MESSAGE TO JOINT WARFIGHTERS

As the Joint Force goes forward, the challenges to international security will continue to increase. It is clear we are stronger when we act with our Partners. The key to our success not only resides in our own Joint Force development, but also in how well we can help our Partners develop to confront shared security challenges. One way to do this is through security force assistance (SFA).

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in coordination with the Joint community has prepared this guide to assist planners at all levels who plan SFA activities. Planners will find the concise conceptual approach described in this guide helpful as they turn policy and strategic guidance into action that results in the establishment of sustainable foreign security force capability and capacity. This guide includes case studies from the operating force and highlights resources planners should consider as they work through the ends, ways, and means of the SFA effort.

Steady state and contingency operations, by their nature, generally involve coordination with foreign security forces and some subsequent development of security force capability and capacity. This task of SFA, essentially the development of a foreign security force and its supporting institutions, is an important pillar of US foreign policy. As we have learned through our own force development process, development is never easy. The energy invested into the planning process upfront has proven to reduce time and resources required for SFA activities.

This guide is intended to provide a resource that stimulates the Joint community’s thinking on how to address the challenges associated with SFA activities. I encourage you to use this guide and provide feedback on its effectiveness so that your lessons learned and best practices will also be incorporated into future Joint efforts.

[Signature]

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# SFA Planner’s Guide

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Preface

SCOPE

This handbook has been designed to assist joint and service planners at operational-level and tactical headquarters in planning Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. However, this handbook may also prove useful for planners regarding Security Cooperation (SC) and its application as part of the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP).

PURPOSE

This handbook seeks to inform the joint force by framing SFA activities in the context of theater strategic and operational campaign planning and execution. Some security cooperation (SC) activities include SFA activities supporting foreign internal defense (FID) programs or security sector assistance (SSA) efforts. Timely and effective execution of relevant SFA activities may prevent the requirement for US forces to conduct combat operations. Execution of relevant SFA activities contributes to a partner nation's (PN) organic capability for managing destabilizing events, either within its own borders or regionally. SFA activities strengthen security forces that collaborate with US or multinational forces to conduct operations.1 As a desktop reference, this document provides the joint force with a framework to facilitate understanding and bring efficiencies to SFA planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

APPLICATION

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) SFA Planner’s Guide addresses joint forces’ SFA planning requirements. The principles contained in this planning guide apply to units tasked to build the capabilities and or capacity of a foreign security force. Units conducting SFA activities should use this handbook to assist in developing a partner nation’s security force. There are 10 chapters in the planning guide. Chapters 1 through 3 provide a broad overview of SFA terminology, strategic policy guidance, and authorities for the conduct of SFA. Chapters 4 through 7 provide a framework for the generation, employment, transition, and sustainment of partner nation security forces. Chapter 8 discusses specific techniques and considerations for the assessment of partner nation security forces’ capabilities and capacity, as well as assessment of the effectiveness of SFA activities. Chapter 9 provides a collection of best practices for advisors in the conduct of SFA activities, and Chapter 10 provides a recommended framework for the selection and training of advisor personnel. This planning guide provides a broad overview of SFA and enables planners to nest their actions within the joint operations planning process (JOPP) as prescribed in JP 5-0.

1 Joint Doctrinal Note 1-13, 29 April 2013, Chapter 1, Para 3.a
Chapter 1
Introduction to Security Force Assistance

This chapter reviews the lexicon for the related terms of security force assistance (SFA), security cooperation (SC), foreign internal defense (FID), and counterinsurgency (COIN) as well as the frequently used phrase of “building partner capacity” (BPC). The intent of this chapter is to provide a general overview of SFA using a framework that reconciles and clarifies SFA with overlapping and related terms. For additional reference, see Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance (April 29, 2013).

FRAMEWORK AND TERMINOLOGY

1-1. What is security force assistance? Security force assistance (SFA) is defined as the Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.

1-2. Planners must understand what security force assistance (SFA) is and what it is not. The US developed numerous terms to describe assistance to foreign governments that are dependent on the authorities, programs, and funding sources used. As a result, new policies and programs overlap with existing policies and established programs, which subsequently confuses planners. Additionally, established terms do not adequately cover all the circumstances during which the USG provides support and assistance to foreign security forces (FSF). It is important to understand the basic definition of terms often linked with SFA in order to understand what SFA is and what it is not, and why and when to use the term “SFA.”

- Security cooperation (SC) consists of all activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. SC includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN) (DODI 5000.68 October 27, 2010).

- Security assistance (SA) is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statues by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by DOD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (JP 1-02).

- Foreign internal defense (FID) is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 1-02). The focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
IDAD is ideally performed preemptively; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD may be performed responsively to the threat(s).

- Building partner capacity (BPC) is a phrase used widely across DOD to describe the development of capabilities and capacities among foreign partners for the mutual benefit of the partner and US national or shared global security interests. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) provides BPC guidance to the combatant commanders (CCDRs) in relation to the theater strategic objectives designated for their areas of responsibility (AORs). Generally, the purposes of BPC are to build the capabilities and capacity of foreign partners to anticipate, deter, or defeat threats to the US homeland and to build the capabilities and capacity of foreign partners to combat their internal threats such as terrorism and other irregular challenges.

1-3. SFA activities must align with the US employment of the other elements of national power [diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL)] to support the growth of the partner nation's security forces. SFA differs from SC, SA, FID and BPC in the following ways:

- SFA is a subset of SC because it is a task done by DOD to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations but it is also a task conducted by DOD to develop other non-military security force capabilities when required. Additionally, SFA can be conducted by US combat units that are paired with foreign security forces during limited and major operations or where US advisors are assigned to directly support foreign security forces conducting security and combat operations. SFA was intended to integrate with security development activities of other USG departments and agencies such as DOS and DOJ. SC activities are funded under various authorities. There are also some SC activities that build security relationships or gain access but do not develop capability and are therefore not SFA, such as USEUCOM’s annual International Chief of Chaplains Conference or USPACOM’s participation in the annual Republic of Korea Ground Forces Festival.

- SA is encompassed under SC and is a set of Title 22 programs which support a large number of the FSF equipping and training activities carried out by DOD. By law, SA cannot involve combat when training or advising FSF. Although significant, SA is not the only program that supports SFA activities.

- SFA differs from FID in that the focus of US FID efforts is to support a host nation in executing its IDAD program while SFA focuses on security forces that deal with both internal and external threats. SFA can occur outside of the “host” country; however, FID activities can only take place in a specific country when that PN has requested support.

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SFA is one of the many activities that the USG may employ in an effort to build the capacity of a partner nation. SFA activities are the DOD contribution to unified action to build partner security capabilities and capacities.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE GOALS

1-4. The US promotes the sustainable development of its regional partners’ military capabilities because the stronger our partners are, the less likely it is that the US will need to conduct major combat operations within regional conflicts. The goal of every US SFA effort is a FSF that is competent, capable, committed, confident, and accountable to the partner nation’s legitimate system of governance. These characteristics enhance the partner nation’s enduring ability to deter and defend against military aggression by neighboring states, and to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorist threats. Objectives for US SFA efforts are an FSF that is:

- Competent
  - Across all levels, from the senior executive levels down to the individual soldier or police officer, or other individuals performing security functions
  - Across all domains, echelons and functions (executive, generating, operating)
- Capable and Sustainable
  - Appropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish missions
  - Sustainable over time with respect to the partner nation’s human capital
  - Resourced within partner nation’s own economic resources and capabilities
- Committed
  - To survival of the state and security for all its people
  - To preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens
  - To the rule of law and the peaceful transition of political power
- Confident
  - In themselves and their ability to secure the country from internal as well as external threats
  - The citizens trust that the FSF will provide security, act in the interests of the citizenry, and conduct their responsibilities within the rule of law
  - The HN government is confident in the capabilities and loyalty of the FSF
  - The international community recognizes the legitimacy of the FSF
- Accountable
  - For their use of power within the framework of rule of law
  - The HN government and the citizens trust the FSF will provide security, respond to crises, and remain professional and accountable at all times.

SECURITY FORCE FUNCTIONS

1-5. US policy dictates the terms and conditions that allow a PN to receive assistance in developing its security forces. Planners must translate US policy for developing FSF across three security force functions: executive, generating, and operating (EGO). This three-prong concept allows DOD planners to identify the gaps in the partner nation’s ability to establish policy and executive or ministerial-level direction, force generation, and employment of the partner nation’s security forces.

- Executive - The executive includes national-level organizations or key individuals responsible for developing national policy for the PN’s security force. This guidance consists of policies, procedures, and authorities for the generation and employment of the
operating force. All security forces apply some level of executive function, which empowers and guides the generating and operating functions. The national government’s departments or ministries that perform this function direct and develop national security policy and provide resources for the PN security forces. The executive function establishes, justifies, seeks authority from the legislature or the appropriate governing body the parameters for the generation of military forces and capabilities, and directs the employment of operating forces.

- Generating - The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating forces. The generating function supports the organization, training, equipping, and rebuilding/building (OTER) of the PN’s security forces. In situations where the FSF has been destroyed, disbanded, or is non-existent, the SFA force (US advisors) initially performs these tasks to promote development in the FSF. The assisting force helps the PN to identify, resource, and resolve capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) of the FSF.

- Operating - The operating function employs military capabilities through application of maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and command and control during actual operations. Generally, organizations or military units from the corps level down to the squad or equivalent that perform the actual security-related missions for the PN security force constitute the operating function. US or coalition forces may employ FSF organizations during partnered operations based upon the FSF’s war-fighting capabilities if the FSF is not capable of assuming the lead in security operations. Employment of PN police forces (when authorized), may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment, or any other activities that support the PN’s legitimate criminal justice or customs enforcement authorities.

1-6. Initial assessment, as well as periodic re-assessment of the FSF is crucial to the success of the SFA mission. Forces conducting SFA will need a comprehensive assessment framework to measure FSF progress. In concert with their PN counterparts, SFA forces develop program objectives, measure progressive milestones, and forecast success. These assessments drive the subsequent set of developmental objectives for the FSF. Operationally, the focus of SFA planning and employment is to resolve the FSF’s capability and or capacity shortfalls and not the symptoms. SFA planners assess how the FSF’s executive authorities employ their resources and to what ends, the conditions that the FSF must change to address their problems, and what capabilities (the ability to do a given task) the FSF must have to accomplish those tasks.

1-7. Understanding actual FSF requirements allows the joint force operational headquarters to identify SFA requirements and request the right capabilities to support FSF force development. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) is ultimately responsible for conducting and maintaining the assessment and helps frame the support needed. For example, an FSF without a sustainable base of logistics support might be an area for future FSF development.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TASKS

1-8. SFA encompasses DOD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. SFA may also enable the FSF to participate as part of international and regional security organizations across the range of military operations or spectrum of conflict, during all phases of military operations. SFA tasks include: organize, train, equip, rebuild (or build), and advise (OTERA). SFA planners consider US and partner nation national interests and objectives,
and then conduct a baseline assessment of the FSF to determine the SFA tasks necessary to build
the required capabilities and capacity of the various elements of the FSF.

- **Organize.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and staffing functions. The acronym “OTER” (organize, train, equip, and rebuild/build) introduced in paragraph 1-5 describes the subset of tasks inherent in the initial organization of a nascent FSF.

- **Train.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction, implementation of training events, and leader development activities.

- **Equip.** All activities to integrate materiel and equipment solutions into the FSF. Equipping the FSF usually includes procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management of all major end items, as well as the forecasting, procurement, and distribution of all classes of supply. Equipping the FSF requires a holistic approach that includes not only fielding of new equipment, but also operational readiness processes, maintenance management, repair, and recapitalization.

- **Rebuild (and/or build).** All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities and supporting infrastructure. This may include bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

- **Advise.** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups. Activities such as assessment, provision of materiel assistance, and liaison with US or coalition enabling capabilities may all be inherent in advising FSF.

### SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IMPERATIVES

1-9. Developing the FSF and building supporting PN institutions, often in the midst of insurgency or major combat operations, is one of the most challenging missions of the US military. SFA activities must be considered for every operation or campaign from the beginning until the end and not as an afterthought, or just when stabilizing, transitioning, or during the reconstruction following a major operation. The following imperatives have universal application for the numerous SC activities and larger-scale Service or joint operations and missions supported by SFA activities.

- Understand the operational environment
- Ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose
- Provide effective leadership
- Build legitimacy
- Synchronize information
- Institute sustainability
- Support PN ownership
- Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights
- Link security and justice
- Foster transparency
- Do no harm
- Plan for SFA early
Chapter 1

UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-10. An in-depth understanding of the operational environment, including the existing FSF, current or potential threats to PN security, and especially the human terrain, is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA operations. Identifying relevant actors, their influence on the environment, and their motivations will help planners and practitioners define the goals and methods for developing PN security forces and their institutions. Regional players and transnational actors also influence the security environment as well, and therefore shape SFA planners’ efforts to frame the operational problem. Frameworks and counter-insurgency best practices such as "areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events" (ASCOPE) and "political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure" (PMESII) may be helpful in understanding the SFA environment, even when the PN is not combating an insurgency. Regardless of the threat or security challenges of the PN, additional considerations may include:

- How will neighboring states or regional actors react to the enhanced military capabilities of the FSF?
- How will the local populace react to the FSF’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, particularly by the police?
- Will the population respond to the potential use of force by submitting to legitimate authority, by protesting, or by revolting?
- What is the historical relationship between the foreign security forces and the populace?
- Are there complicating factors that exist in the internal relationships between security forces (e.g., police and Army)?
- Are there secular facets to the security picture that may affect how security forces are organized, manned, or deployed?
- What infrastructure (transportation nodes, energy production or storage areas, cultural or religious icons, etc) needs specific or dedicated protection?
- What US, coalition, international or nongovernmental organizations’ (NGO) formal agreements, treaties, or informal alliances were in effect prior to SFA engagement? Will they remain in effect?

1-11. Planners may need to consult with experts such as cultural anthropologists, social scientists, or human terrain teams who provide focused area of operations expertise to gain a sufficiently detailed understanding of the operating environment. Always consider legal restrictions and policy factors as well as the impact of US or coalition presence on the PN government’s legitimacy.

ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT AND UNITY OF PURPOSE

1-12. The SFA effort may include multinational partners or intergovernmental organizations. Effective command and support relationships warrant special consideration. Unity of command is preferable, but often impractical. Unity of effort and purpose however, are imperative. SFA mission command relationships may range from very simple to very complex, and military commanders may answer to nonmilitary personnel such as an ambassador or a special appointee. Whatever the relationship, clear delineation and understanding of command and support relationships is essential. Additionally, recommended best practices include establishment of coordinating boards or centers to promote unity of purpose and effort partners, and to ensure operations are synchronized and contributing to the desired strategic objectives.

1-13. The SFA effort may be executed by special operations forces (SOF), conventional forces (CF), or a combination of both. Planners must consider which forces are in the lead (supported force) for security, and who will be the supporting forces. It may be entirely appropriate for CF units to support smaller SOF elements working with a PN’s foreign security forces. Supporting
and supported relationships will change over time and are instrumental to accomplishment of the SFA mission.

1-14. Essential to unity of effort is the ability of leadership to effectively communicate and synchronize efforts, in time, space and purpose, throughout coalition and PN operations. Planners should plan for wide diversity in communications systems and the possibility of needing to supply additional communication systems to advisory or transition teams that fall outside of conventional force structure.

1-15. SFA activities should ideally be collaborated with interagency, coalition, and NGO efforts. The planner, at a minimum must consider the efforts of the country team under the Ambassador. The planner must consider the development of appropriate roles and missions when international treaty organizations are included such as NATO or the UN.

**PROVIDE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP**

1-16. Depending on the circumstances, the US may execute SFA activities unilaterally, or as part of a multinational force. Leadership, a critical aspect of any application of military combat power, is especially important in the inherently dynamic and complex environments associated with SFA. The SFA environment places a high premium on effective leadership at all levels, from the most junior noncommissioned officer (NCO) to the most senior general officer or agency director. The leadership imperative is multifaceted. The US, coalition, and PN leadership must fully comprehend the operational environment, and prepare, engage and support the SFA effort to succeed. Productively engaging the leadership on all sides requires extensive effort throughout the campaign.

