticipating revolutions. He isolates the emergence of a numerically significant, economically powerful, and intellectually informed, but yet politically marginal, group as one of the leading indicators of a coming revolution.

———. **"The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements." *Social Forces* 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–79, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480032964>.**

In this article, Hopper describes the revolutionary process in four stages: the preliminary stage of mass (individual); the popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest; the formal stages of formulation of issues and formation of publics; and the institutional stage of legalization and social organization.

**Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982>.**

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic identities may be



particularly salient because alternative common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is in some circumstances malleable.

**Irwin, Will. *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*. London: Ebury, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63185790>.**

Irwin, a U.S. Special Forces colonel, details the history of the Jedburghs, three-man teams of American, French, and British soldiers dropped in enemy territory during World War II. Behind enemy lines, the Jedburgh teams trained and led local resistance fighters in support of the Allied invasion of Normandy and the liberation of France.

**Jones, D. “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter.” Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/128284158>.**

In this thesis, Jones addresses the ongoing debate within the Special Forces community regarding whether unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are applicable in contemporary and future Special Operations environments as they are currently defined and operationalized. In regard to unconventional warfare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching term for efforts against nonstate actors in the Global War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign internal defense. His thesis argues that unconventional warfare needs a clear and concise definition and furthermore that it should not be transformed to fight global insurgency. He identifies a transitional point between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense signifying the change from unconventional

warfare to foreign internal defense. Moreover, the operational preparation of the environment is not unconventional warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own doctrine. Lastly, these three concepts, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational preparation of the environment, will be the dominate Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.

**Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/12975032>.**

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

**Laqueur, Walter. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/254422371>.**

The author reviews historical incidences of guerrilla warfare from Biblical times, the Middle Ages, and into the 18th century, but especially the Napoleonic era, which he argues fostered the roots of modern guerrilla warfare, and on into the 20th century. Eschewing a systematic theory of the successes, failures, and conditions giving rise to guerrilla warfare, the author does identify 12 common patterns relevant to understanding these processes.

**Lawrence, T. E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. London: Vintage Books, 2008, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/435728007>.**

A personal account of famed T.E. Lawrence's experiences in leading a successful Arab guerrilla resistance against the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I era.

**Lewis, Bernard. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books, 1999, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052>.**

Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the domestic, regional, and international tensions of the modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191>.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis traces the growth and development of Islamic political language from the Prophet and the promulgation of the Qur'an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse in modern times.

**Lichbach, Mark Irving.** *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471>.

The rebel's dilemma holds that according to the theory of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the free rider. Lichbach's book is largely about the solutions used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective dissent, including when they are adopted and when they are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel's dilemma within the context of the market, community, contract, and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify collective action problems, a struggle constituting the primary political struggle between opposition and the state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the processes used in overcoming the problem of collective action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action in any given situation, not just conflict.

**Machiavelli, Niccolò.** *The Prince*. Translated by Harvey Claflin Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11623750>.

Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, especially those

founders of new regimes and orders. In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how it actually manifests in human society. The result is a text that recommends princes and politicians to use all means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. The text is considered by some to be the first modern treatment of the science of politics.

**Makiya, Kanan. *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38079204>.**

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, Makiya describes how the Ba'athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly refined techniques of fear used by the Ba'athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success of the Ba'athist regime can be understood against this backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.

**Malaquias, Assis. "Diamonds are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy." *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478629614>.**

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, Malaquias suggests that control of important diamond-producing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national and international levels. The author also highlights the political and military miscalculations committed by the rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large sums of money into rebel coffers.

**Malcom, Ben S., and Ron Martz. *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51566610>.**

Malcom, a U.S. Army lieutenant, recounts the U.S. Army's unconventional warfare operations during the Korean War.

Malcom recruited, trained, and lead a North Korean guer-  
 rilla resistance against the Chinese and North Korean forces.

**Mao, Zedong. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Urbana: University of  
 Illinois Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/44446629>.**

Mao's classic treatise on the conduct of guerrilla warfare  
 in underdeveloped countries, especially those with a rural/  
 urban divide. The Mao doctrine includes an emphasis on  
 the local population and blending guerrilla and conventional  
 military tactics to achieve success.

**McCallister, William. "The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of  
 a Tribal Rebellion." *First Monday* 10, no. 3 (2005), [http://  
 firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/  
 article/view/1215](http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215).**

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally net-  
 worked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and the  
 Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the motiva-  
 tions and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

**McCuen, John J. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The  
 Strategy of Counter-Insurgency*. London: Faber, 1966, [http://  
 www.worldcat.org/oclc/2423079](http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2423079).**

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, McCuen  
 looks at the organization, operations, and mobilizations of  
 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a four-fold template  
 for successfully deterring insurgent campaigns: the state of  
 insurgency must be identified, strategic counterinsurgent  
 bases must be secured, a counterinsurgent campaign must  
 be engaged in for the long term, and the counterinsurgent  
 government must maintain the will and deliver the resources  
 necessary to defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

**Melnik, Constantin. *The French Campaign Against the FLN*.  
 Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967, [http://www.  
 worldcat.org/oclc/16946601](http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16946601).**

Melnik, a high-placed official in the French government dur-  
 ing the Algerian War, details the counterinsurgent campaign  
 waged against the Algerian National Liberation Front.