1-17. Senior leaders within the SFA force must empower subordinate leaders to make appropriate, timely decisions. While senior leaders must maintain situational awareness, decentralized control usually provides greater success and credibility with PN security forces in the dynamic SFA environment. There is usually a positive correlation between the clarity of the SFA mission, objectives, and parameters, and the ability for junior leaders within the SFA force to operate independently. Senior command-level leaders must also consider the individual talents or traits of subordinate leaders when matching them to SFA activities. Some leaders are better suited to dealing with the complex socio-cultural and human relationship issues inherent in SFA. Unlike some types of military activities, personal and professional rapport between coalition and PN counterparts defines positive or negative relationships that set the stage for success or failure of SFA activities. While temperament is a facet of individual personality, training in negotiating, methods of influence, cultural understanding, and rapport building skills can help coalition leaders and advisors. Historically, personnel who are patient, perseverant, and practice empathy perform well in advisory roles.

**BUILD LEGITIMACY**

1-18. SFA helps to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the population. This is done by assisting the PN to develop FSF that are competent, capable, committed and confident, not only in the eyes of the US coalition and PN governments, but more critically, in the eyes of the PN population. This perceived legitimacy is a critical objective of all SFA activities, not just those conducted as part of a counterinsurgency operation. SFA leaders, planners, and practitioners at all levels must consider how each SFA activity affects popular perceptions and gear those activities to build the legitimacy of the PN government and PN security forces. While it is important to assist FSF to develop professionally, a mirror image US model may not be the optimum solution for organizing the FSF. Like leadership, legitimacy is a multi-faceted imperative. Considerations include:
The legitimacy of the PN government in the eyes of the people.

The legitimacy of the PN government in the eyes of the international community, including regional neighbors.

The legitimacy of the PN security forces in the eyes of the government.

The legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of the people.

The legitimacy of the PN government in the eyes of the PN security forces.

1-19. Subordination of the military to the political leadership is one of many inherent differences between the US and some other nations, and it is important for planners to understand the roles that security forces play in a focus nation or region when planning SFA activities. Throughout the course of the campaign or operation, every SFA activity must ultimately support the relationship between the PN government and the people in order to be effective.

SYNCHRONIZE INFORMATION

1-20. Information is a powerful enabler in the complex and dynamic environment typical of SFA activities and requires synchronization between SFA efforts and the overarching operation or campaign. Managing information encompasses the collection, analysis, management, application, and preparation of information both from an influence perspective as well as in ways internal to the SFA efforts, such as lessons learned integration. This sets the conditions for success and may serve to mitigate the ability of destabilizing influences to impact SFA efforts and potentially damage the PN government.

1-21. The influence of media reports will directly affect the perceptions of the PN and US populace on the success of SFA activities. Planners should anticipate and become proactive in how information on the development of FSF efforts will flow to the media. Failure to plan for and execute coordinated management of information will likely make efforts to build or maintain PN security force legitimacy much more difficult. SFA planners should work closely with GCC information officers and public affairs officers to develop themes and messages that are coordinated with interagency, coalition and the PN that highlight the increased capabilities and professionalism of the FSF. These themes and messages must be thoroughly understood and propagated by all personnel involved in the SFA effort.

1-22. Sustained SFA activities require an extensive lessons learned integration effort. Capturing, analyzing, and incorporating advisor best practices; threat tactics, techniques, and procedures; and environmental factors into the training and preparation of each successive SFA force rotation helps to maintain the continuity and momentum of the SFA effort.

INSTITUTE SUSTAINABILITY

1-23. Sustainability consists of two major components. The first component is the ability of the US or coalition to sustain the SFA effort throughout the campaign by following through with any given task until achieving the strategic objective. The second and objective component is the ability of FSF to sustain their operations independently. Maintaining legitimacy is a function of the first component. Working with the PN's security forces is the second component of this function in order to sustain the efforts. The US must consider the culture, infrastructure, fiscal limitations, and education level of prospective partners when fielding weapons systems or complex organizations.

1-24. The US or coalition approach to SFA must be sustainable over time through the successful attainment of campaign or operational objectives. The political environment will drive the dynamics to determine the scope of efforts for the most viable course of action. Planners must not overlook the extensive preparatory planning efforts and personnel resources to develop a self-
sustaining FSF and its supporting institutional structures. The FSF must be equipped and sized appropriately so that the PN executive, generating and operating functions can sustainably regenerate elements of the FSF over the long term. Planners must synchronize US efforts with a PN to transfer responsibility for all three EGO functions as soon as it is practical to do so.

1-25. Failure to develop clear expectations and the failure of leaders to manage these expectations will lead to disenchantment within the US and international political and public arenas. Planners must continue to promote strategic communication messages that highlight the increases in professionalism, capabilities, and legitimacy of the FSF in order to sustain domestic support for these efforts.

SUPPORT PARTNER NATION OWNERSHIP

1-26. The PN’s history, culture, legal framework, and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures that form the set of SFA activities. As such, the needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SFA will differ substantially from one country to another. Accounting for the basic security concerns of the PN population is essential for attaining buy-in, and is critical to the success of SFA activities. US efforts must consider the needs of the PN population to ensure the sustainability of reforms implemented. The implementation of these reforms serves long-term goals that are often not evident in day-to-day results, but do progress measured over time.

1-27. Assisting forces must be careful not to detract or disrupt a PN's legitimacy efforts by fulfilling the basic needs of the populace. The populace may perceive the assistance of international forces with contempt, suspicion, or as rife with hidden agendas that attempt to alter their culture or way of life. For example, a PN leader embracing or accepting too much Western culture and ideology can cause the populace to reject United States assistance. This can sabotage legitimacy efforts of the PN and influence the populace into accepting an illegitimate shadow government. The legitimate government needs time to build trust with its populace. Assisting forces must understand these factors when supporting a fragile government in rebuilding its security forces.

INCORPORATE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

1-28. Security force assistance efforts must be transparent, promote respect for human rights, and be legitimate to succeed. Partner nation military and civilian security forces must carry out their core functions in accord with these principles and the rule of law. This is particularly important in rebuilding countries where the legacy of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall. SFA plans should include accountability and oversight mechanisms, including direct collaboration with civil society to prevent FSF abuses of power and corruption, and to build public confidence. Vetting of FSF leaders and units that receive assistance shall occur prior to giving provisional assistance or training to security forces. Likewise, SFA programs must incorporate an explicit focus on the executive function of the FSF, particularly at the ministerial level. Strengthening the overall legal, policy, and budgetary frameworks should be an important component of SFA into any country as well.

Good Governance

1-29. The challenge for all societies is to create a system of governance that provides security, a criminal justice system, a framework for conflict resolution, and essential services such as basic utilities, sanitation, and education. Effective governance also sets the conditions for economic activity, employment, and price stability; and promotes human development, especially for the poorest and most marginal. Good governance is participatory, transparent, accountable, and promotes the rule of law. Institutions inclusive of all ethnic groups and economic classes are a key
aspect to good governance. Security force assistance deals primarily with the security and occasionally the criminal justice aspects of governance, but cannot be viewed in isolation without consideration of the other roles and functions of the PN government. Ultimately, US policy may have to take a pragmatic approach to developing FSFs for the sake of regional stability and US national security. In all cases, the SFA force must promote international law, to include respect for human rights and adherence to the law of armed conflict.

1-30. Good governance nurtures the processes and structures that guide healthy political and socio-economic relationships. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identifies a set of five principles that are widely recognized. See Table 1-1 for more details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Good Governance principles</th>
<th>The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Principles and related UNDP text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Legitimacy and Voice**       | **Participation** - All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively  
**Consensus orientation** - Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures while respecting the views and rights of the minorities. |
| **Direction**                  | **Strategic vision** - Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded. |
| **Performance**                | **Responsiveness** - Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders and support changing requirements.  
**Effectiveness and efficiency** - Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources. |
| **Accountability**             | **Accountability** - Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders.  
**Transparency** - Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them. |
| **Fairness**                   | **Rule of law** - Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. |

Equity - All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

1-31. These five principles or core characteristics are mutually reinforcing and cannot stand-alone. For example, accessible information means more transparency, broader participation and more effective decision-making. Broad participation contributes both to the exchange of information needed for effective decision-making and for the legitimacy of those decisions. Legitimacy, in turn, means effective implementation and encourages further participation. Responsive institutions also must be transparent and function according to the rule of law if they are to be equitable.

Human Rights Principles

1-32. Of the five principles, "legitimacy and voice" and "fairness" have the smallest variance between cultures. Table 1-2, below, links the two governance principles with key clauses in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948. Since that time, the UN adopted eight treaties and five protocols, which together make up the body of international human rights laws.

Table 1-2 Human Rights Principles and Good Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Governance Principles</th>
<th>UNDP Principles</th>
<th>United Nations Declaration of Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy &amp; Voice</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>&quot;Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression&quot; (Article 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association&quot; (Article 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” (Article 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Everyone has duties to the community…” (Article 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td>“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage…” (Article 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (Article 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights…” (Article 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Article 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (Preamble)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Whereas it is essential …that human rights should be protected by the rule of law” (Preamble)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“All are equal before the law” (Article 7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Ibid.
"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal…” (Article 10)
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile” (Article 5)
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property” (Article 17)

**LINK SECURITY AND JUSTICE**

1-33. At the root of any “modern state” is a set of organizations and institutions that ensure the rule of law within a given society. For a state to survive in a territory it must ensure that its own rules trump rival rules (whether they be the rules of neighboring states or sub-national groups within its territory) and that it can guarantee the protection of property rights and the resolution of conflict according to those rules. Additionally, PN security forces must be vested with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force among all elements of the PN society.

1-34. SFA efforts should aim to ensure that all foreign security forces operate within the bounds of domestic and international law, and that they support efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. The police in particular should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to the police and state security providers may complement other SFA efforts to strengthen these institutions, to avoid unintended consequences, and to ensure that the security forces operate according to the law. Experience demonstrates that police assistance without efforts to strengthen other parts of the justice system often lead to increased arrests without the necessary means to adjudicate cases, or defend, incarcerate, or rehabilitate suspected offenders. Additionally, the tendency is to focus on criminal justice systems, but civil justice reform may have equally important implications for law and order, particularly with respect to the resolution of potential civil conflict, such as land disputes.

**FOSTER TRANSPARENCY**

1-35. Effective SFA programs should be conducted transparently and openly whenever possible. Program design should include a robust public information campaign to foster awareness of reform efforts among PN officials and the population, neighboring countries, the donor community, and others with a potential stake in program outcomes. Likewise, DOS, DOD, and USAID practitioners should engage in broad consultation with other USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, international donors, and the media to enhance program development and program execution.

**DO NO HARM**

1-36. In complex environments, donor nation assistance can become a part of the conflict dynamic serving to reduce, or in fact increase tension. Donors can inadvertently do harm when the resources they deliver or the policy reforms they advocate exacerbate rather than mitigate the conditions for violent conflict, or they weaken rather than strengthen the state as a site of decision-making and policy formation over the apportionment of public resources. As with any activity that involves changes to the status quo, SFA planners and implementers must pay close attention to minimize adverse effects on the local population and community structures, the security sector, or the wider political, social, and economic climate in unanticipated or unintended ways. Infusion of money or other tangible resources into the PN at either the local or national levels may produce an inflationary effect that actually reduces the population's access to resources. A prerequisite for the success of any SFA-related activity is developing a thorough understanding of the system for which change is sought, and the actual needs that exist. Practitioners should conduct a risk assessment prior to implementation and be prepared to adjust activities over the lifetime of the SFA program.
1-37. Reconciling the PN government’s strategic objectives with state building and development objectives poses a delicate balancing act. Donor nations’ actions and motives will be driven primarily by their sovereign geopolitical objectives. These may include national security, global economic integration, ideological commitments in the defense of human rights, or the spread of democracy. In such situations, it may be impossible for donors to avoid “doing harm” in the course of state building from the vantage point of actors within a given state. Understanding these strategic dilemmas is arguably the first step in undertaking an assessment of the impact of donor intervention on state building.

**Plan SFA Early**

1-38. The development of any security force takes time. SFA planning to develop a foreign security force should begin long before the point when that capability needs to be employed. The US military primarily focuses on the foreign military forces with the majority of the effort going to improving the operating function. Even during peacetime under security cooperation programs, the tendency is to improve the operating function. However, developing the executive and generating functions of a security force is the best way to institute change and ensure consistent long-term quality in the operating function. Within the operating function, the tendency is to focus on maneuver units first, then fires units, and finally the logistics units. Following this pattern, US personnel tend to be dismayed that the FSF units can fight but they cannot sustain themselves.

1-39. Additionally, during COIN or stability operations, the US military may find that the PN police forces are not as well trained as the foreign military units, usually because the foreign police were a secondary training effort. SFA planners must ensure that police development is weighted appropriately, and that the PN police generation milestones are incorporated into the plan. If the military will be ready to turn an area over to the police in six months and it takes six months to train and equip a police unit to do the mission, but it takes two years to get the equipment for the unit through a security assistance program, the planning and resourcing should have already taken place at least two and a half years earlier. Police trainers should work with the assisted police force at every level, from the overseeing ministries down to the station levels, and use a holistic approach to prepare them for the upcoming mission. SFA must be considered at the beginning of every operation. Failing to plan early for SFA will extend the duration and can possibly jeopardize ultimate success.
Chapter 2
SFA Strategic Context, Operational Design, and Planning Considerations

This chapter provides the strategic context to support SFA planning. It introduces DOD strategic documents, objectives, and joint force operating concepts that drive joint force development in support of SFA requirements. The chapter introduces focus areas contained within the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) that have direct implications to SFA. It outlines the application of operational design for SFA planning to achieve unity of effort. It also details SFA planning considerations.

SFA STRATEGIC CONTEXT

2-1. The DOD recognizes the need to sustain its SFA capability and capacity that it developed over the past decade of conflict. DOD recognizes it must retain and refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. SFA capabilities ultimately support DOD’s strategic emphasis on military-to-military cooperation to address instability and to reduce the demand for large-scale US force commitments.

2-2. In practice, SFA capabilities provide measured and cost efficient capacity within GCC focused initiatives to strengthen key strategic partnerships throughout GCC areas of responsibility (AORs). SFA in execution enables innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches through exercises, rotational presence, and effective employment of advisory skills.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

2-3. SFA supports unified action based on instruments of national power: (DIME-FIL). Planners must understand the national strategic guidance to align SFA activities effectively within a unified approach as seen on the following page (Figure 2-1).

2-4. National Security Strategy (NSS). Prepared by the executive branch of the USG, the National Security Strategy guides the development, application, and coordination of the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

2-5. National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Secretary of Defense approves the DOD level-policy to apply the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with DOD agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. The NDS provides guidance for

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developing the National Military Strategy (NMS) and provides a foundation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

2-6. National Military Strategy (NMS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the NMS for distributing and applying military power to attain NSS and NDS objectives. The NMS provides the ways and means by which the military will advance our enduring national interests as articulated in the NSS and accomplish the defense objectives in the QDR.

2-7. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is a legislatively mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The QDR is an important step in institutionalizing ongoing reform and reshaping of DOD to balance the urgent demands of today with the likely and lethal threats of the future, and provides input for the NDS.

2-8. Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Combatant commanders (CCDRs) develop a theater strategy and corresponding Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), which provides an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. So, even though SFA may occur as part of a major operation or counterinsurgency campaign, the majority of SFA missions occur during peacetime in support of the TCP.

![Figure 2-1 National Strategic Guidance](image-url)

**JOINT FORCE OPERATING CONCEPT**

2-9. To contribute to broader DOD strategic guidance (Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense), the CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) informs joint force development to meet the requirements contained within the strategy. The CCJO presents a joint operating concept of “globally integrated operations,” and provides implications and risks for consideration in the conduct of joint force development. Table 2-1 illustrates key elements within the
CCJO globally integrated operations concept having relevancy and potential implication to SFA capability areas.

Table 2-1 CCJO: Globally Integrated Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Element</th>
<th>SFA Relevancy (joint force)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mission Command                      | - Adaptable and empowered advisor and advisor teams able to operate in complex and remote OEs where SFA occurs  
- Leverage technology to integrate PN assessments in order to achieve efficiencies across PN development and SFA activities |
| Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative | - Rapid SFA lessons integration and concept development to provide solutions across complex OEs and meet future force requirements  
- Integrated SFA assessments across PN executive, generating, and operating functions to improve decision making at all levels |
| Global agility                       | - Address and link SFA capabilities to current security challenges  
- Align SFA strategic solutions in context to GCC requirements |
| Partnering                           | - Link strategic guidance to the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) concept  
- Link strategic guidance to the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) concept |
| Flexibility in Establishing JF       | - Enabling SFA constructs for rapid stand-up of Service centric JTF headquarters abilities to carry out regional and PN specific SFA  
- Improve GCC and Service Component Commands abilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess strategic, regional, and country specific SFA concepts and activities |
| Cross-Domain Synergy                 | - Achieve low-cost and high impact SFA employment options for current and future joint force requirements  
- Integrate PN security forces into joint exercises and operations when their capacity is developed via SFA |
| Use of Flexible, low-signature       | - Mature SOF/GPF integration across SFA mission areas  
- Encourage efficiencies across SA teams and SC teams |
| capabilities                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE (GEF)

2-10. The GEF translates strategic guidance (NSS, NMS, NDS, and QDR) into goals for DOD activities; it establishes the priorities and objectives to which subordinate plans are focused. The GEF outlines the goal to enable partner nations to provide for their own security, contribute effectively to broader regional or global security challenges, and maintain professional, civilian-led militaries that respect human rights. For clarity, the GEF establishes DOD policy objectives, while its sister document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) outlines the ways GCCs achieve policy goals.

2-11. GCC theater campaign approaches vary widely; however, TCPs provide a framework to organize and align operations, activities, events, and resources in time, space, and purpose to achieve directed end states. Intermediate military objectives (IMOs) define the goals necessary to achieve end states. As displayed below, Figure 2-2, shows a larger framework and parallel planning process that must be understood to gain unity of effort.
2-12. The application of operational design within the broader campaign provides the essential framework for unity of effort linking SFA with all other activities. Operational design is the means in which a commander links tactical actions to strategic ends.\(^9\) It is the conceptual basis for the commander’s operational approach resulting in plans and orders. Operational design is particularly well suited for ill-defined problem sets such as those faced by the SFA planner. The design conceptually links SFA activities to quantifiable objectives for assessment against desired conditions.\(^10\)

2-13. The effectiveness of the commander’s operational approach depends on a comprehensive understanding of the environment (as described in Chapter 1, SFA Imperatives). Planners must determine the essential problem that needs to be addressed. A comprehensive assessment of the FSF is necessary in order to properly plan SFA activities. These assessments provide an understanding of the security environment in which the FSF must operate. Desired conditions, depicted as objectives in higher plans (and the GEF) and the PN’s requirements, must drive FSF development. A key lesson from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan is that gap analysis must shape the security construct in order to achieve desired conditions. For example, if a desired condition is police primacy in the population centers, the SFA planner must determine the current gaps in police capabilities and devise a plan that incorporates activities such as training, sustainment and judicial system development to close those gaps. Units conducting SFA may not be able to achieve their US goals and objectives by simply improving FSF capability and capacity if that development is not integrated into a coherent security framework.

2-14. Planners must evaluate the FSF capabilities as they develop and provide US forces with the right capabilities to assist the PN close the security gaps which are based on the PN’s environment. Planners may experience resistance when coordinating for SFA due to PN officials’ and senior military leaders’ reluctance to recognize lack of capability for the fear of losing face, respect, reputation, and thus power. This is exceptionally problematic when it occurs in the executive function. When this occurs, planners must mitigate risks by intensifying efforts on the PN generating and operating functions. This will extend the duration of the developmental efforts. Objectives over time must be measurable and contribute meaningfully both to the fulfillment of FSF requirements for security, and to the desired conditions associated with USG goals and policy. Additionally, FSF development should be balanced across executive, generating and operating functions; efforts should be expressed as the SFA tasks

\[^9\] JP-5, III-1
\[^10\] For more information on operational art and operational design see JP-5 Chapter III
Strategic Context

2-5. Strategic Context

(organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise) as described in Chapter 1. It is important to note that SFA activities are normally supportive of a higher campaign plan and operational approach. In some cases, SFA may be the main effort, as in the late stages of Operation NEW DAWN (Iraq) and RESOLUTE SUPPORT (Afghanistan). In other cases, Security Cooperation centric organizations may outline the overarching approach to SFA activities through operational design.

2-15. Figure 2-3 depicts a notional operational approach to an SFA effort. Development is balanced across executive, generating, and operating functions (notionally arrayed as lines of effort), and across the SFA developmental tasks: organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise. SFA activities are generally nested within a higher campaign plan and operational approach and contribute IMOs and desired conditions (end states).

SFA Construct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US SFA Tasks</th>
<th>Organize</th>
<th>Train</th>
<th>Equip</th>
<th>Rebuild</th>
<th>Advise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Function</td>
<td>Partner Nation security force executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating Function</td>
<td>Partner Nation security force generating function refers to the capability and capacity of the security force to organize, train, equip, and build operational units.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Function</td>
<td>Partner Nation security force operating function employs capabilities through the use of concepts similar to the joint functions to achieve Partner Nation security objectives.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-3 Executive, Generating, Operating Functions

Operational Design Case Study: South Sudan

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) applied a comprehensive approach to planning SFA activities in South Sudan in support of its Theater Campaign Plan (TCP).

The Republic of South Sudan (RSS) security forces are comprised of former irregular forces working to transform into a national defense force. The Government of Sudan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) general is working to increase its capacity to perform critical ministerial and headquarters functions. They would like to improve critical mission unit readiness levels. The SPLA general staff wants to improve its ability to exercise command and control (C2) of the force. Environmental considerations also include economic factors such as oil exports as a means to generate revenue within the RSS.

The design of the RSS SFA program leverages inherent Title 10 authorities and programs to build SFA capacity through education and engagement at the institutional levels of the RSS MoD, general staff, and critical mission units, with logical integration of security assistance (SA) materiel and
training solutions. The RSS SFA program consists of a multi-year integrated assessment based program with specified interim and final objectives, which define RSS military capabilities and provides measurable progress within the program.

The RSS SFA Program (Figure 2-4) design reflects a balanced approach across the echelons of security forces described in this chapter (executive, generating, and operating functions). It brings the elements of operational design into a conceptual framework for carrying out SFA activities in support of the TCP.

**Figure 2-4 Republic of South Sudan SFA Program Design**

**SFA PROCESS**

The development of security capability and/or capacity follows a distinctive pattern that is called the SFA process. This process has five distinct stages: Plan, Generate, Employ, Transition, and Sustain which is known by the acronym (PGETS) which is represented in figure 2-5 which depicts a notional level of SFA effort by stage.
2-16. The first stage of PGETS is Plan where the US and PN assess what the PN security capability and capacity must do and what is hindering it from fulfilling these requirements, creating a plan with ends, ways, and means, and then ensuring the resources and authorities are available to complete the mission. The Plan stage ends when the plan is approved for execution. This does not mean that planning has ended but rather that the preponderance of effort has shifted. Plan activities are found throughout all five stages.

2-17. The next stage is Generate. This is where required capacity and capacity starts to be generated and the focus of the majority of the activities is to actually organize, train, equip and build the FSF and its institutions. The FSF functions must be generated before they can be employed. Generation won’t end until all the planned FSF have been generated and have started performing their designed functions, but the focus will shift from generation to employment as more and more of the FSF is generated.

2-18. The third stage is Employ, where the generated capability and capacity is applied for its designed purpose. The primary SFA task during employ is to advise. During employ, the US often provides US enablers to augment the capability provided by the PN. During the next stage, this additional enabling capability will be reduced to a point where it is no longer needed.

2-19. The fourth stage is Transition where the EGO functions are transitioned to the PN in a manner that supports their ability to sustain their FSF capabilities and capacities. The majority of the activities in this stage are focused on transitioning activities to the PN.

2-20. The fifth stage is Sustain where the PN and the US revert to normal security cooperation as part of the TCP to maintain proficiency, improve interoperability, improve capability and capacity, and maintain opportunities for access.

2-21. The PGETS model can be applied for a single capability or for the entire security force. The Plan stage will always be carried out first, but the other stages are dependent upon the respective level of development of the PN capability and the way that the US is willing to support the PN. The PN may be unable to generate its own capability, but may not want the US to provide advisor and enabler...
assistance during employment thus negating the need for US participation in the employ, transition, and possibly the sustain stage.

SFA PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-22. While operational design is useful to the SFA planner in constructing a generalized conceptual framework, the following SFA planning considerations that support the imperatives described in Chapter 1 may help planners in the development of SFA support plans.

2-23. **Information** is the linchpin of SFA. Understanding of FSF structure and requirements developed during the initial intelligence assessment influences effective SFA planning during all stages. Ultimately, sound intelligence satisfies two primary requirements: a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment of the FSF, and a viable estimate of threat capabilities and intentions. A joint, interagency, and coalition intelligence effort supports a better understanding of the operating environment by leveraging indigenous sources while building a more professional FSF. The planner must understand and consider all the various threats to the operation.

2-24. **Systems perspective of the operational environment.** One way to think of the operational environment is as a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), and other systems. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts SFA activities. Understanding the social and political components of the PN, including in-depth sociocultural analysis, enhances the SFA planner’s ability to anticipate or prevent hostile acts within the PN or across the region. The PN population’s support toward their security force is vital to the security of the region. Popular disenfranchisement following any major shift in political power needs to be addressed in planning. Public support to the FSF and their coalition partners will be paramount to success and viewed as a continuous long-term campaign effort. This long-term campaign effort should reach from the grass-roots levels of the PN to governmental arenas as well as the supporting coalition partners’ spheres of influence. Planners and practitioners must comprehend the elements of PN PMESII systems including culture, language, and societal organization (i.e. tribes, criminal associations, political organizations, etc.), and how to influence them through productive relationships with leaders.

*For further guidance on developing a systems perspective as part of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), refer to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. For further guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint operation planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*

2-25. **Balance security and synchronization.** US and coalition forces must share space, experience, and intelligence with the FSF. Leaders must balance security and force protection against requirements of the SFA mission. The SFA force must follow established protocols for sharing sensitive information with the FSF in order to ensure that the information shared does not wind up in the wrong hands. On the other hand, an inconsistent or untimely transfer of information can jeopardize the trust between the SFA force and the FSF, and may delay the FSF’s ability to assume control over the operational environment. US forces tend to conduct planning and communication activities using their own networks, which inhibit information sharing with the FSF. In all cases, planners and practitioners must consider how to effectively share information with the PN forces in advance of the commencement of the operation.

2-26. **Conduct and maintain frank, honest assessments.** Planners and practitioners must carefully assess all dimensions of SFA activities. Planners must understand shortcomings and deficiencies and develop contingencies to either counter or develop an alternative to meet the requirement. Leaders at all levels in SFA missions must communicate these shortcomings or deficiencies to ensure that "fixes" by both the PN and US or coalition structures address those shortcomings in a timely fashion. Advisors
may need to develop an elaborate shadow chain of communication to help the FSF better see itself. However, SFA planners and advisors must understand cultural factors when sharing assessment information with FSF counterparts.

2-27. **Leader selection.** The development of leaders within the US military who understand SFA is critical. During the past several years, the Services established training organizations to develop advisors for specific SFA missions. However, not everyone is equally suited for SFA and it is important to continue to select and employ leaders who understand SFA at the conceptual as well as practical levels. SFA operations usually involve a steep learning curve and extensive experiential learning events. The Services must continue to develop officers and NCOs with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes necessary to lead and conduct SFA. The goals, objectives, frustrations, and typical functions of SFA operations must be clear to the leaders and their forces, setting appropriate expectations up front. This will mitigate misperceptions and unproductive friction between coalition and PN forces. Chapter 10 of this planning guide addresses this matter in greater detail.

2-28. **Long-term commitment.** SFA campaign objectives may require a long-term commitment of US resources. The availability of funds, time, and US public support may not always be in harmony with the requirements of developing a FSF. To address public support, plans should have public affairs (PA) and strategic communications points that outline themes and messages supporting a long-term commitment. Planners need to formulate a concept appropriate to the task assigned, and consider the impacts of the constraints with these tasks and other variables. Planners should then staff their appropriate SFA requirements and recommendations to their senior leaders and seek adjudication against these constraints (funds, time, and public support) to optimize their SFA efforts.

2-29. **Identify and work towards GEF-directed US goals, DOD priorities, and theater objectives.** Identifying an end state allows political and military authorities to formulate plans to achieve the stated SFA goals and objectives. Planners should develop intermediate objectives that link specific SFA activities to theater objectives. SFA activities are typically found in country plans and should directly contribute to the attainment of theater objectives.

2-30. **Develop and maintain institutional memory.** The nature of SFA may require long-term commitment, which often requires unit rotation. Transitions between successive rotational units or advisor teams may produce unintended pauses or even regression in the development of PN security forces. Units must develop and maintain an institutional memory that can transfer this knowledge and information to incoming units. As a best practice, joint force commanders can implement comprehensive relief in place and transition of authority (RIP-TOA) checklists to standardize transition activities, and to analyze and archive these critical milestones. Continuity is maintained as advisors evaluate and build upon previous efforts from a position of understanding achieved through a solid RIP-TOA process. Units should integrate FSF personnel into the development and continuation of the plan to address all aspects of force development.

2-31. **Provide security and protect the force.** Under some circumstances, such as following major combat operations or while the PN is combating an insurgency, additional US or coalition forces may be required to establish and maintain security within the PN until the FSF is sufficient for the task. When the PN’s population is fearful of violence at the hands of insurgents, terrorists, or criminals, they may not support their government's efforts to develop a legitimate security force for fear of reprisal. Planners should consider establishing a US security force to protect the PN population until permanent legitimate government reforms are implemented and a level of security is achieved. The failure to establish a basic protective force for the PN population will hinder SFA development operations. If fear of reprisal against self or family is too great, FSF recruiting will suffer and absenteeism of trainees will be high. Additionally, local civilians will be much less likely to provide information on threat activity and the quality and quantity of HUMINT, critical to counterinsurgency operations, will degrade.
2-32. Historical examples from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan indicate that SFA personnel who live and work in the local community alongside the FSF have enjoyed greater success than forces that barricade themselves in and limit contact with the local population. Therefore, in cases where SFA is conducted in the course of a larger counterinsurgency campaign, force protection and security are critical factors planners must address for SFA operations. Rarely can the SFA forces perform both SFA and security (based on the threat situation) without degradation of both missions unless additional dedicated security forces are provided.

2-33. Promote Legitimacy and Governance. The US conducts SFA to improve the FSF’s ability to protect and defend the legitimate government of the PN. The FSF must be imbued with a mindset that it exists to defend not only the PN’s population or territory, but its constitutional framework or equivalent set of processes and procedures for legitimate governance. FSF and SFA forces conducting operations must obey the laws of the legitimate government and the international community for fair and humane treatment of civilians. These rules also must consider the local culture and practices, and the implications of not adhering to them. Inappropriate use of force or authority degrades the legitimacy of the PN government and security force. US and coalition partners should assist in the establishment of PN institutions that sustain the judicial system including police forces, court systems and the prison system. There will be those instances where informal governance systems also exists in parallel to the PN formal structures. In these cases, SFA planners must anticipate the challenges of linking the PN government’s federal institutions with local or tribal systems of governance.

2-34. Manage resources. Planners should identify realistic needs based on campaign objectives and historical lessons learned. Resourcing should be both sustainable and flexible to support the fluid nature of SFA activities. Resourcing is more than just meeting immediate needs, but encompasses planning for future requirements as well. Planners should also be familiar with the resources other partners such as coalition governments, USG departments and agencies can provide. More importantly, planners must map out and understand the processes and even the personal relationships for coordination of interagency resources, to include knowing what PN resources are or will be available. A critical part of managing resources will be the ongoing effort to maintain political support for SFA activities for the duration of the operation.