**Merom, Gil.** *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam.* Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51274584>.

Merom argues that democratic institutions are less effective in waging small wars or counterinsurgencies. In particular, the moral values implicit in democratic society make it difficult to sustain the casualties and brutality inherent in small wars. The result is a “normative gap” between the values of society and those of the state, making it difficult for the state to continue its focus on the external threat.

**Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen.** *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61343149>.

The authors argue that insurgencies in the 20th century are dissimilar to those in the 21st century. They distinguish between “national” insurgencies in the former century and “liberation” insurgencies in the contemporary era. Accordingly, the United States must address 21st-century insurgency and revise its strategy, doctrine, operational concepts, and organization.

**Molnar, Andrew R.** *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies.* Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1966, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2069125>.

This work, representing research conducted under the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), describes the organizational, motivational, and behavioral characteristics of undergrounds in insurgent movements along with an analysis of 24 insurgencies.

**Olson, Mancur.** *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909>.

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory of collective action. According to his theory, rational, self-interested individuals will not pursue collective goods, or those that will be of benefit to all in society, because of the problem of “free riding,” or the logic that supposes the collective goods will be available to one through the work of others whether or

not one actually expends efforts in procuring them. Olson argues that because of the problem of free riding, mobilization, or collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, or distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the group is small enough that the benefits will be worth the expended cost to procure them.

**O’Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57465511>.**

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case studies include insurgencies in the past several decades as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

**Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of Insurgency.” *The New Yorker* (2006), <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/101605816>.**

Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate. Both discuss the importance of “knowing the enemy” and the key role social science can play in this strategy. Highlights include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in insurgent participation.

**Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343>.**

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing

socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages in society—is positively related to incidences of terrorist activity.

**Plaster, John L. *Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/54537114>.**

A Vietnam commando unit leader shares the story of secret operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia, describing the efforts of small teams to capture enemy officers, rescue pilots, and collect intelligence.

**Rothstein, Hy S. *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62324474>.**

In his examination of Operation Enduring Freedom, Rothstein maintains that while it is to be praised for its creativity, it was fought in a conventional manner despite Secretary Rumsfeld's emphasis on unconventional capabilities. Furthermore, the use of conventional methods increased after the fall of the Taliban. Rothstein presents an overview of the "conventionalizing" of the U.S. Special Forces and makes suggestions to regain the lost unconventional capacity.

**Rubin, Barry M. *Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849>.**

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin catalogues the PLO's evolving method of operations, from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

**Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177>.**

Ghorayeb provides and insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

**Saskiewicz, Paul E. *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal Enterprise*. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166>.**



In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC's criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of its base.

**Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21375275>.**

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate groups of society against the powerful despite their often public displays of deference to domination. Such groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations between the power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics different, but no less important, than more overt forms of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

**Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480862154>.**

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for collective action, or social movements. They claim that not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and transmit and diffuse their interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, or “schematas of interpretation,” that help individuals explain occurrences and events within the context of their lives and the world at large. In doing so,

frames make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement organizations strategically align their frames with the values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in order to encourage participation in collective action. The underlying premise is that some sort of frame alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The authors identify and explain four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

**Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*, edited by Jeremy Jennings. United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40595298>.**

Sorel, a radical French syndicalist writing in the early 20th century, offers his views on the role of violence in modern politics and what prompts men to engage in political action. He highlights the importance of “myths” in motivating and maintaining conflict, arguing that myths are essentially irrational constructs insulating adherents from empirical reality. He contrasts these with the more “utopian” rational blueprints for political objectives. Sorel also discusses the use of violence as theater and spectacle and its role in inspiring and maintaining resistance momentum.

**Taber, Robert. *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49942647>.**

A description and analysis of the similar tactics used by guerrilla fighters to advance their cause, whether fighting for religious, nationalistic, or a host of other political agendas. First published in 1965 and considered a classic in the field, Taber's evidence is drawn from numerous cases, including French experience in Indochina, the Irish war for independence, and British experience in Cyprus and Malaya.

**Thayer, Charles Wheeler. *Guerrilla*. New York: New American Library, 1965, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/5106211>.**

The author examines several guerrilla wars in which the military has been engaged, the Vietnam War, the Bay of Pigs, and the war waged against the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines, discussing the reasons for failure in the former two and success in the latter. He also extracts general lessons of

guerrilla warfare from several cases, including the Greek civil war, Yugoslavia, Indochina, and others.

**Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, edited by Robert B. Strassler and Richard Crawley. New York: Free Press, 1996, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/34788895>.**

Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian, called his account of the Peloponnesian War between ancient Athens and Sparta a “possession for all time.” For the past 2,000 years it has stood as a key text in the liberal education of generals, statesmen, and citizens. While detailing one of the first major conflicts of civilization, Thucydides offers military, political, moral, and philosophical perspectives on man and society. Perhaps most famously, Thucydides distills human motivation to the triad of “fear, profit, and honor.”

**Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 1978, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/243910663>.**

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he develops a theory of political opportunity structure to explain how and why collective action develops. The theory of political opportunity structures evaluates the extent to which existing political systems facilitate independent organization and collective action by the citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence their development, their immediate outcomes, and their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred by those choices in the political and social world in which they find themselves. The relationship between political opportunity structure and collective action is described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are to engage in collective action because less costly and difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in collective action. As a result, collective action is most likely to occur when the

state hits a sweet spot between neither too much repression nor too much openness that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.

**Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63807665>.**

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying social movements propose here to unite the previously fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, public claim-making of groups where the government is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms of contention are studied under the same framework. What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse events have universal, or common laws, explaining their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or relational (or working on connections among groups, people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms include: mobilization, political identity formation, and elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and research social contention.

**Volckmann, R. W. *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*. New York: Norton, 1954, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1535784>.**

After escaping from Bataan in 1942, Volckmann led a three-year-long successful local resistance against the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II. Volckmann later helped found the U.S. Army Green Berets.

**Von der Heydte, Friedrich August Freiherr. *Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon*. New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/15364848>.**

Von der Heydte, a German Luftwaffe officer during WWII, discusses the phenomenon of irregular warfare, its strategic importance, and its practice.

**Xenophon. *The Anabasis of Cyrus*. Translated by Wayne Ambler. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/154706657>.**

The *Anabasis* is the account of Xenophon, an ancient Greek general and philosopher, of his successful leadership of a band of 10,000 Greek mercenary soldiers from the heart of the Persian Empire back to Greece. Surrounded by numerically superior forces in a foreign land, Xenophon's tale is a classic tale in military leadership by example, unit cohesion, and human nature in trying circumstances.



## IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

### INTRODUCTION

The most comprehensive doctrinal approach of COIN available today is in the 2006 FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* document. While not without its detractors, the document has exercised some influence over how military personnel practice and think about counterinsurgency strategies and tactics. Within the document, COIN is broadly defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”<sup>40</sup> Of course, contemporary insurgents wage war in an IW context. As a result, their objectives are often not a final, decisive military victory. The “thinking enemy” is one that recognizes the U.S.’s comparative advantage in conventional warfare.<sup>41</sup> As a result, insurgents often seek to influence conditions favorable for political solutions. COIN operations, guided by these insurgent objectives, are oriented toward sufficiently securing the environment to allow national institutions to be effective in maintaining law and order. These unconventional terms of victory demand more than military prowess and more resources than those available to the U.S. unilaterally. Instead, it requires a willing and able host-nation government as well as a population supportive of COIN and host-nation efforts against insurgent elements.<sup>42</sup> It may also require inter-agency effort and cooperation from allied nations and supra-governmental agencies.

COIN presupposes the presence of an insurgency, or a “protracted politico-military struggle,”<sup>43</sup> whose ultimate goal is to overthrow, control, or otherwise weaken the legitimate ruling authority primarily through the use of political violence. FM 3-24 states that achieving victory depends on large part on the insurgent’s ability to “mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences.”<sup>44</sup> COIN tactics, then, require individuals of a country to take control of their own affairs and accept the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Stability is understood as coterminous with legitimate, as opposed to primarily coercive, rule. Providing security for the local population, in terms of establishing legitimate government, is of primary impor-

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<sup>40</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 102.

<sup>41</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-2.

<sup>42</sup> Hasler, *Defining War*, 23.

<sup>43</sup> As Clausewitz famously noted in *On War*, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes.”

<sup>44</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

tance.<sup>45</sup> In the currently accepted COIN doctrine, it is the population, not the enemy insurgents, which form the center of gravity.<sup>46</sup>

In addition, COIN in FM 3-24 aims to eliminate as many of the underlying motivations for the insurgency as is feasible, eventually providing for the rule of law and order and growth of social and economic sectors. As presented in FM 3-24, simply killing insurgents, although necessary, the primary emphasis, as suggested by its understanding of the nature of insurgency,<sup>47</sup> is swaying the will of the population to favor counterinsurgent objectives.<sup>48</sup> To this end, coercive violence should be appropriate to the situation at hand and analyzed in terms of its impact on overarching political objectives.<sup>49</sup> The emphasis of FM 3-24 relies on a “hearts and minds” strategy over, but not in exclusion of, coercive violence. To this end, civilian-led development projects take on new importance. In this regard, COIN operations can be considered “armed social work,” essentially requiring redressing “basic social and political problems while being shot at.”<sup>50</sup> FM 3-24 emphasizes that nation-building efforts are not exclusive to civil affairs personnel or the Department of the State, but also part of the mission of the military.<sup>51</sup>

The conceptualization of COIN, as codified in FM 3-24, is not without its detractors. Among other critiques often lobbed by military personnel include the emphasis of winning hearts and minds as opposed to coercive violence; the defense of civilian populations as opposed to offensive action against the enemy; and the merit of waging COIN with large, conventional forces as opposed to smaller footprint special operations forces with the appropriate enablers. Social scientists have also criticized FM 3-24 for the assumptions it makes regarding the nature of insurgencies, especially in regards to its emphasize on the population as the center of gravity. In wars

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 1-23–1-24. The importance of human security in legitimate governance has a long history, going back to the 17th-century publication of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, which argues that the surest method of convincing individuals to consent to rule is the introduction of a strong ruler capable of protecting his citizens from violent death at the hands of their neighbors.

<sup>46</sup> “At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support.” Ibid., 1-28.