2-35. Clarify command relationships. SFA activities may involve multiple joint and combined military units, as well as other US government departments and agencies, and international organizations performing different but often interdependent roles. This fluid array of activities and actors requires clearly defined command relationships to include the delineation of supported and supporting roles in each SFA line of effort. Designating a single authority over all SFA activities (unity of command) may incur political and technical challenges. For this reason, planners should agree upon, delineate, and understand lines of authority and decision-making and clearly designate supported and supporting entities. Timing is critical when rotating key leaders or transitioning the SFA force’s objectives as the SFA mission matures.

2-36. Consider the Capabilities of Allies and Coalition Members. Allies and nations that are willing to act in a coalition bring their own capabilities which may be significantly different from those of the US and they may have more or less restrictions on their use. There is a robust network of LNOs stationed within DOD’s COEs and institutions. Many of these partner nations have conducted their version of SFA across the globe. Their efforts, experience, and lessons learned can be leveraged to inform, even supplement, our own SFA activities and capabilities. Every effort should be made to work with partner nations to capture their best practices and lessons learned in a country or region of interest.
Chapter 3
Plan Stage

This chapter provides an introduction to ways that military planners can request and utilize US resources to support SFA across the range of military operations. Planning and resourcing is done at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels and follows two specific paths: Campaign plans and Contingency plans. This chapter also provides a primer on authorities that the USG may use. However, this is only a starting point as authorities change over time. All DOD interactions with international partners are governed by specific legal authorities, which in turn authorize, fund, and establish constraints on SFA activities. Always consult your staff judge advocate for specific and current guidance in order to maximize opportunities for success, as well as to avoid negative legal or fiduciary consequences.

Figure 3-1 Means, Ways, Ends

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Abbreviations Key
FMF - Foreign Military Sales
IMET - International Military Education Training
PEP - Partnership Exchange Program
PFP - Partnership for Peace
2282 - Building Capacity for Foreign Security Forces
SFA - Security Force Assistance
FSF - Foreign Security Force
OSA - Other Government Agencies
DOD - Department of Defense
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
USCG - United States Coast Guard
Abbreviations Key
1207 - Global Security Contingency Fund
MCO - Major Contingency Operations
Stab Ops - Stability Operations
HA - Humanitarian Assistance
PKO - Peace Keeping Operation
Abbreviations Key
CT - Counterterrorism
UW - Unconventional Warfare
SFA PLANNING APPROACH

3-1. The basic structure to planning is matching resources to tasks to achieve a specific purpose. For SFA, the resources have two basic components: programs which come in the form of appropriations and authorizations, and personnel with their equipment (units). All programs and units have their capabilities, limitations and restrictions. Planning is normally done in reverse order, looking first at the Ends, then the Ways, and finally the Means. As see above, Figure 3-1, the diagram follows the format of a mission statement (means, ways, ends) where a unit will be given the funding and tasked to conduct an activity to achieve an objective.

3-2. Determining the correct objective is key to success. Normally, planning centers around determining what the US wants or needs to achieve. For SFA, it is critical to determine the FSF objective first. What problems are the PN trying to solve? In knowing the FSF problem, the US can then determine if it is feasible, acceptable and suitable for the US to help the foreign nation resolve those problems. Assuming the US wants to aid the partner nation, the US and the PN must agree on what must be changed to achieve the PN objective. As show above in Figure 3-2, the PN nation must determine what actions it will have to take to change the environment and only then can the US start to figure out what it must do to help the PN achieve its goal. Picking the wrong tasks by the PN and the US at this point will lead to failure. Picking the right tasks does not ensure success.

Critical to planning is understanding that developing security capabilities is a long process. Actions that will happen within twelve months are immediate and can be modified only slightly. Most money is programmed in a two year cycle. In order to make most resources available, planning must occur before this two year cycle starts.

3-3. Another key planning consideration is where on the Spectrum of Conflict the Security force will be expected to operate. The US has strict laws that delineate what its military forces may and may not do. The figure 3-4 below shows that not all forces are expected to work equally well in all environments. However, the US may be asked to conduct SFA under any conditions.
3-4. The EGO functions can be performed at a National, District and Local level for all the various security forces that the PN will employ. One cannot assume that just because resources have been placed at the national level that there are no other security entities that may need support to manage the executive function or generate forces. Additionally, as all the security forces work in concert to maintain control and enable governance, planners must be aware of which forces are being developed, who is doing it, and what their timelines are following the PGETS process.

3-5. Planning is required for SFA whether the PN capability is an EGO function, strategic, operational, or tactical, whether it is a military force, a police force or a border guard unit and whether it is a routine aspect of the TCP or if it is a task during a contingency operation.

ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION

3-6. Building FSF capability and capacity should begin with an overarching analysis of requirements, existing capabilities, capacity and constraints, including a thorough consideration of cultural, political and economic factors. This information is then considered in the context of US national security interests and available resources, as reflected in strategic guidance.

3-7. Each situation will differ depending upon the level of conflict and the Partner Nation’s existing capabilities and capacity of their security forces. The complexity and difficulty of conducting SFA increases dramatically when working in a failing or failed state. Under such conditions, the key PN’s operational level security sector organizations, particularly Defense and Interior ministries, may not be present or effective.

3-8. Analysis must start from an understanding of the operational environment, the required end-state and taking into account the regions needs and concerns. Analysis should determine the requirements for force development, training, sustainment, unit and logistical distribution, deployment of forces, and equipment acquisition for each type of security force.

3-9. Assessments must be comprehensive, and include Joint, Interagency, and multi-national partners from planning through execution, as directed in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, “Security Sector Assistance.” However, where partner organizations are not available or prepared to coordinate
Chapter 3

with SFA planners, the Joint Force must be prepared to fill the gap. The application of the military estimate or decision making process may serve as a useful starting point.

**FSF ASSESSMENT**

3-10. Assessment of the FSF is critical to determining what problems the FSF must resolve. Conducting a thorough FSF assessment reduces the risks of identifying the wrong problem or focusing on factors that do not actually affect the FSF problem(s). The FSF assessment enables the SFA organization to establish the right developmental objectives and then allows for the alignment of developmental tasks (OTERA). The FSF assessment provides a comprehensive understanding of FSF capability requirements relative to their environment.

3-11. The FSF assessment looks at four elements: organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional. Together this provides a holistic perspective of FSF capability, capacity, and proficiency levels in relation to security environment they must operate in.

**ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

3-12. The organizational assessment looks at the designed or intended capabilities and capacity, and the effectiveness of the FSF in performing its assigned tasks. To determine what the organization is designed to do, the organizational assessment answers the three following questions:

- What are the roles of the FSF?
- What is the FSF Mission? (FSF Mission Analysis).
- What are the FSF own developmental goals and objectives?

3-13. **What are the FSF roles?** The role of a FSF should identify its designed and/or intended operational or institutional purpose(s). A FSF may have multiple roles and, at times, it may perform roles for which it is not specifically designed or configured to do. Regardless of declared or stated roles, the tasks and functions the FSF unit is actually performing determines what role the unit is filling. Roles will be operational or generating, although some FSF units may have both operational and generating roles.

- **FSF operational role.** FSF having an operational role operate and execute within the Joint/Warfighting functions. These functions enable the organization to conduct mission tasks and to execute other mission related requirements.
- **FSF generating role.** FSF having a generating role have supporting functions (e.g. administrative, resource management, planning, operations, etc.) that allow the organization to carry out institutional tasks (e.g. recruiting, training, doctrine development, human resource, medical support, acquisition and procurement activities, etc.). FSF must be able to recruit, organize, train, and equip its own personnel to operate as members of teams and provide logistics and other support.

3-14. **What is the FSF mission?** The staff responsible for planning SFA should conduct mission analysis through the eyes of the FSF commander in order to provide an operational perspective of the FSF mission. This analysis allows SFA planners to consider how they would execute the mission if they were the FSF within its constraints, limitations and culture. Ideally they could compare and contrast their analysis with the analysis of the FSF unit, but this is not always possible.

3-15. **What are the FSF’s own development goals and objectives?** FSF may have formal methods of identifying and developing capabilities within their own forces. As such, an SFA organization should fully understand the FSF development process and synchronize SFA developmental efforts.
within the PN process. As development within the FSF occurs, the ability of the FSF to sustain progress in development and the ability to recognize its own capability gaps is of paramount importance.

**OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

3-16. A clear understanding of a FSF operational or institutional mission serves as the starting point to base the operational assessment. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the FSF ability to perform its assigned missions, roles, or functions. It answers the question as to how well the FSF can conduct its assigned tasks.

3-17. **How well can the FSF conduct its assigned tasks?** FSF with an operational role will execute missions by employing the Joint/warfighting functions. For example, a unit that failed to properly conduct a cordon and search may have failed because they lost communication with part of the cordon force (command and control) or they may have gone to the wrong location (intelligence). A generating unit may have failed to produce sufficient basic training graduates because it did not recruit enough soldiers or too many of the trainees quit because they were not receiving pay (resource management). Be careful not to arrive at conclusions prematurely. In the example of the operational unit losing communication with its cordon, it could be because of old and worn out equipment, poor maintenance of equipment, insufficient training, poor leadership, lack of standard operating procedures or a number of other causes.

**ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT**

3-18. The FSF environmental assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on specific FSF organizations. The environmental assessment should validate the suitability of a FSF organization’s assigned tasks. This may also reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities and/or capacities in the FSF beyond those normally associated with a similar type security force. The environmental assessment answers the questions:

- What capabilities and how much capacity does the FSF really need?
- How proficient does the FSF actually need to be?

3-19. **What capabilities and how much capacity does the FSF really need?** Establishing what capabilities the FSF really needs as it relates to the environment has precedence in all developmental activities. The environment determines requirements immediately placed on a FSF. SFA planners must determine what tasks the FSF units must perform to meet objectives within their environment. These FSF required capabilities should provide the basis for development. As FSF units operate and conditions change, SFA planners should adjust accordingly. As an example, an infantry battalion assigned to provide security for a large rural area might need different capabilities in order to cover large distances quickly and communicate over extended distances than an infantry battalion that is working primarily in a small section of a city.

3-20. **Establishing the “How Well” a FSF Unit Must Perform a Task.** How well a FSF unit performs its required tasks will normally serve as the basis for the development of measures of effectiveness (MoE) for SFA organizations. Determining how well a particular FSF is or is not performing a specific task or achieving an objective depends directly on the conditions it must deal with. For example, if an infantry battalion is succeeding in defeating the enemy when coming into direct contact, they do not need to improve their marksmanship to make every soldier a sniper. If the enemy then changes tactics and begins engaging at longer ranges, the unit may have to improve its marksmanship capabilities.

3-21. SFA planners must confirm where there are shortfalls or gaps between existing capacity and required capacity to succeed in the environment. Capability gaps can be traced to deficiencies in one
or more of the development constructs such as Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities – Policy (DOTMLPF-P) (US), Defense Lines of Development (DLOD) (United Kingdom), Personnel/Leadership/Individual Training, Research and Development, Infrastructure/Environment/Organization, Concepts/Doctrine/Collective Training, Information Management and Technology, Equipment and Support (PRICIE) (Canada and New Zealand), Fundamentals Inputs to Capability (FIC) (Australia) as they relate to required or desired capabilities. These gaps form the basis for SFA developmental objectives.

3-22. The environmental analysis must consider an understanding of current conditions that affect or influence specific FSF units. Variables such as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) influence development and may have a positive or negative impact on development. For example, if a commander is perceived to be corrupt, his unit may be denied resources which would hamper development of the unit. Units with a strong political or social connection may receive priority for new equipment.

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

3-23. The institutional assessment evaluates FSF capabilities by examining DOTMLPF-P or a similar construct in order to close existing capability gaps. The institutional assessment answers the questions:

- Why is the organization performing at its current level?
- What can be done to improve its performance?

3-24. Why is the organization performing at its current level? This question seeks to identify institutional and other causal factors as they relate to capability gaps or factors that are impeding development.

- **Doctrine.** Is there a need to help develop PN doctrine? If so, what domains will it cross, e.g. Armed Forces/Police/Intelligence/wider security forces? Does the organization have standard operating procedures (SOPs) or existing doctrine?
- **Organization.** C2, Size/Sustainability/Composition and Ethnicity considerations.
- **Training.** Duration/Level/Depth, Capacity for training/throughput and sustainability.
- **Materiel.** Availability of equipment, standardization of equipment, loan of equipment and sustainability of equipment.
- **Leadership and Education.** Does Key Leader development occur through training programs in the PN or in countries and what are their morals/ethics?
- **Personnel.** Personnel administration, effective recruiting system, career progression processes including promotion, demobilization and reintegration. Effective and timely pay system including pensions and disability payments. Linkage to PN identification process, i.e. vetting. Discipline procedures and personnel welfare including family support.
- **Facilities.** C2, barracks, operational e.g. force protection measures and permanent check points. Logistics and training facilities. Coordinated basing plan which requires long term development and sustainment.
- **Policy.** Written or standing practices that affect the organization, such as a leave policy, promotion boards, selections for schools, etc.

3-25. What can be done to improve its performance? Underlying conditions within the domains of the varying capability constructs are where developmental problems can normally be traced. Knowing what is impeding development enables SFA planners to determine SFA requirements (i.e. what the SFA organization must do) to enable development in the FSF. For example, if the FSF is unable to conduct command and control because its radios are worn out, a solution could be to acquire new radios, develop better maintenance procedures, or obtain repair parts to fix the existing radios.
3-26. Through these assessments, the commander is able to characterize the FSF in terms of their level of development (resource, generate, employ, transition, or sustain) and determine how forces should be aligned to accomplish the developmental tasks of OTERA in support of SFA objectives.

### Security Force Assistance

**Sequencing Activities to build Partner Nation Security Capabilities**

![Diagram](image)

3-27. The diagram above, Figure 3-6, illustrates how the planners usually have to craft a plan using a large number of programs to achieve the final objective. It is seldom that one single program will be able to achieve proficiency. Some programs are more flexible while others may be very specific.

### AUTHORITIES AND APPROPRIATIONS

3-28. USG appropriations follow specific laws and guidelines that evolve over time to meet explicit needs. Due to the complexity of funding programs and their laws, SFA planners need to remain current on the laws, programs, policies and actual appropriations.

31 USC 1301

Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.

3-29. Authority for the DOD to conduct SFA activities, like any other military activities, requires USG approval. US law, codified into United States Code (USC), provides the authority for the DOD to execute security force assistance (SFA). The two titles in USC that apply most directly to SFA are Title 10 USC (Armed Forces) - DOD and Title 22 USC (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) - Department of State (D(S)).
Chapter 3

- Title 10 USC outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD programs receive permanent authorities from Title 10 USC. Title 10 USC authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the US ambassador to the host nation.

- Title 22 USC outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DOS with respect to foreign relations. When a program states "Title 22", it means that, by law, DOS maintains overall responsibility for the program. DOS requests funding from Congress, monitors program execution, and reports program status to Congress, even when implementation of the program is delegated to DOD.

- The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended, are included in Title 22.

3-30. SA is a tool of US foreign policy. Statutory responsibility for SA rests with the Secretary of State under the direction of the President. The DOS is responsible for the supervision and general direction of all US foreign assistance, to include SA programs. The DOS determines whether there will be a SA program with a given country. This determination outlines the aid granted to a given country and sales of defense articles. The DOS has responsibility to ensure that SA is integrated and in harmony with other US policies and activities on a country-to-country, regional, and global level. Security assistance programs allow the transfer of military articles, services, and training to partner governments. Security assistance transfers may occur through sales, grants, leases, or loans.

3-31. Foreign governments may formally request nation assistance through diplomatic means. Some of this requested assistance is provided through SA programs. Congress recognizes that countries have valid defense requirements that also align with the United States’ national security interests. To this end, Congress authorizes the President in Section 1 of the AECA to sell, loan, and lease US defense articles and services to those countries when determined by the President to be consistent with US foreign policy interests. US foreign assistance, including SA, contains authorities to maintain a level of funding to meet the various foreign assistance programs. These security programs include the economic support fund (ESF), international military education and training (IMET), the foreign military financing program (FMFP), and the voluntary peacekeeping operations (PKO) programs.

3-32. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the hub of most DOD security cooperation activities and is DOD's primary interface with the Department of State on security assistance issues. It develops and promulgates DOD policies and procedures through the security assistance management manual (SAMM). It serves as the DOD focal point with US industry on security assistance issues. DSCA oversees all financial accounting for security assistance, including USG appropriated funds and customer cash payments. It also manages DOD training of both international personnel and US government employees who work in the security cooperation field. Finally, DSCA is responsible for a number of security cooperation programs, including humanitarian assistance, disaster and emergency response, and the DOD demining program.

3-33. Achieving SFA objectives requires "selecting the right tool for the job." Selecting the right tool can be a challenging task due to the wide variety of SA and SC programs that incorporate SFA activities. Figure 3-7 lists some of the more commonly used authorities for SFA. The table shows the authorities with the relevant SA tasks and activities. The last column depicts the purpose for the authorities. Note that the term SFA is not listed specifically since the purpose of the table is to show different ways of funding SFA. SFA relies on various funding sources (sometimes referred to as "pots of money") that are defined by statute in the USC. The stated purpose of the SFA activity limits the funding authority selection (which pot of money may be used). Although the strategic purpose of the activity is usually stated, SFA planners must ensure that the operational-level SFA tasks and their associated funding streams nest appropriately within the strategic intent. For example, as US forces draw down
in Afghanistan, global counterterrorism efforts will become more widely distributed across the GCCs, and characterized by a wider variety of security force assistance activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program/Current Authority</th>
<th>Tasks / Activities</th>
<th>Purposes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not an exhaustive list- for reference only see SJA for guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
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<td>Coalition Readiness Support Program (CSRP)</td>
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<td>Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)</td>
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<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)</td>
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<td>Counter Drug Support to Other Countries (1033)</td>
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<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIDI)</td>
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<td>Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP)</td>
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<td>Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses</td>
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<td>Excess Defense Articles (EDA)</td>
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<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
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<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)</td>
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<td>Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)</td>
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<td>Global Train and Equip (2282)</td>
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<td>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</td>
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<td>International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE)</td>
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<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)</td>
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<td>Lift &amp; Sustain (Global)</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defense Advisor Program (MoDA)</td>
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<td>Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Partnership Program (SPP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional CCMD Activities</td>
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Figure 3-5 Programs and Current Authorities

3-34. From the list of SFA tasks and activities (provide training, provide equipment, provide education, provide construction, provide supplies, conduct mil-to-mil activity, or conduct combined exercises) at the operational level, the planner selects those tasks or activities that are suitable and in concert with the purpose, but also permit flexibility. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has developed a website that provides a searchable list of authorities, tasks, and purposes. It is called the Partnership Strategy Toolkit and can be accessed via the link [https://apps.osd.mil/sites/PSTools](https://apps.osd.mil/sites/PSTools).

3-35. US forces can be expected to conduct sustainable presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capability and capacity of partner nation forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, facilitate peacetime and contingency access to partner nation infrastructure, and increase US influence. As fiscal resources become more limited, SFA planners must constantly implement measures to improve efficiency in order to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity.
Since 2005, Congress passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities that are not permanent law within the United States Code, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriations acts. These special authorities often contain “dual key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State (or in other cases, with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission). Some programs specify support toward a particular country (e.g. Iraq or Afghanistan), or to partner nations who participate in US operations. Other programs are enduring peacetime activities, which apply broadly around the world. Each program has its own limitations and not all programs apply to every partner nation. Below is a representative list of DOD security cooperation programs:

- **Joint Exercise Program** - The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Exercise Program offers foreign countries the opportunity to train with the US in exercises that may lie beyond their ability conduct on their own. The Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program allows developing countries to be reimbursed for expenses directly related to the exercise to include rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation. Other programs can be used in conjunction with the exercise program such as the use of humanitarian and civic assistance programs, personnel exchange programs, combatant commander's initiative funds, official representation funds, exercise related construction, and Service-specific operation and maintenance funds. Careful design of an exercise can greatly enhance the training benefit to all the participants.

- **DOD regional centers** - DOD maintains the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the William S. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies to serve as forums for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, and exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants.

- **Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)** – CTFP was established to meet an emerging and urgent defense requirement to build partnerships in the struggle against violent extremism through targeted, non-lethal, combating terrorism (CbT) education and training. CTFP programs are designed to address key CbT challenges globally, regionally, and in specific countries through a tailored program of educational and training activities.

- **Counter-narcotics assistance** - Section 1004 and 1033 authorizes US military training of foreign police forces, an activity that the Foreign Assistance Act – a separate law governing most security-assistance programs – does not authorize for counter-narcotics purposes. These programs are restricted to specific countries whose military forces require assistance in combating narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism. This type of support includes maintenance, repair, and upgrading of equipment; transport of US and foreign personnel and supplies; establishment and operation of bases of operation and training; training of foreign law enforcement personnel; detection and monitoring; construction to block drug smuggling across US borders; communication networks; linguistic and intelligence services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance. Programs can be implemented by the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) resident in the US Mission to the PN, or directly through the GCC, and may or may not use the foreign military sales (FMS) process for procurement of defense articles and training.

- **National Guard State Partnership Program** - provides a unique capability to combatant commanders and US ambassadors through partnerships between US states, territories and the District of Columbia and foreign countries. The state partnership program supports US national interests and security cooperation goals by engaging partner nations via military, socio-political, and economic conduits at the local, state, and national levels.
• International armaments cooperation - is “cooperative research, development, test, and evaluation of defense technologies, systems, or equipment; joint production and follow-on support of defense articles or equipment; and procurement of foreign technology, equipment, systems, or logistics support under one of the programs of security cooperation.”

• Train and equip - (“Section 2282”) - Enacted in FY 2015, Title 10 Section 2282 of the US code provides DOD the authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces. This codified Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, which was amended and regularly extended through 2015. Like the previous “1206” program, 10 USC 2282 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes – counterterrorism and stability operations – and foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism operations. As opposed to grant allocations by country, specific project proposals are developed and submitted for 2282 funding approval. Projects must have the concurrence of the DOS, and are normally implemented through the FMS process. The SCO usually coordinates these projects.

• Humanitarian and de mining assistance - Title 10, USC, Section 407 states that under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the assistance will promote either the security interests of both the USG and the country in which the activities are to be carried out, or specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

• Exercise Related Construction (ERC) is unspecified minor military construction outside the US in support of the JCS Joint Exercise Program. ERC funds are appropriated as part of the annual military construction (MILCON) budget request. Projects must be complete, useable, and remain after conclusion of the exercise. ERC projects may be constructed by U.S. military forces, combined U.S. and PN forces, and/or contractors. DOD manages and ensures the timely execution of the ERC program in full accordance with all applicable DOD and JCS directives, instructions, and guidelines. The intent of ERC projects is to support the CCMD Joint Exercise Program military to military engagements through JCS exercises within the CCMDs’ AORs. ERC projects are intended to support exercise training objectives, reduce overall exercise costs, enhance safety, and improve training opportunities.

• GPF Training Authority 1203 - Section 1203 of FY14 NDAA gives GPF nearly the same authority as SOF JCETs. It enables GPF the opportunity to train with FSF to the benefit of GPF. Certain conditions apply when using Sec. 1203 authorities. Quoting from the NDAA, ‘Any training conducted by the United States Armed Forces pursuant to subsection (a) shall, to the maximum extent practicable - support the mission essential tasks for which the training unit providing such training is responsible; - be with a foreign unit or organization with equipment that is functionally similar to such training unit; and- include elements that promote observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and respect for legitimate civilian authority within the foreign country or countries concerned.’

3-37. Keeping track of these authorities can be very challenging, as they frequently expire at the end of each fiscal year, making their future availability entirely dependent upon annual renewals by Congress. The result is a tenuous collection of temporary authorities, although they can be extremely useful for SFA operations. Despite repeated requests by DOD to make some of these special authorities permanent, Congress has largely resisted this approach, citing concerns over a shift of traditional DOS authority to the DOD. The chief advantage cited by combatant commanders is the speed of funding for special authorities which can be achieved in months, compared to more traditional Title 22 programs, which can take years from request to delivery. Commanders and SFA planners need to work with
appropriate combined or joint comptroller offices and their staff judge advocates to determine the appropriate funding authorities that are available to them.

3-38. Current legislation prohibits providing assistance to governments that have violated human rights. The prohibition on human rights violations applies not only to the foreign government, but also to its armed forces. Beginning in 1997, the annual Foreign Assistance Appropriations Acts have included a provision referred to as the Leahy Amendment, after its sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont. This act required that there will be no security assistance to any security force unit if the Secretary of State has credible evidence of gross violations of human rights by that unit or by an individual in that unit. Funding can resume only when the State Department reports to Congress that the country has taken effective steps to bring the responsible unit or individuals in that unit to justice. The result of this legislation has been the initiation of a screening, or vetting process by the SCO in-country and the US Embassy. This process is designed to identify and eliminate any foreign military members or units from training by, or exercising with, US forces if they have been involved in human rights violations or criminal acts. This vetting was later codified as Section 620J of the FAA. This language also may be found in the annual DOD appropriations acts and prohibits such funding unless all necessary steps have been taken, or unless the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, decides to waive the prohibition due to extraordinary circumstances.

3-39. The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) serves as defense attaché to the partner nation and the chief of security cooperation at that US embassy. (Note for remaining sections: SDO represents the functions of the SDO/DATT). As such, they act as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing US defense issues and activities in the host nation. This includes security cooperation programs under the oversight of the GCC.

3-40. Security cooperation organizations (SCOs) are all DOD elements located in a foreign country as part of the US embassy or consulate with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SC and SA management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security cooperation or security assistance functions. SCOs in partner nations play a key role in the planning, coordination, and execution of both security assistance and other security cooperation programs, especially those that involve the provision of education or training.

3-41. The President may assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to a foreign country to perform functions delineated in Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act. These functions pertain to security cooperation and security assistance and also equipment and services case management; training management; program monitoring; evaluation and planning of the host government’s military capabilities and requirements; administrative support; promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability and other defense cooperation measures; and liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance. The SCO is the lead organization to carry out these seven functions.

3-42. In the management of FMS equipment and services cases, the SCO functions as an in-country intermediary for information flowing between the customer and the implementing agency or agencies in the US, the SCO must maintain a complete file of all records that pertain to each FMS sale in order to assist the implementing agency and the host country in the management of the FMS case. These records help monitor the progress of FMS sales. The SCO may be asked by the host country to explain case reports, case status, and messages relating to the FMS case. The SCO should participate in program management reviews of ongoing sales to the host country. The records should contain financial reports as well as supply reports on individual sales. The SCO is a country “advocate” representing the national security and foreign policy interests of the US; the SCO is involved in case management but is not the FMS case manager.
3-43. Program monitoring is one of the most important functions of the SCO. Monitoring the progress of SC programs and transactions, initiating appropriate remedial action, or advising the appropriate DOD components of problems and issues encountered are all key functions of the SCO. FMS often leads to SFA activities involving training and advising tasks, and the associated assessments of those activities. The SCO evaluates the host nation military’s capacity to employ and maintain requested equipment, and assists in processing SC requests as required. This evaluation and advice should promote interoperability between the host country and the US Program monitoring includes monitoring the end use of US-origin equipment by the host nation, as well as the ultimate disposal or transfer of those items.

3-44. The SDO also serves as the principal embassy liaison with the host-nation’s defense establishments actively participating in national security and operational policy development and coordination. As the principal in-country DOD diplomatic representative of the Secretary of Defense and DOD components, they present coordinated DOD views on all defense matters to the Chief of Mission.

3-45. The SDO’s primary purpose is to work with the PN military and defense establishments to accomplish a number of assigned functions. To do this, the SDO must coordinate with many different organizations and activities while developing or implementing security cooperation and security assistance programs. The SDO must develop relationships with other members of the country team to understand how their respective initiatives and the security cooperation and security assistance programs interface to accomplish the US goals for a particular country. The SDO must develop relationships with the members of the regional combatant commander’s staff, with the country desk officers of the Military Departments, and the component commands that provide support at the Department of Defense level. Finally, the SDO must also develop a working relationship with US industry representatives to facilitate delivery of systems or services.

3-46. The GCCs are responsible for security cooperation and security assistance programs and support of the personnel assigned to the respective countries in those areas. The functions assigned to the GCC include, but are not limited to: providing DOD staff activities and agencies’ evaluations and recommendations concerning programs and issues in his area of responsibility, and management and provision of resources to the SCO.

3-47. Foreign military sales (FMS) is the largest and probably the most well-known of all US security cooperation programs. FMS is a Title 22 security assistance program, authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and implemented by DOD. It is the process by which international partners contract with the USG to obtain defense articles, services, and training. This contract process is referred to as an "FMS case." DOD may provide articles, services or training either from stock, other internal resources, or through procurement. The FMS system is remunerated through the partner nation’s own national funds. However, while the PN may fund FMS programs by means of their own revenues, they might also fund these programs via money provided to them by the USG via FMF described below. The FMFP and resulting cases may serve as a mechanism to procure articles and services for Title 10 programs.

3-48. Another major security assistance program under Title 22 is Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. FMF is an annual congressional appropriation under the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. The resulting funds are managed by DSCA and available to partner nations as grants or loans. Countries then utilize these funds to procure defense articles and services through the foreign military sales process. FMF funds are requested by the SCO, through the GCC, during the annual FMF budget submission process in support of its country campaign plan.
3-49. As noted by Clay Crawford in his article, “A Few Hints for the New Security Cooperation Officer”\(^{11}\), the first priority is to determine specifically what you need to do to help build host nation capacity. It is best to start with the strategic guidance and work your way down to the country and SCO specific plans. Perhaps the most important aspect of building partner capacity is the relationship between the SCO and the HN. It will be very difficult to attain the SCO goals and objectives without developing and sustaining key relationships with the HN counterparts. Of course, this will not happen overnight. Relationship building takes time and effort—developing trust, knowing who makes the key decisions, understanding the culture (not everyone operates like us), etc. The basics of understanding how the strategic guidance, embassy and GCC plans, and the HN strategies flow down to the individual program levels remain important. It is also critical to determine where the gaps exist and the best way to fill them to build partner capacity effectively. Finally, building and sustaining relationships continues to be the key ingredient for successful SCOs. Unit visits, representational events, and going the extra mile will all play a significant role in enhancing the SCO & HN relationship. Finally, the SC projects envisioned by one SDO will often be implemented by a following SDO and finished by a third SDO so it is vitally important that these plans be integrated in the GCC’s TCP, the Country Team’s Country Plan and HN’s national security strategy.

UNITS

3-50. SFA planners require a basic knowledge of how the US military Services prepare for SFA operations and what they can provide so planners can frame the requirements and requests for the type of capabilities needed to meet the mission. While the Services retain control over which units to deploy, understanding what capabilities are available allows the planner to coordinate specific needs early in the SFA planning cycle. The following section outlines units and processes each of the Services uses to meet security force assistance requirements.

ARMY

3-51. Army units are increasingly focusing on preparing for missions within a specific GCC. This regional alignment will enhance relationships between planning staffs while improving units’ familiarity with areas in which they will most likely be employed. The Army is working diligently to prevent war in the future through select Army units, partnered with allies and specific nations around the globe; a strategy it terms “regional alignment.” The Army’s combat training centers (CTCs) improve unit readiness by providing highly realistic, stressful, joint and combined arms training across the full spectrum of conflict (current and future). Rotational units include conventional airborne, air assault, light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored units, as well as special operations forces from all Service components. The CTCs and regionally aligned forces are described below.