<sup>47</sup> As Clausewitz advised, among the first tasks in war is comprehending the particulars of the conflict, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking.” Some detractors of FM 3-24 note that its population-centric approach was heavily influenced by Operation Iraqi Freedom and that potentially not every counterinsurgency campaign will have the same center of gravity. Social scientists, as the comments in the concluding paragraph indicate, agree. One controversial detractor, COL Gian Gentile, has made similar connections to Clausewitz’s theory, noting that the center of gravity is discovered within, not before, each conflict. Octavia Manea, “Thinking Critically About COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile,” *Small Wars Journal*, December 14, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/thinking-critically-about-coin/>.

<sup>48</sup> Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Praxis,” *Perspectives on Politics* 6 (2008): 347.

<sup>49</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-25.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., A-7.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 1-27.



## COUNTERINSURGENCY

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involving issues of identity, for instance, it may not be as simple as the population siding with the government or the insurgents. Lastly, when the host nation government represents entrenched interests of only a segment of the population, other measures, such as coercive bargaining, might be called for, otherwise COIN efforts might only produce more efficient sectarians.

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**‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169>.**

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The essays included in the volume highlight the salience of the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms of political and social institutions.

**Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857>.**

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, and suicide attacks.

**Ang, Cheng Guan. *The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective*. London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940>.**

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet sources.

**Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365>.**

This collection of essays describes how the “bad guys,” whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requisite suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The authors in the volume discuss the tactics used

by anti-World Trade Organization demonstrators during the 1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet and international crime; “hactivism,” or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.

**Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318410521>.**

An in-depth survey of unconventional warfare throughout history. Beginning with the ancient world and ending with the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, Asprey also discusses unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, launching a trenchant critique of U.S. military’s leaders’ knowledge of guerrilla warfare during Vietnam.

**Aussaresses, Paul. *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957*. Translated by Robert L. Miller. New York: Enigma Books, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49396263>.**

General Paul Aussaresses’ memoir details the brutal counterterrorist campaign against Algerian insurgents during the Algerian War. His controversial, and some argue failed, methods include torture and summary execution.

**Beckett, Ian F. W. *Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005.**

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of European colonization, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives emerged encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency. Beckett considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience.

**Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38248965>.**

Bell offers an analysis of the underground world of insurgent and terrorist networks, drawing on examples from the IRA, Holy Jihad, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian fedayeen, among others. Utilizing decades of research experience in the midst of armed struggles, Bell offers a look at the subtle, inner dynamics of violent political movements. He emphasizes the theatricality of terrorist tactics; the normality and sometimes reluctance of the gunman; and the difficulties of mixing political pragmatism with the utopian goals of many insurgent movements.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen. "Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/86384874>.**

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because rebels no longer have access to government or state backing, many have turned to looting and other profit-seeking behavior.

**Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785>.**

This edited volume identifies the economic and social factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The authors consider the economic rationality of conflict for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites find war to be more profitable than peace.

**Bowman, James. *Honor: A History*. New York: Encounter Books, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867>.**

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to the West's Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman argues, is crucial to understanding the culture of the Islamic world and its grievances against the West.

**Brittain, James J. *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP.* London; New York: Pluto Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/424560012>.**

Brittain offers an insider's account of the Colombian Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary Colombia.

**Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/472893615>.**

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back these movements. In addition, they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.

**Cassidy, Robert M. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency." *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (2006): 47–62, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/109440694>.**

Cassidy describes a shift in national strategic interest to small-scale, protracted warfare emphasizing bolstering local security forces. As early as 2006, national security personnel began to adopt the term "long war" in describing contemporary efforts against insurgents and terrorists. This protracted form of warfare may be replacing large-scale conventional war, giving way to small-scale insurgency operations. As a result, many national strategic documents emphasize the need to build the operational capacity of indigenous security forces of allied partners.

**Choueiri, Youssef M. *Islamic Fundamentalism.* London: Continuum, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/249033120>.**

By viewing Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to modern civilizations and political structure, the author presents an analysis of how and why Islamic values have become such a potent contemporary political force. This book presents a definition of Islamic fundamentalism that links it to Muslim traditions since the 18th century from diverse areas such as

Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Choueiri examines how these traditions have played out in contemporary Islamic movements like Hamas, the Taliban, and Egyptian Islamist Association.

**Cobban, Helena.** *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics.* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629>.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources and first-hand recollections.

**Collier, Paul.** *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/76073943>.

Collier argues that one of the most pressing threats in the 21st century is the “bottom billion,” or the poorest segments of the world’s population occupying mostly failing states, the majority of which are in Africa. He identifies several “traps” facing these states: armed conflict, dependence on natural-resource extraction, poor governance, and geographic isolation from good markets. Armed conflict in these areas, while often characterized as ethnic strife, is more often the result of profiteering and resource grabbing. Greed, rather than grievances or ideology, is the primary motivating factor for political violence in these poverty-stricken areas.

**Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler.** “Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War.” World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf>.

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one

participates in their procurement. On the other hand, collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking behavior because it can potentially provide incentives for participation in armed conflict by the promise of private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war episodes from 1965 to 1995, they find that the risk of conflict does not appear to be significantly increased by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective action presented by the source of grievances, like social fractionalization or government repression, appear to reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in looting rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep profiting from the local population and exploiting resources they have captured.

**Crawford, George A. *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/465191240>.**

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy would allow the military to counter threats without the expense and turbulence of major military operations. Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.

**Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43095934>.**

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the problems of policing in a divided society. The authors trace the history of Northern Ireland's primary police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its inception in 1922 until its reorganization following the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sym-

pathetic to the insurgent's nationalist demands, affecting how everyday policing was conducted in the region. The authors also discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence in 1969 and the RUC's reorganization in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force in a divided society while offering alternative models of policing such as community policing and local control.

**English, Richard.** *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51266166>.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

**Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin.** "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096>.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Conventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal war is the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the post-Cold War international system. When per capita income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political



instability; rough terrain; and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

**Felbab-Brown, Vanda. *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515>.**

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. Conventional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular support. The author examines Peru's Shining Path, the FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents' popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

**Forest, James J. F., ed. *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/230811941>.**

This edited series includes three volumes of essays by scholars, military, and intelligence personnel on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The series addresses understanding and defeating terrorist and insurgent threats. The first volume, *Strategic and Tactical Considerations*, considers the use of differing instruments of national power through which states pursue counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts—hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence. The next volume in the series, *Sources and Facilitators*, covers state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, networks of trade and trafficking, and various societal issues. The final volume, *Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency*, includes a number of case studies, including singular terrorist operations such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as long-term counterinsurgent and counterterrorist

efforts like ETA, the LTTE, the Shining Path, and Israeli efforts against numerous Palestinian organizations.

**Galula, David.** *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71250738>.

Galula, a French military officer who served in the Algerian war, provides a template for the defeat of insurgents seeking to define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, discuss its principles, and outline the corresponding strategy and tactics. Galula draws upon his experiences in counterinsurgency in Algeria, Greece, and Indochina. His ideas regarding counterinsurgency were influential in the development of U.S. COIN doctrine codified in FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, especially in regard to its assertion that the population forms the center of gravity in insurgent campaigns.

**Ganguly, Sumit.** “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay.” *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 76–107, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/482429668>.

Ganguly traces the rise of the insurgency in Kashmir to the failure of the Kashmir state to properly address the political and social demands of its ethnic classes. In addition, when discontent first arose, state institutions were ill-prepared to offer political solutions and instead adopted coercive and military strategies to quell the emerging conflict.

**Gunaratna, Rohan.** *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror.* New York: Berkley Books, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062>.

Gunaratna’s work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al Qaeda’s internal operations and personnel. The author includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden’s ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of the group’s global and Asian networks. Gunaratna’s evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

**Gurr, Ted Robert.** *Why Men Rebel.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833>.

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a discrepancy between what men and women think they deserve and what they can actually get in society. The resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

**Hafez, Mohammed. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 1 (2007): 95–115, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/102978918>.**

Jihadists in Iraq are adept at using various media to construct myths of heroic martyrdom, demonize intended targets, and appeal to potential recruits across the Muslim world. The jihadists use three primary narratives in service of these goals: humiliation of Muslims at hands of foreigners; impotence of official Muslim governments; and redemption through faithful sacrifice.

**Hammes, Thomas X. *Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61322326>.**

Hammes argues that fourth-generation warfare, a modern form of insurgency, characterizes the conflicts playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth-generation practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat. Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains focused on changing the minds of decision makers. Politically, it involves transnational, national, and subnational organizations and networks. Operationally, it uses different messages for different audiences, all of which focus on breaking an opponent’s political will. Tactically, it utilizes materials present in the society under attack to include industrial chemicals, liquefied natural gas, or fertilizers. Although these modern insurgencies are the only type of war that the United States has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), Hammes

notes that they can be overcome, as such successes in the conflicts in Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El Salvador (1980s) indicate.

———. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/456160698>.

An analysis of how the U.S. military has not successfully met the challenge of fourth-generation warfare. Hammes argues for a network-based rather than a hierarchical-based approach to modern warfare.

**Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar.** *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967>.

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of pragmatic politics.

**Herbst, J.** “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa.” *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517>.

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. In particular, those movements that face competent national militaries will have to evolve into viable armies while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and pursue economic agendas.

**Hobbes, Thomas.** *Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37923319>.

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the *Leviathan* is among the most influential works of political theory written in the modern era. In it, Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state of nature outside of

political society. There, a war of all against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which encourages them to contract, or consent, with one another to form political society. A strong sovereign, whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

**Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21026149>.**

Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of mass movements, and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also details the behavior of mass movements once they have formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer’s book has remained an influential and widely read work since its publication in the early 1950s.

**Hopgood, Stephen. “Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.” In *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860>.**

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

**Hopper, Rex D. “Indicators of Revolutionary Potential: Transcript of Dr. Hopper’s Presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, Rock Island, May 1964.” *Special Operations Research Office, The American University*, 1964, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/22699470>.**

A transcript of Hopper’s presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, 1964, discussing the role of social science in studying internal war and his own research in isolating indicators of revolutionary potential, or anticipating revolutions. He isolates the emergence of a numerically significant, economically powerful, and intellectually informed, but yet politically marginal, group as one of the leading indicators of a coming revolution.

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———. **“The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements.”** *Social Forces* 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–9, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480032964>.