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the 3rd Bn, 353rd Armor Regiment

3-52. The 3-353rd, part of the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, trains advisor skills, combat skills, and security force assistance techniques and procedures to provide Army and joint force commanders with trained personnel and units to build partner nation security capacity in support of the regional Army service component commands’ (ASCC) theater campaign support plans. The 3-353rd primarily trains US Army conventional forces (as opposed to special operations forces) personnel.

Strategic Context

The 3-353rd’s SFA training program nests within the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) force generation cycle, which includes home station training, leader development training, and brigade combat team (BCT) level collective training at one of the Army’s CTCs at either Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Irwin, California; or Hohenfels, Germany.

Regionally Aligned Force (RAF)

3-53. The RAF is the US Army's concept of military organization intended to provide the GCCs with mission-trained and regionally focused Army forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. Regionally aligned forces are drawn from total force assets, which include the active US Army, the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. To assist in the provision of specialized support to the Combatant Commands, the Army will habitually align one corps or division headquarters to each GCC. This operational warfighting headquarters will primarily provide planning support to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and may serve as a contingency Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Through regional alignment, the Army plans to maintain its core war-fighting skills, and complement these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural awareness training.

3-54. The RAF training and employment concept requires an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and military forces of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. This applies to Army organizations and capabilities that are forward deployed, operating in a combatant command area of responsibility, supporting, or prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Aligned forces will always maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals. Regionally aligned forces will:

- Provide predictable and dependable support to GCCs
- Generate rotational forces (tailorable, scalable, various duration—contingency force concept)
- Maintain readiness for contingency operations
- Foster continued SOF – conventional force synergy
- Strengthen relationships & interoperability with allied and partner-nation land forces

3-55. Under Army regional alignment, some of the Army is already habitually aligned and includes Special Forces, civil affairs units, military information teams, foreign area officers, and the Army National Guard State Partnership Program. These Army, Reserve, and National Guard units are traditionally focused on specific countries and regions. They either require or encourage their soldiers to learn the languages of those regions, and some of these personnel may focus on a single region for most of their careers. Some units are assigned to a particular GCC, such as 2nd Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division, which are assigned to US Army-Pacific, the ASCC for US Pacific Command. Assigned units remain regionally aligned to the same GCC, although Army personnel assigned to them will rotate on the normal Army personnel rotation cycle.

3-56. The Army’s basic unit of employment is the BCT. Initially, the Army aligns a BCT to each GCC to provide a consistent, dedicated, and regionally focused Army force with capabilities to support their security cooperation and partnering requirements, and to respond more quickly and effectively to a potential crisis or contingency. These BCTs will not be habitually aligned, and will rotate at regular intervals.

3-57. Finally, United States Army FORSCOM distributes other Army forces between the GCCs for planning purposes. While distributed forces do not have as active a role as special operations forces or assigned units, regional alignment provides a training and education focus. Distributed forces will be the first considered for additional security cooperation activities or contingency requirements. In general, units distributed to combatant commands will not be habitually aligned and will rotate yearly.
Regional alignment will not change where any Army units are based. Although units will focus on an individual region, if circumstances require, all regionally aligned forces can support any one of the DOD’s combatant commands at any time; they are globally responsive and regionally engaged.

**US Army Security Assistance Command**

3-58. The US Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) is responsible for managing SA programs and FMS for the Army. USASAC serves as the primary entry point for U.S. Army materiel- and service-related FMS requirements.

3-59. USASAC leads the Army Materiel Command’s SA Enterprise and co-leads the Army SA Enterprise. The command develops and manages SA programs and FMS cases to build partner capacity, support geographic Combatant Command engagement strategies and strengthen U.S. global partnerships.

3-60. USASAC implements approved US Army SA programs, including FMS of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments. USASAC is responsible for life cycle management of FMS cases, from pre-Letter of Request, to development, execution and closure.

3-61. To carry out the Army SA mission, USASAC relies on AMC Life Cycle Management Commands as well as other DOD agencies and US industry to support its processes. Each sale of equipment to overseas customers comprises the same “total package” of quality materiel, facilities, spare parts, training, publications, technical documentation, sustainment and other services that AMC provides to U.S. Army units.

3-62. The US Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO), a subordinate command of USASAC, facilitates deployment of training teams throughout the world to provide training tailored to a country for equipment purchased through FMS. USASAC manages approximately 5,000 FMS cases valued at greater than $160.7 billion.

Geographic locations include:
- Headquarters, Redstone Arsenal, Ala.
- New Cumberland, Pa.
- U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization, Fort Bragg, N.C.
- Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard
- Liaison officers at Combatant Commands

**MARINE CORPS**

3-63. The Marine Corps service campaign plan 2014-2022 assumes combatant commanders will "maintain, if not increase, their requirements for Navy and Marine Corps forces to support steady state engagement activities." This requires the Marine Corps to seek efficiencies in managing requirements in support of ongoing operations and security cooperation activities articulated in various theater campaign plans. The Marine Corps training and deployment plan addresses the persistent need of developing partner nation security forces.

3-64. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is the Marine Corps’ principal organization for conducting missions across the range of military operations. The naval character of the forward-deployed MAGTF enhances its global mobility, lethality, and staying power. The MAGTF provides continuous presence in international waters, immediate national response capability, the ability to seize key terrain in order to enable the introduction of follow-on forces, and the ability to conduct combat operations ashore, employing organic aviation and logistics capabilities. In support of the GCCs’ respective theater campaign plans, the Marine Corps leverages its forward-deployed, crisis response-capable Marine expeditionary units (MEUs and special-purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) to conduct
combined training exercises and other SC activities with partner nation security forces at every opportunity. In addition to sustaining the MAGTF’s training and war-fighting capabilities, these exercises foster mil-to-mil relationships, maintain peacetime and contingency access to host nation infrastructure, and build the capability and capacity of partner nation security forces.

**Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG)**

3-65. MCSCG executes and enables Marine Corps SC programs, training, planning, and activities in order to ensure unity of effort in support of Service-level and regional Marine Corps Service component command (MARFOR) objectives and in coordination with operating forces and Marine air-ground task forces.

- MCSCG was established in 2007 to assist in coordinating Marine Corps SFA and SC efforts, to provide conventional training and advisor support to FSF or to conventional forces. MCSCG also provides planning assistance to regional MARFORs in assessing, developing, and executing partner-nation training programs in order to build partner capacity in support of GCC SFA and SC objectives.
- MCSCG provides specialized engagement capability, creates effective advisors to conduct SFA and SC missions, assists MARFORs in assessing FSF capabilities and developing and executing PN training plans, and establishes and maintains long-term, persistent relationships with country teams and FSF. MCSCG is the link between MARFORs and supporting forces providing assessment, planning, coordination, and liaison support.
- MCSCG provides oversight, coordination, and synchronization for the execution of Marine Corps SFA activities and enabling support to the operating forces, supporting establishment, and reserve forces. Advisor and trainer teams comprise officers and staff non-commissioned officers that are regionally focused, providing support to MARFORs supporting theater SFA and SC plans.
- MCSCG trains and assesses task-organized advisor and trainer teams to support operational requirements. The pre-deployment training program for advise, train, and assist teams consists of individual, core, unit, and mission specific training based upon region, country, and mission requirements as determined by the GCC, MARFORs, and MCSCG.

**NAVY**

3-66. Navy operations occur across all domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) in the operational and information environments. As such, Navy security cooperation activities occur in each of these domains. It follows that Navy activities may occur across all branches of a PN’s defense establishments and in direct contact with the civilian populace. Thus, tactical missions must account for the PN capacity and desires, the strategic and operational objectives of the US government, as well as the appropriate resources to execute the planned activities. Because of the various capabilities the Navy can bring to bear, selection of the proper resources is paramount to ensure maximum contribution to GCC SC objectives.

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Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS)\textsuperscript{13}

3-67. The NAVSCIATTS was commissioned NAVSCIATTS an echelon IV shore command OPCON and ADCON through Commander, Naval Special Warfare Center and Naval Special Warfare Command to USSOCOM on 1 October 1999. Collocated with Special Boat Team - Twenty Two on Stennis Space Center, NAVSCIATTS’s immediate supervisor is NSWG-4. This arrangement has resulted in improved maritime SFA training integration with Special Boat Team operational support to Naval Special Warfare Units, Theater Special Operations Commands, Combatant Commanders and Partner Nation maritime units worldwide. NAVSCIATTS currently offers 13 formal courses of instruction in English, Spanish and other languages during five in-resident semesters graduating as many as 80 partner nation international military students from across the globe each training cycle. NAVSCIATTS also deploys Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) globally in support of Special Boat Team Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) worldwide.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

3-68. NECC maintains scalable active and reserve forces capable of training and advising foreign security forces and security institutions. While these forces are constantly evolving, some resources that may be available to the SFA planner are:

- Coastal Riverine Force (CRF) with active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) CORIVRONs.
- Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command (NEIC) with AC and RC Intelligence Exploitation Teams (IET).
- The Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC), which trains, equips, and deploys IAs in support of overseas contingency operations.

AIR FORCE

3-69. Security force assistance processes in the Air Force take a variety of forms. The Air Force developed and tasked various types of structured schools, centers and units to train Airmen how to advise and develop partner nation air forces. Some of these activities occur stateside where the partner nation sends equipment and personnel to the United States for pilot and maintenance training, or language classes in established schools and units. Another developmental approach involves Airmen deploying outside of the continental United States as mobile training or advisory teams to the PN and embedding within their unit. The method may vary depending on the requirements, but there are several key organizations and processes the Air Force employs in developing Airmen to conduct security force assistance.

USAF Expeditionary Center

3-70. The USAF Expeditionary Center provides rigorous, relevant, and flexible education and training to prepare and motivate air-minded professionals to assess, train, educate, advise, assist, and equip partner nations in the development and application of their aviation resources. The center trains airmen to better engage with PN counterparts to include all air and ground activities required to establish, operate, maintain, and sustain an aviation capability, including space and cyberspace capabilities. It encompasses both the military and civilian aviation capabilities of a partner nation

Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center (AFSOAWC)\textsuperscript{14}

3-71. The AFSOAWC organizes, trains, educates, and equips forces to conduct special operations missions; leads major command irregular warfare activities; executes special operations test and evaluation, and lessons learned programs; and develops doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for Air Force special operations forces.

3-72. The 6th Special Operations Squadron under AFSOAWC assesses, trains, advises, and assists foreign aviation units in special operations airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration. When required, AFSOAWC executes operations directly, employing organic tactical capabilities. They also apply mission capabilities across the operational continuum with emphasis on CbT, FID, and unconventional warfare (UW). They advise and assist combatant commanders, civilian agencies, and foreign internal aviation units on planning and integrating foreign airpower into theater campaign plans, contingencies, and other joint and multi-national activities.

Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) Squadron\textsuperscript{15}

3-73. AETC is the executive agent for all Air Force sponsored international training and education. The command implements and approves Air Force sponsored security assistance training, monitors the progress of training and welfare of US Air Force-sponsored international students, and provides guidance for implementation of the DOD informational program. Each year AETC members train or facilitate training for more than 5,500 students from more than 135 countries attending flying, technical, medical and professional education and training. The AFSAT squadron maintains permanent divisions at each of the theater Air Force headquarters. The key divisions are as follows, see footnote for complete information to include the following divisions and other support elements within AFSAT.

- The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) division manages training programs for 54 different countries.
- The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) division manages a portfolio of training programs for 18 countries. The division is the focal point for all USAF-sponsored security assistance and security cooperation training programs supporting international partners in the Middle East region. The USCENTCOM training effort represents some of AFSAT's largest and most consistently demanding workload due to political visibility, program dollar value, student volume, training complexity and critical impact on US national security.
- The United States European Command (USEUCOM) division manages training programs for 52 different countries. The Netherlands operates a training squadron of 10 Dutch F-16 aircraft in the continental United States. It is AFSAT's formally appointed security assistance program manager's responsibility to manage this dedicated squadron.
- The United States Northern & United States Southern Command (USNORTHCOM & USSOUTHCOM) division manages training programs for 30 different countries. A significant portion of USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM training efforts are via MTTs used to meet training requirements ranging from civil engineer, to Defense Language Institute, to fighter integration working group support.


\textsuperscript{15} Air Education and Training Command, About, Fact Sheets, AETC Units, http://www.aetc.af.mil/About/FactSheets/AETCUnits.aspx
Chapter 3

- The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) division manages training programs for 28 different countries. Taiwan and Singapore actually operate training squadrons of foreign-flagged F-16 trainer aircraft in the continental United States to enhance their flying training proficiency. It is AFSAT's formally appointed security assistance program managers’ (SAPMs) responsibility to manage these “dedicated squadrons.”

Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons

3-74. The Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) mission is to train, advise, assist, and equip partner nation air forces in the development of their aviation enterprises, primarily focusing on their air mobility systems. The MSAS core capabilities are command and control, air operations, communications, aerial port, aircraft maintenance, aeromedical evacuation, and support functions.

3-75. Air mobility command activated the 571 MSAS, Travis AFB, California, and the 818 MSAS at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB MDL), New Jersey. The two MSAS units reached full operational capability December 01, 2012. The two squadrons belong to the 621st Contingency Response Wing, which is headquartered JB MDL. The 571st MSAS supports USSOUTHCOM objectives in Central and South America while the 818th MSAS supports USAFRICOM. Collectively, the two squadrons are a key component of the Air Force support to the DOD building partner capacity efforts. With the two squadrons at full operational capability, MSAS Airmen are now focused on forging relationships and sharing best practices with partner nations on an Airman-to-Airman level; a tactical mission with a global impact.

COAST GUARD

3-76. Since the 1960s, Training Center (TC) Yorktown has been home station-away-from-home to thousands of international students from more than 100 naval and coast guard services while continuing its long-standing tradition of providing training in a variety of technical and professional courses. In 1998 the International Resident Training Branch was established to manage the ever-expanding international program which currently involves 250 international students from upwards of 60 countries annually. The training branch offers in-resident and mobile training capabilities:

- Resident School: DOS Security Assistance enables civilian and military personnel from many nations to participate in Coast Guard training programs in order to acquire new skills or to advance technical and professional capabilities. Approximately 250 international students - officer, enlisted and civilian - annually attend the Training Center Yorktown schools and courses: search and rescue (SAR), maritime safety, aids to navigation, engineering and weapons, maritime law enforcement, and small boat operations.

- The International Training Mobile Training Branch (MTB) travels to countries and provides technical training and consulting services in maritime law enforcement, marine safety and environmental protection, small boat operation and maintenance, search and rescue, port security and infrastructure development for countries with waterway law enforcement programs.

3-77. The international maritime officers school (IMOS) resides within the international resident training branch at TC Yorktown. The schoolhouse provides an in-depth overview of US Coast Guard organization, planning and management of its missions to mid-grade coast guard, navy, maritime police and civilian equivalent personnel from around the world.

16 TCYorktown, International Division, United States Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/tcyorktown/international/default.asp
3-78. The international MTB is the backbone of the US Coast Guard’s effort to provide training worldwide. Each year, working with the international affairs staff, members of MTB travel to countries around the globe providing technical training and consulting services in maritime law enforcement, marine safety and environmental protection, small boat operation and maintenance, search and rescue, port security and infrastructure development for countries with waterway law enforcement programs.

**UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM)**

3-79. USSOCOM provides oversight for the training and education of military and DOD civilian personnel to conduct SFA. Some of their lead responsibilities are:

- Serve as lead for the development of joint doctrine, training, and education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the individual to the Service-level.
- Identify and establish guidelines for skills, experience, rank, training, education, and levels of expertise for Service members and career DOD civilian and contractor personnel to conduct SFA activities.
- Assessment of SOF proficiency and readiness to conduct SFA activities into the annual assessments of SOF proficiency.
- Identify and explore new SFA concepts and capabilities and integrate them into the joint concept development and experimentation program.

3-80. The joint combined exchange training (JCET) is a program utilized by SOF to maintain their proficiency. Congress clarified the authority of the USSOCOM in 1991 to use operations and maintenance funds for overseas deployments in which SOF train with the armed forces and other security forces of friendly foreign countries. Provided that the purpose of JCET training was to train US SOF, legislation found in 10 USC 2011 (1994) gives authority for the DOD to pay training expenses for these activities. These activities are incorporated into the TCPs of the GCCs.
Chapter 4
The Generate Stage

The foundation of SFA is generating foreign security force capability and or capacity. Generating an FSF can occur during any phase of an operation, and anywhere across the range of military operations. The FSF cannot employ a capability until it is generated. The effectiveness of the force will depend largely upon how it is generated.