In this article, Hopper describes the revolutionary process in four stages: the preliminary stage of mass (individual); the popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest; the formal stages of formulation of issues and formation of publics; and the institutional stage of legalization and social organization.

**Horowitz, Donald L.** *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982>.

A seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic identities may be particularly salient because alternative common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is in some circumstances malleable.

**Hudson, Rex A.** **“Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.”** Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53312538>.

This report assesses the activities of organized crime groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics related to the issue of the transnational criminal and terror nexus.

**Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/231745621>.**

While many researchers address the origins of terrorist groups, Jones and Libicki research the most effective methods for ending terrorist groups. Using statistical analysis of 650 terrorist groups, the authors conclude that the most effective methods involve arrest and killing of key members by local police and intelligence agencies and inclusion of terrorist groups in the political process. They argue that policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against Al Qaeda.

**Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/221155251>.**

Kilcullen offers a perspective on modern warfare that distinguishes localized conflict from global conflicts like the War on Terror. He argues that the U.S. military often erroneously conflates these localized struggles, the “accidental guerrilla,” with worldwide terror networks.

———. “Countering Global Insurgency.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/356605661>.

Kilcullen was among the first to suggest that the War on Terrorism was a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency. In order to be effective, counterinsurgent and counterterrorism tactics should be adapted to this new phenomenon to include “disaggregation,” breaking or dismantling the links of the global jihad.

———. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/652490349>.

A compilation of 28 articles by Kilcullen serving as a practitioner’s handbook on counterinsurgency.

**Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber and Faber, 1991, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/471701587>.**

Kitson, a British officer and veteran of numerous counterinsurgent operations, analyzes the evolution of typical insur-

gent campaigns. Connecting with a grievance that resonates with a goodly proportion of the population is central to subversive campaigns. As a result, counterinsurgency measures should address the causes of unrest and thwarting the leadership seeking a revolution that extends beyond a particular grievance. Kitson also highlights the importance of intelligence operations for planning tactical operations as well as the types of units, equipment, and specialized personnel required for effective counterinsurgent operations.

**Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/12975032>.**

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

**Le Billon, Philippe. "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts." *Political Geography* 20, no. 5 (2001): 561–84, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247>.**

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources. Le Billon examines theories of relationships between resources and armed conflicts and the historical processes in which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the risks of violence linked to the conflictuality of natural resource political economies, and the opportunities for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of resources.

**Lewis, Bernard. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books, 1999, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052>.**



Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the domestic, regional, and international tensions of the modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191>.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis traces the growth and development of Islamic political language from the Prophet and the promulgation of the Qur'an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse in modern times.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471>.

The rebel's dilemma holds that according to the theory of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the free rider. Lichbach's book is largely about the solutions used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective dissent, including when they are adopted and when they are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel's dilemma within the context of the market, community, contract, and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify collective action problems, a struggle constituting the primary political struggle between opposition and the state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the processes used in overcoming the problem of collective action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action in any given situation, not just conflict.

**Macdonald, Douglas J. *The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy*. Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/634910022>.**

Macdonald argues that the “clash of civilizations” is not yet occurring but rather is the goal of radical Islamist grand strategy. Like the fascist and communist totalitarians before them, they cannot allow alternative value systems to flourish in areas under their control. Instead, they seek to spread their totalitarian beliefs to Muslim societies to encourage a violent “clash” with non-Muslim societies. As a result, little room for negotiation exists between the West and radical Islamists of the totalitarian ilk.

**Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Translated by Harvey Claflin Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11623750>.**

Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, especially those founders of new regimes and orders. In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how it actually manifests in human society. The result is a text that recommends princes and politicians to use all means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. The text is considered by some to be the first modern treatment of the science of politics.

**Makiya, Kanan. *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38079204>.**

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, Makiya describes how the Ba’athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly refined techniques of fear used by the Ba’athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success of the Ba’athist regime can be understood against this backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.

**Malaquias, Assis. “Diamonds are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy.” *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/478629614>.**

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, Malaquias suggests that control of important diamond-producing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national and international levels. The author also highlights the political and military miscalculations committed by the rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large sums of money into rebel coffers.

**Maley, William, ed. *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. New York: New York University Press, 1998, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38130751>.**

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its military capabilities and tactics, external support, and the failures of the pre-Taliban government. Following sections include pieces on the role of outside actors in relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a Western model.

**Manwaring, Max G. *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59823190>.**

The author explains the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs to insurgency in terms of the instability it wreaks upon government and its challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency.

**Marston, Daniel, and Carter Malkasian, eds. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Oxford; New York: Osprey, 2008, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/166380048>.**

Insurgency has been a prominent form of warfare throughout history. Likewise, regular armies have often struggled to counter the threat posed by irregular forces. In this edited

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volume, experts from the field provide case studies of U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns from early efforts in the Philippines to current struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recurring themes throughout the cases include the nearly universal failure to initially understand the problem; the necessity, but not the sufficiency, of firepower; the political dimensions of insurgent conflicts; and the central role played by police work and intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency efforts.

**McCallister, William.** “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion.” *First Monday* 10, no. 3 (2005), <http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215>.

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and the Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the motivations and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

**McCuen, John J.** *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency*. London: Faber, 1966, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2423079>.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the long term, and the counterinsurgent government must maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

**Melnik, Constantin.** *The French Campaign Against the FLN*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16946601>.

Melnik, a high-placed official in the French government during the Algerian War, details the counterinsurgent campaign waged against the Algerian National Liberation Front.

**Merom, Gil.** *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51274584>.

Merom argues that democratic institutions are less effective in waging small wars or counterinsurgencies. In particular, the moral values implicit in democratic society make it difficult to sustain the casualties and brutality inherent in small wars. The result is a “normative gap” between the values of society and those of the state, making it difficult for the state to continue its focus on the external threat.

**Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61343149>.**

The authors argue that insurgencies in the 20th century are dissimilar to those in the 21st century. They distinguish between “national” insurgencies in the former century and “liberation” insurgencies in the contemporary era. Accordingly, the U.S. must address 21st-century insurgency and revise its strategy, doctrine, operational concepts, and organization.

**Molnar, Andrew R. *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*. Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1966, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2069125>.**

This work, representing research conducted under the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), describes the organizational, motivational, and behavioral characteristics of undergrounds in insurgent movements along with an analysis of 24 insurgencies.

**Munck, Ronaldo, and Purnaka L. De Silva, eds. *Postmodern Insurgencies: Political Violence, Identity Formation, and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/41223903>.**

This edited volume explores how the identity of groups is formed and changed in the midst of violent struggle and peacemaking. The volume includes several conceptual chapters as well as case studies ranging from Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Somalia, and others.

**Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2008.**

A co-author of the Army's FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the Vietnam and Malayan wars. Using archival sources and interviews of those involved in the engagements, he argues that the British military's adaptable organizational culture, based in part on their experience as a colonial police force, was key in its success in its Malayan counterinsurgent campaign while the inflexible U.S. military failed to adapt to the insurgent tactics characterizing the Vietnamese conflict.

**Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909>.**

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory of collective action. According to his theory, rational, self-interested individuals will not pursue collective goods, or those that will be of benefit to all in society, because of the problem of "free riding," or the logic that supposes the collective goods will be available to one through the work of others whether or not one actually expends efforts in procuring them. Due to the problem of free riding, Olson argues that mobilization, or collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, or distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the group is small enough that the benefits will be worth the expended cost to procure them.

**O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57465511>.**

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case studies include insurgencies in the past several decades as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

**Packer, George. "Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of Insurgency." *The New Yorker* (2006), <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/101605816>.**

Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate. Both discuss the importance of "knowing the enemy" and the key role social science can play in this strategy. Highlights

include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in insurgent participation.

**Pelletiere, Stephen C.** *A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/33372632>.

Pelletiere examines the origins of numerous fundamentalist groups posing a security threat to some of the most adept security services in the world. Developing a theory of fundamentalism, Pelletiere maintains that the most appropriate method to quell the groups' influence is not repression, which has not proved successful, but exploiting divisions within the movements between the more socially constructive and violent elements.

**Petraeus, D. H.** "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review* 86 (2006): 45–55, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/204243520>.

Highlighting that the U.S.'s superior conventional power makes it likely that future threats will be asymmetrical, Petraeus catalogs 14 observations gathered from his experiences during the Iraq counterinsurgency efforts.

**Piazza, James.** "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343>.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a "weak" political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages in society—is positively related to incidences of terrorist activity.

**Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343>.**

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. national security from terrorist and other extremist organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by groups that embrace Al Qaeda's worldview but are not formally part of the organization; threats posed by other extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

**Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43840039>.**

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic fundamentalism, explaining how the organization rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the "Great Game" of Central Asia; the role of regional and international powers; the historical tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

**Reed, B. "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency." *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (2007): 19-30, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/161784355>.**

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author argues that conventional understanding and strategies need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, units, and organizations among armed groups.

**Rotberg, Robert I., ed. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557>.**



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A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of state failure by the editor as well as prescriptions for both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

**Rubin, Barnett. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888>.**

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the Afghan state from its early 19th century roots. From the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, sources. The result was a state divided from its society. The following communist revolution “from above” left the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin movement against the Soviet incursions, whose development Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth account of state-building, civil war, and the context of the international system.

**Rubin, Barry M. *Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849>.**

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

**Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion*. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177>.**

Ghorayeb provides an insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of jihad

and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

**Sageman, Marc.** *Understanding Terror Networks.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53972026>.

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the web of interconnections that link its members. Using social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among “cliques” of young Muslims who encourage one another to wage jihad and the “strength of the weaker ties,” or the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

**Saskiewicz, Paul E.** *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal Enterprise.* Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166>.

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of its base.

**Scott, James C.** *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/21375275>.

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate groups of society against the powerful despite their often public displays of deference to domination. Such groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations between the

power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics different, but no less important, than more overt forms of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

**Shelley, Louise.** “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11 (2005): 101–12, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040>.

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship between the state, transnational organized crime, and terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom operate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.

**Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill.** *Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism*. National Institute of Justice, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62713393>.

Researchers commonly believe that the link between criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the authors develop a methodology for identifying crime-terror interactions derived from a standard intelligence framework that has proven useful in law enforcement investigations.

**Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew.** *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763>.

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is often interwoven with the local organization of society. In the non-Western world, this often means confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics suitable for the operating environment. The authors provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed groups into more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.

**Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/480862154>.**

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for collective action, or social movements. They claim that not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and transmit and diffuse their interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, or "schematas of interpretation," that help individuals explain occurrences and events within the context of their lives and the world at large. In doing so, frames make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement organizations strategically align their frames with the values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in order to encourage participation in collective action. The underlying premise is that some sort of frame alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The authors identify and explain four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

**Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*, edited by Jeremy Jennings. United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40595298>.**

Sorel, a radical French syndicalist writing in the early 20th century, offers his views on the role of violence in modern politics and what prompts men to engage in political action.

He highlights the importance of “myths” in motivating and maintaining conflict, arguing that myths are essentially irrational constructs insulating adherents from empirical reality. He contrasts these with the more “utopian” rational blueprints for political objectives. Sorel also discusses the use of violence as theater and spectacle and its role in inspiring and maintaining resistance momentum.

**Taber, Robert.** *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare.* Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49942647>.

A description and analysis of the similar tactics used by guerrilla fighters to advance their cause, whether fighting for religious, nationalistic, or a host of other political agendas. First published in 1965 and considered a classic in the field, Taber’s evidence is drawn from numerous cases, including French experience in Indochina, the Irish war for independence, and British experience in Cyprus and Malaya.

**Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer.** *Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/58451801>.

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplinary framework of analysis for improving understanding of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

**Thucydides.** *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War,* edited by Robert B. Strassler and Richard Crawley. New York: Free Press, 1996, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/34788895>.

Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian, called his account of the Peloponnesian War between ancient Athens and Sparta a “possession for all time.” For the past 2,000 years it has stood as a key text in the liberal education of generals, statesmen, and citizens. While detailing one of the first

major conflicts of civilization, Thucydides offers military, political, moral, and philosophical perspectives on man and society. Perhaps most famously, Thucydides distills human motivation to the triad of “fear, profit, and honor.”

**Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution 1978*, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/243910663>.**

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he develops a theory of political opportunity structure to explain how and why collective action develops. The theory of political opportunity structures evaluates the extent to which existing political systems facilitate independent organization and collective action by the citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence their development, their immediate outcomes, and their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred by those choices in the political and social world in which they find themselves. The relationship between political opportunity structure and collective action is described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are to engage in collective action because less costly and difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in collective action. As a result, collective action is most likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between neither too much repression nor too much openness that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.

———. **“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”** In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11785182>.

Tilly, a prominent sociologist, describes a model for the development of the state analogous to the maturation of organized crime syndicates. In Europe, the state and war

making capabilities developed out of organizations resembling protection rackets. However, vigorous resistance by local populations modulated the state's harmful effects. By contrast, states developing in the contemporary area have little constraints placed on their actions by the population, making the organized crime analogy more apt. This points to a key divergence in the experience of state formation in the European and developing world systems.

**Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63807665>.**

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying social movements propose here to unite the previously fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, public claim-making of groups where the government is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms of contention are studied under the same framework. What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse events have universal, or common laws, explaining their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or relational (or working on connections among groups, people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms include: mobilization, political identity formation, and elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and research social contention.

**Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. *Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/273816706>.**

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some terrorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance their activities.

**Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.**

An account of French rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and '50s in Indochina. Trinquier, a veteran of the operations, describes his tactics for combating the insurgents.

**Urban, Mark. *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*. London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31242701>.**

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how the British executed tasks in the field.

**Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217>.**

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences to understand relationships among social entities rather than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social network analysis methodology highlights actors and their actions as interdependent; relational ties among actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial resources; and network models



that map the constraints and opportunities provided by the network structural environment.

**West, Bing. *The Village*. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51491677>.**

As a first-hand observer, West recounts the experiences of a small Marine unit sent to a village in Vietnam as military advisors to defend and train local militiamen.

———. ***The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan*. New York: Random House, 2011, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/659766251>.**

West offers a trenchant criticism of the use of the “benevolent” counterinsurgent strategies adopted in Afghanistan. The winning the hearts and minds strategy failed among the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan to encourage action against the Taliban. More troops, and more money, are required for an extensive nation-building effort in Afghanistan. He recommends that U.S. forces there transition to an adviser corps and continue to train Afghan security forces to defeat the Taliban.

**Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Knopf, 2006, <http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193>.**

Wright’s work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI’s counterterrorist chief John O’Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial information that could have potentially averted 9/11.



## **APPENDIX**

In addition to the above bibliographic sources, the following websites are crucial resources for further investigating irregular warfare and its associated core tasks.

- **U.S. Army War College bibliographies:**  
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibliographies.htm>
- **Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center *Irregular Warfare* bibliography:**  
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/irregular2010.htm>
- **Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center *Special Operations* bibliography:**  
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/specops2010.htm>
- **Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center *Terrorism – Groups and Methods* bibliography:**  
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/terrorgroups2010.htm>
- **Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center *Warfare in the 21st Century* bibliography:**  
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/war21stcent.htm>
- **National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College bibliographies:**  
<http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/library/publications/bibliography/>
- **Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library bibliographies:**  
<http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research%20Tools/Bibliographies/index.html>
- **U.S. Army War College Library bibliographies:**  
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibliographies.htm>