INTRODUCTION

4-1. During planning and resourcing stage, US planners validate the executive, generating, and operating functions of the FSF and determine where improvements are needed. In many cases, the US government representatives to the partner nation, to include the SDO, work with the partner nation to negotiate security sector assistance initiatives, and then the DOS turns to the CCMD to determine how to make the DOD part happen. GCC planners analyze the requirements and design SFA activities to meet the DOS as well as the CCMD’s overall intent. The planners then determine capabilities milestones for the FSF as the capability is being generated. At the same time, planners develop SFA tasks for the SFA force (usually a Service component command of the GCC) for each line of effort. Optimally, the FSF would only require a one-time upgrade of an existing capability during a time of peace when there are preexisting and working executive, generating and operating functions for the FSF and a legitimate, stable, popular government, a stable society, and a developed and growing economy. However, in a worst-case scenario, the FSF could be in conflict with an internal and external threat while being directed by a dysfunctional, dishonest, and unpopular government amid a broken society after the executive, generating and operating functions of the FSF have been completely destroyed.

GENERATION

4-2. The SFA tasks that apply to FSF generation are organizing, training, equipping and building or rebuilding. The OTER construct is compatible with, but subordinate to the overall OTERA model, but focuses only on the actions required to generate the FSF (the term “advise” is more commonly associated with employment and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5). Fundamentally, these core OTER functions require identification, resourcing, and resolution of capability gaps across DOTMLPF and FSF policy.

ORGANIZE

4-3. Organizing foreign security forces primarily encompasses the areas of doctrine, organizational structure, personnel, and materiel (See Figure 4-1 for linkages). In other words, the act of organizing a foreign security force requires analysis to determine the tasks that the force will be required to perform, and then establishing personnel, equipment, and mission command structures that organize the assets and capabilities required to perform those tasks in accordance with an enduring doctrinal framework. Typically, cultural factors, legacy organizational structures, and existing systems will shape the organization of the FSF.
Doctrine

4-4. Shaping FSF doctrine is much more than translating US doctrine into another language and providing it to the FSF. Clearly, there are cases where a FSF will want to use US doctrine (see the Taiwan case study). This is most common for the operational forces, and least common with the executive forces. For many security forces, it is cost effective to copy existing successful models. Yet, even if the FSF takes advantage of these models, they will have to have some system of management and integration. These processes and the personnel to manage them must be incorporated into the plan. Ultimately, the FSF’s enduring doctrine will provide the structure and continuity required to extend the value of the SFA effort long after the SFA mission is complete.

Organization Structure and Purpose

4-5. Organization requires an understanding of what the FSF will be required to do. It addresses structure, personnel, skills, equipment and purpose. One product of organization is a visual representation of those organizations and their operational functions. Organization establishes chains of command, and enables the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal nesting of efforts among units or elements of any security force. SFA planners should propose organizational structures that espouse the characteristics and attributes of the FSF personnel in order for them to successfully accomplish their assignments. Organization addresses the social and political challenges in generating and utilizing the organization.

4-6. Organization begins with identifying the FSF’s organizational functions, roles, missions, and operations, in the context of a framework of their strategic guidance documents, and if applicable, any current operation or campaign plans. Planners determine the FSF’s organizational capability requirements, gaps and appropriate actions as shown in Figure 4-2.
The goal of identifying FSF capability requirements and gaps is to determine how the FSF will eliminate those gaps to meet their requirements which could be done by creating an organization with the capability to fill a specific gap or by increasing capability across existing units. Primary outputs include: Description of the mission and security problem being assessed

- Identification and assessment of prior studies, and other analytical products applicable to the area of interest
- Identification of the tasks to be completed to meet the mission objectives
- Identification of the capability requirements in terms of the tasks, performance, and conditions
- Assessment of capability gaps between the identified capability requirements and current or programmed force capabilities
- Assessment of operational risks associated with each capability gap if not addressed
- Evaluation of possible non-materiel and materiel approaches to satisfy part or all of the capability requirements and close or mitigate the associated capability gaps
- Recommendations for the most appropriate approach to be taken to close or mitigate capability gaps and reduce operational risk.

4-7. The key is to describe what capabilities are required, and whether they support an enduring peacetime activity or ones that must be sustained until the end of a current conflict. What is the target, threat or operational deficiency? What cannot be done without new or improved equipment or materiel? Do proposed solutions include threshold or objective performance requirements for any key attributes? This description must also specify the latest acceptable date to address the capability requirements and capability gaps. Specific consideration should be given as to whether the force will be expeditionary or it will operate from fixed installations.

4-8. In the event of technological or other challenges, SFA force planners and their partner nation counterparts should indicate whether receiving a partial solution on schedule is preferred to a delayed solution which satisfies a greater portion of the capability requirement.

4-9. Planners must provide estimates of acceptable percentages of reduced performance or acceptable delay timeframes. In other words, what is the trade-off between a 60-percent solution now versus a 95-percent solution six months from now? In all cases, SFA planners should develop risk estimates that support the JTF or GCC’s decision cycle with respect to capabilities development timelines.
4-10. SFA force planners and partner nation leaders must clearly indicate the initial operational capability requirement, desired delivery date, and any impacts to personnel, training, logistics, and communications. They must also consider material and non-materiel solutions, and describe non-materiel options and alternatives for consideration. For materiel solutions, identify and discuss viable solutions from US or allied or other nations’ sources. For example, equipment solutions based upon major end items manufactured in Russia, China, or other former Warsaw Pact countries may be the preferred option based upon the FSF’s existing proficiency with these systems. Planners must conduct detailed analysis to identify quantities of major end items required and distribution among applicable FSF components to include expected quantities required for spares and training activities. Identify any known constraints such as arms control treaties, logistics support, transportation, manpower, training, and non-military barriers.

Personnel

4-11. Within the organization aspects of SFA, FSF personnel requirements include the recruitment of quality human capital representing the demographics of the population, sources of qualified personnel, and the eventual permanent assignment of personnel. It accounts for promotions and retirements as well as considering time before, during, and after assignments. When designing a FSF personnel system, SFA planners must account for the estimated number of FSF personnel on the rolls but not present or fit for duty, those currently undergoing basic training or formal schools, or those personnel who are between assignments. In order to support a capability, the knowledge, skills, abilities, and competencies needed to perform a position, job, or task must be identified. Task analysis and development of detailed position or billet descriptions complements the development of the FSF organizational structure. Where the required personnel do not exist, the personnel system must be able to create new occupational specialties to support new missions, threats, and technologies.

Recruiting

4-12. Recruiting consists of those practices, processes and structures that support the selection and integration of non-security force personnel from outside a service, agency or organization into its system to become a security force member. Usually, recruiting is the first step for a prospective member and precedes an accessions compatibility examination, and some form of individual training, which further integrates them into the security force. Recruiting is a key force generation function as it sustains the organization with the personnel required to maintain its force levels. Under most conditions, units conducting SFA do not physically recruit FSF personnel and the SFA effort consists of training the FSF executive and generating forces to recruit by building institutional knowledge and training in:

- Force projection, funding, and sustainment requirements
- Inform and influence activities geared toward FSF employment opportunities
- Force generation occurring in a positive environment for FSF trainees
- Themes and messages within the operational force promoting a positive FSF sub-culture through the current FSF personnel, families, and government advertisement.

Train

4-13. Training as a force generation function can be described as those practices, processes, and activities designed to instill and develop the individual and collective task capabilities of individuals and units to meet operational requirements. At the institutional level, individual training includes initial entry training, occupational specialty or technical training, and leader development training or professional military education. Collective training refers to a variety of activities that include maneuver exercises, combined arms training, and command post exercises that may span the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. SFA planners should consider a systems approach to training.
that includes task analysis, training design, curriculum or exercise development, processes for implementation, and evaluation of the individuals or units being trained. This “analyze-design-develop-implement-evaluate” system constitutes a feedback loop that the FSF generating or operating functions can assume responsibility for as their capabilities and capacity mature.

4-14. Individual training focuses on basic training, professional development, and technical skills training. Collective training focuses on the ability of units to perform at multiple echelons while incorporating all of its war-fighting or policing functions. Institutional training is centralized, operating from a common curriculum and training methodology with common instructors. Entities like The National Training Center and the JRTC are the largest institutional training venues operated by the US military. Unit training is decentralized. It operates from a standard task list with the units having input as to which tasks are trained and in what order so that a unit is trained to execute its mission. Unit training also has greater variation as compared to institutional training. Training can be focused at the tactical, operational or the strategic level. The FSF executive, generating, and operating functions all have tiered levels of training.

4-15. Experience is the basis for all learning. Experience can be first hand (learn by doing) or second hand (learn from others’ mistakes). Reflection occurs in an attempt to understand something that was experienced. During training, reflection relates the experience to application of the subject being trained on. Doctrine compiles experience and concepts and forms the basis for training and education.

4-16. Training resources are finite, so units are first taught to perform missions based upon doctrinally correct tactics, techniques, and procedures. Doctrine provides a template for what is believed to work in the majority of situations. Thus, units are not expected to conduct trial and error until they come up with a working solution, or train by “discovery learning.” Accordingly, doctrine is often revised after each conflict or as the result of experimentation in order to capture applicable lessons, thus reducing the risk that the new doctrine “fights the last war.”

4-17. FSF doctrine should be designed to reflect universal truths while applying capabilities the FSF actually has access to and a requirement for. US combined arms doctrine for instance assumes the availability of artillery. Police forces and some militaries will not necessarily have access to such capabilities. Additionally, US doctrine divides policing functions from military functions. As a result, foreign police forces trained by the US military tend to be more developed in conducting military activities than they are in conducting policing activities. Unless a conscious effort is made during planning, SFA personnel will gravitate towards training others in the skills and tasks that the SFA personnel are good at, as opposed to prioritizing training on the skills the FSF really need.

4-18. Once doctrine has been taught, the focus of training shifts from theory to application. Hands on training and realistic training are slogans that reflect the importance of knowing and doing. The third aspect is training to standard and not to time. This is commonly espoused but seldom accomplished. Normally, training is executed according to a schedule, which affords conducting the activity once, conducting an after-action review, and then moving on. Resources must be allocated to ensure that functions are done correctly. Training is the key to ready trained forces; successful SFA activities instill the FSF with an appreciation for the value of quality training.

**EQUIP**

4-19. Equipping as a generating function can be described as those processes and structures that field, maintain, and account for the materiel required for partner nation security force personnel and organizations to train for and execute their roles and missions. Equipping the FSF relates to materiel, which includes not only major end items such as vehicles, weapons, or aircraft, but also the other classes of supply that sustain those systems. Most equipment will be sourced through a number of possible SA programs, to include FMS, direct commercial sales (DCS), or through the provision of excess
4-20. The process of equipping FSF presents a number of implications for the FSF, such as facilities and life support for trainers. These implications necessitate an assessment defining the location, characteristics, and capacity of facilities to initially train and then support FSF during operations. The assessment of requirements takes into account cultural expectations, force protection, proximity and connection to the local community, training support, and the budget to acquire and maintain the equipment provided. The equipping plan needs to define accountability and control measures to track equipment use in order to reduce the likelihood of corruption or compromise by hostile forces or other foreign agents. FSF equipping plans must also take into consideration equipment lifecycle concerns such as sustainability, supply and maintenance, and operator training and proficiency.

4-21. As discussed in paragraph 4-12, as well as throughout Chapter 3, equipping FSF is a complicated process with many oversight mechanisms that must be addressed in order to comply with US laws. Effective SFA planners begin the equipping process by conducting a detailed assessment of all FSF DOTMLPF considerations, existing systems, trained personnel already fielded by the FSF, and CCMD- or Service component command objectives. In some cases, equipping programs may be designed to enhance interoperability between the PN and US or allied forces, which introduces a different set of drivers into the planning process. In all cases, SFA equipment solutions must provide the FSF with the required operational capability, they must be sustainable given the PN’s own economic or human resources, and must be appropriate given the GCC’s overall theater campaign plan.

REBUILD AND BUILD

4-22. Rebuilding and building as a generating function can be described as those practices, processes and structures that develop and maintain the physical infrastructure required to sustain the FSF. This could include installations, ranges, buildings, road networks, airfields, shipyards, or other security force related infrastructure. Build or rebuild addresses the “facilities” element of DOTMLPF. This set of SFA activities incorporates the supplies and engineering support required to construct or repair buildings, roads, runways, and infrastructure, and encompasses the activities it takes to maintain them in support of operations or capacity generation.

4-23. Facilities are physical structures that serve a specific purpose. Police stations, courthouses, and government offices are examples of facilities. Infrastructure is a system of utilities such as electrical, water, and sewer systems that support the operation of a facility. Infrastructure also refers to systems, services and facilities necessary to support economic, political, or military systems such as transportation networks (roads, railways, canals, seaports), communication systems (telephone, internet, cellular phone), and military installation systems. For the purpose of this guide, "facilities and infrastructure" refers to the physical structures and systems that support and sustain a FSF’s security force organization.

4-24. Sustainable security forces facilities and infrastructure are dependent upon many broad factors such as communications, funding, governance, institutions, the indigenous labor pool, and regional cultural factors. Infrastructure is often abandoned or discarded if the PN does not take pride in ownership or have the ability to maintain it. This is another reason why cultural considerations, to include architecture and decoration are worthwhile considerations for SFA facilities planners.
4-25. Assessing a need and planning for a build or rebuild activity must be conducted in conjunction with the FSF. Assessments (covered in detail in Chapter 8), are based on identifying the security force requirements, which fall into three categories: direct, indirect and other requirements. Direct requirements are headquarters, barracks or housing complexes, dining facilities, and training areas (classrooms, ranges). These are the easiest to capture since units can readily identify these requirements. Indirect requirements are those facilities and infrastructure systems needed to support operations but not exclusively tied to the security organization. Electrical, water, and wastewater production and the distribution systems (power lines, poles, pipes, valves, etc) fall within this category and are commonly referred to as area or communal requirements. Other requirements identify environmental, geographical and physical assessments that provide the framework for the organization to operate. These may involve requirements like obtaining permits, or scheduling and passing inspections.

4-26. Some countries lack official certification processes such as building codes for construction, to include electrical, plumbing, and structural safety standards. Subsequently, project designs developed outside the country may not support the construction techniques used by local companies. Theater policies regarding standards for design, building, utilities, and safety should be provided to ensure construction is of a style and from materials that the PN can sustain. Caution should be used when using US standards for permanent facilities as problems may arise in procuring parts and materials for these facilities as well as infrastructure support after the FSF assumes ownership.

4-27. Facilities and infrastructure, once constructed, require operation and maintenance (O&M) funds to prevent them from falling into disrepair before completion of their expected lifecycle. O&M programs are new concepts to some FSFs and may be required as part of SFA planning and operations.

**CASE STUDY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taiwan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The US has provided Taiwan (Republic of China) with its military defense capability for almost 50 years as part of diplomatic agreements and developing relations. The political strategy has been to build the Taiwanese defense capability and capacity in order to deter military action from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and create a superior military allied force in the Asian-Pacific region. The US accomplishes this by conducting SFA activities in response to Taiwanese requests for defense capabilities, and assessments that have been commissioned by Congress that justify the need in accordance with national security interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The US SFA activities include the sale (FMS) of, and training programs (SA &amp; SC) for F-16A/B fighter jets and associated equipment. The program was initiated in 1992 and completed with the last delivery of aircraft in 2001. Due to the cost of maintaining aging equipment, and the advancement of PRC military equipment technology, in 2006 Taiwan began the diplomatic process to procure new F-16C/D fighters through the same US programs and activities. The Bush administration could not approve the sale; it was not conducive with the relations and agreements being negotiated with the PRC, who vehemently opposed the sale of new equipment to Taiwan at the time. Initially, President Obama concurred with his predecessor. In November 2009, during the US - PRC summit, President Obama publicly reiterated the US commitment to Taiwan's defense capability. A 2010 congressionally mandated assessment of Taiwan’s air defense forces was conducted. It concluded the Taiwanese air defense capability had diminished, affecting its ability to deny the PRC air superiority. Readdressing the issue with a new strategy, Taiwan requested the US upgrade its existing inventory of F-16 A/B fighter jets. Recognizing the opportunity to increase Taiwan’s air defense capability without selling new equipment to</td>
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Taiwan, the Obama administration approved the request. On July 13, 2012, Taiwan signed an agreement for the program, at a value of $3.7 billion. The F-16A/B fighter upgrade program will include several SFA activities and funding programs prior to completion. The expected date of completion is 2021, and the retrofit would reportedly provide upgrades that provide a set of capabilities comparable to the F-16C/D fighters.17

KEY “GENERATE” POINTS

ANALYSIS

4-28. EGO (executive, generating, and operating functions): In this example, the US is generating an operational capability for the government of Taiwan. The Taiwanese executive capability did not need to be assisted and the US was providing the generating function as the manufacturer of the aircraft and the owner of the training base, and was not recreating that capability on the island of Taiwan.

4-29. Authorities: Special authority exists regarding US relations regarding Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the US to sell defensive arms to an entity, which is afforded all the rights of a sovereign nation except the official recognition.

4-30. Programs: In the example above, Taiwan purchased the F-16 aircraft using their own money so it would be a FMS case.

4-31. The US conducted an assessment in cooperation with the host government. This assessment was directed by Congress and therefore would not be chargeable as an FMS case. Based on this assessment, which was shared with the host government, the host government submitted a letter of request through the American Institute in Taiwan, which performs the functions of a US embassy. Because the US has agreements with the PRC to decrease sales of arms to Taiwan, the US was willing to upgrade existing F-16 capability but was hesitant to sell new aircraft.

TASKS

4-32. Organize: Doctrine will need to be updated to incorporate capabilities of the upgraded airframe. Personnel will need to be selected for training or retraining to perform operation and maintenance.

4-33. Training: Pilot training occurs at Luke Air Force base and is conducted by the 21st Fighter Squadron, which has been conducting the mission since 1997 in conjunction with the original sale of F-16s to Taiwan. This is institutional training. Unit training and host joint training could be conducted as part of a bilateral exercise at a future date (SC).

4-34. Equip: DSCA and the Air Force will provide oversight to Lockheed and the other contractors that will be supplying the parts and making the upgrades.

4-35. Rebuild or build: Facilities requirements would need to be identified to house the upgraded aircraft and its supporting requirements such as aircraft maintenance, as well as any required infrastructure upgrades or modifications to airfields, radar, and air traffic control in order to support the upgraded aircraft.

4-36. Advise: No advising would be conducted at this point. However, advising actions should be planned for to address maintenance schedules and equipment usage in order to maximize the equipment’s operational capabilities and lifecycle.

**GOALS**

4-37. The US is threading a needle with regard to meeting the requirements of Taiwan without compromising relations with the PRC. The ultimate US goal is regional peace and stability while maintaining a positive relationship with all the parties. Taiwan is an independent actor and has its own goals and objectives, as does the PRC. The US has so far enabled Taiwan to maintain a solid defense capability without antagonizing the PRC. However, this delicate balancing act will be tested in the future as the PRC develops more sophisticated military capability and the US will be forced to sell new equipment or allow the deterrence level of Taiwan’s forces to erode.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS - GENERATING**

4-38. Every force must be generated before it can be employed regardless of what EGO functions it will perform. Any plan must consider the time and effort it takes to create these forces.

4-39. The US generating force is sized to sustain itself, the US executive force and US operating forces. Excess US capacity is used to generate capability for other nations. Very few US units exist with the sole mission of developing foreign security forces, especially foreign police forces.

4-40. The US operating force has been used to generate foreign generating forces, but is best suited to collaborate with FSF operating forces after the foreign operating forces have been generated.

4-41. In planning and executing FSF generation, it is vital to know to what extent each of the three FSF EGO functions must be generated, which US forces are going to do it, and what OTERA tasks the US units will be conducting. Because of the multitude of dynamic factors in the contemporary operating environment, it is impossible and unnecessary to model US foreign policy as to when, where, and why the US will generate foreign security forces.

4-42. Table 4-1 provides sample questions relating to force generation in support of FSF that may be helpful to the SFA planner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Initial Planning Considerations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>What is the education level of the country?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What demographic groups support the government? The military? The police?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Will the force be stationed where it is recruited?</td>
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<td>Will the force be reflective of the nation or the region? (US active military are national, US National Guard are regional. Police in the US are primarily local.)</td>
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<td>What themes encourage national service?</td>
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<td>Which force is more prestigious - military or police?</td>
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<th>Organize</th>
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<td>• Doctrine</td>
<td>What doctrine does the FSF already use?</td>
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<td>Are other countries training the FSF?</td>
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<td>Is the FSF allied with other countries that use similar doctrine?</td>
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<td>Organization Structure and Purpose</td>
<td>Does the FSF require separate Services? (Some countries have limited aircraft or watercraft, which do not require the infrastructure that a Service entails).</td>
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<td>Does the military have a police function? Do the police have a military function?</td>
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<td>Is the force expected to be expeditionary?</td>
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<td>Will the force have some sort of reserve or auxiliary system?</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
<td>What qualifications are required for service as an officer, a warrant officer, an NCO, an enlistee?</td>
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<td>How are promotions determined?</td>
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<td>What branches are needed?</td>
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<td>When are personnel scheduled for training and professional military education?</td>
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<td>How are assignments determined?</td>
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<td>How are personnel demobilized, released, or retired?</td>
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<td>Train</td>
<td>What organization is responsible for individual training?</td>
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<td>What organization is responsible for unit training?</td>
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<td>What form of training cycle has been established?</td>
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<td>Who determines when personnel get trained?</td>
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<td>What standards do they use?</td>
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<td>Where is the training conducted?</td>
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<td>Equip</td>
<td>What equipment does the FSF manufacture?</td>
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<td>What equipment does the FSF purchase?</td>
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<td>Does the FSF life-cycle manage?</td>
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<td>Who maintains the equipment?</td>
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<td>How does the FSF dispose of equipment?</td>
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<td>What is the funding source?</td>
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<td>Rebuild and Build</td>
<td>How does the FSF maintain its current infrastructure?</td>
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<td>Does the FSF own the property where its facilities will be located?</td>
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<td>Is this a repair, replacement or new infrastructure?</td>
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<td>Does the local community also use the same services? (Phone lines, power lines, sewage, water treatment, roads)</td>
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Chapter 5
Employing Foreign Security Forces

The Employ Stage

Employing the FSF, whether by the PN or, in unique circumstances by the US, must be considered as part of the up-front assessment and understanding of the overall SFA mission. US employment of foreign security forces is never preferred, but occasionally the US does become involved in the direct the employment of FSF. During steady-state SFA missions in support of GCC theater campaign plans, US SFA forces will assist in the organization, training, equipping, and rebuilding of the FSF during times of peace or at other points on the spectrum of conflict, but will avoid being placed in contact with hostile forces. In cases where the partner nation faces an internal or external threat that it cannot deal with on its own, the US, acting bi-laterally or as part of a coalition, may deploy forces to assist the partner nation in defeating the threat, while at the same time building the capability and capacity of the FSF to eventually assume responsibility for security. Under these circumstances, the US or coalition commander may actually direct the tactical employment of the FSF until responsibility for security can be transitioned to the FSF. Of note, there is a distinct difference between the use of the word “operating” and “employing.” All units can be employed, but only the operating forces operate and conduct operations.

INTRODUCTION

5-1. The separation between the generating and operating functions is not as simple as it may seem. In the United States military, the services are responsible for providing fully ready operational forces to the CCMDs. In the case of the US Army, this mission is broken into two subordinate commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and FORSCOM. TRADOC conducts the institutional training and FORSCOM conducts collective training for the US Army. Yet the CCMD often conducts additional training as a final preparation for employment, to sustain proficiency, and to improve interoperability with other national security forces. However, in the case of some foreign security forces, units are often deemed ready for employment once the personnel have received their training and the unit has been formed.

5-2. In the employ stage, the FSF unit has already been formed and functions at some level of proficiency but is typically not fully mission capable or ready for independent operations. FSF units may still receive additional equipment and training from advisor teams to assist them in performing their assigned functions. During peacetime, units often will be trained to a high level of proficiency in individual and collective tasks in preparation for operational deployment. During conflict, operational tempo may require the employment of FSF units before they are completely proficient on certain tasks based on SFA assessments.

5-3. The primary SFA task conducted during the employ stage is advising the FSF. There are two major variations as to how advising is carried out: unit partnering or dedicated advisors.
UNIT PARTNERING

5-4. Unit partnering goes by different names but ultimately it requires pairing US units with PN units where the US units have the responsibility to conduct or sustain operations while simultaneously developing the FSF through training and advising (Figure 5-1). Joint publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, describes three basic command structures for multinational operations: integrated, lead nation, and parallel. These command structure models can also be applied to unit partnering to facilitate SFA activities.

INTEGRATED

5-5. During the Korean War, English speaking Koreans were assigned to US units at various levels of war. There are two advantages to this method: first the US units gained a cultural SME and a native speaking translator, and second, the Korean soldier became familiar with US doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. When these soldiers returned to their own army, they were often placed in positions of leadership where they could employ what they observed while working with the Americans. One of the biggest challenges associated with the integrated partnership in this example is language.

5-6. Integrated command may also relate to a single commander with an integrated staff, as described in JP 3-16. However, integrated partnering may refer to any arrangement where US forces and the FSF conduct operations side-by-side under the direction of a single commander for the purpose of accomplishing objectives, while simultaneously imbuing the FSF personnel with some of the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes inherent to the US military unit.
LEAD NATION

5-7. Under a lead nation SFA construct, FSF can be incorporated underneath another nation’s command. This works when the force being developed has reached a level of proficiency at lower echelons, but does not have a functioning higher headquarters. For example, a battalion may have been generated and is ready to operate without any assistance but its associated brigade headquarters may not yet be capable of mission command. This battalion could be assigned to a US brigade until its own headquarters was ready to assume operational or tactical control or it could report to a higher echelon command of the FSF. As with the integrated model described above, the lead nation model may refer to tactical-level US and PN forces operating in concert. This arrangement may simply refer to the US commander exercising tactical control of an FSF unit or units until the FSF can develop the mission command capacity to employ its forces to their full potential on their own.

PARALLEL

5-8. Units that retain their organic command and are partnered with another foreign unit or several foreign units are considered to be in parallel (Figure 5-2). Both the US and foreign units are expected to perform their normal functions, however, the US unit also has the additional task of developing the foreign unit. Parallel command may be an option when the foreign force is reluctant to relinquish command to another nation. The foreign units can still have a parallel command system but they must directly coordinate operations and missions with the U.S or coalition unit they are operating with.

5-9. Parallel arrangements also work best when the units are of similar size, however, US brigades have been partnered with foreign divisions and they have also been partnered with smaller units such as police battalions or geographical districts.

5-10. US units are frequently partnered with foreign units that perform similar functions. For example, one could partner a US heavy brigade combat team with a foreign armor brigade. Parallel units could be linked at various echelons of command. Units could operate in parallel from the division level down
to the fire-team level, though this is seldom done. Numerous historical examples from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan illustrate this concept at the battalion or brigade levels.

### Employment of a FSF - Vietnam

In I Corps Tactical Zone, III Marine Amphibious Force continued its successful Combined Action Program effort while Lieutenant General Richard C. Stilwell, the new XXIV Corps commander, went further and began integrating all U.S. and Vietnamese Army tactical operations in his area of responsibility. Under his direction, all multi-battalion operations were conducted with a mix of U.S. and Vietnamese battalions acting in concert, but not under a unified command. Operations were conceived jointly by General Stilwell and Major General Truong. Commanding general of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division, and each contributed a share of the forces against common objectives. During these combined efforts, U.S. brigade and Vietnamese regimental commanders often established neighboring command posts in the same fire support bases and conducted operations through close and continuous cooperation. Stilwell and Truong worked closely together and spent most of their days in the same helicopter alternately visiting U.S. and Vietnamese units. The psychological and practical effect of these visits brought about a complete integration of military effort and a high degree of cooperation between the Vietnamese and American forces. The resulting partnership initially made possible some tutelage by U.S. commanders at battalion and brigade levels for their Vietnamese counterparts; later, there was a little "reverse lend-lease" in this arrangement as the seasoned Vietnamese commanders were able to pass on their experience to newly arrived U.S. leaders. (Clarke, 1988)

### DEDICATED ADVISORS

5-11. Dedicated advisors can be assigned during peacetime or during combat, however, advisors employed under combat conditions requires the same level of approval as if the force were normal combatants. In situations where deployment of large US formations to the partner nation is not practical for political or strategic reasons, the US may deploy individuals or advisor teams to conduct SFA. These teams would be dedicated to a specific FSF unit or organization for the purpose of advising the FSF unit’s key leaders, as well as to provide liaison to US enabling capabilities. Dedicated advisors can also be employed in conjunction with the deployment of US combat forces in order to relieve the US unit commanders from the responsibility of conducting SFA activities while simultaneously conducting operations. Dedicated advisor teams could be controlled and supported by US units in the battle-space, or they could fall under an independent advisor command.

5-12. The advisor’s primary function is to develop foreign security forces. Advisors do not have a unilateral operational mission apart from the unit they are advising and they are too small in number to independently carry out the mission of the advised unit. During employment of the generating force, the personnel that were assigned to train are often held over to serve in an advisory role until the generating force institution or school is fully mission capable. In cases where advisors oversaw the
generation of an operating force unit and assisted in training the FSF unit, they may remain with that unit for some or all of their initial deployment.

HYBRID

5-13. The force conducting SFA can also combine or mix the four aforementioned methods (integrated, lead nation, parallel, and dedicated advisors) as depicted in Figure 5-3. The US will not deploy its service staff so it will not be possible to establish a parallel command structure at the executive or upper-echelon generating force levels. The FSF’s service level headquarters staff would likely get an advisor element and possibly have connectivity with the JTF headquarters staff.

5-14. Often, providing dedicated advisors in conjunction with partnering or pairing units achieves the best results. It is most useful where there is a significant difference in language and culture between the US and the FSF. Advisors have constant contact with the FSF commanders while the US unit can model the actions of a highly effective military organization as the FSF unit takes note. It is difficult for everyone in the unit to have access to an interpreter, but advisors are seldom without one. Passing information to the advisor as well as the counterpart increases the chance that the information is understood correctly.

5-15. It is important to remember that all EGO functions have their own stratification levels. The executive is normally compartmentalized into agencies, departments, bureaus, or offices. These subordinate entities are stratified as well. A defense ministry’s procurement agency for instance has its director, staff, and technicians. FSF training departments have centers and schools where courses and classes are presented in some form. It would be appropriate to provide advisors sourced from US
professional military education institutions to the FSF equivalent institutions, advising instructors, course administrators, and curriculum managers. Assessments will determine the proficiency and capability within each SFA function and level of command (tactical, operational, and strategic). These assessments inform decision making as to what SFA arrangement (partnering or advising) should be undertaken.

5-16. There are certain enduring aspects regarding advising. Advisors commonly serve multiple roles. There are three common roles that a US advisor faces: the assessment and liaison role, the support or assistance role, and the primary role to advise. Each role could be a mission by itself with personnel employed to conduct each single function. Situation and lack of personnel may require advisors to do them all. A brief description is provided below to differentiate the functions of each of the common roles.

ASSESSMENT AND LIAISON ROLE

5-17. As a fundamental element of any military or corporate enterprise, assessment should precede execution of any SFA activity. Assessment is an iterative process that informs SFA planning, and occurs at multiple echelons. As such, effective assessment requires close coordination and information sharing among CCMD, Service component, and country team planners. A shared understanding of the purpose of any given SFA activity facilitates effective communications and closure of the planning and assessment feedback loop. Chapter 8 of this handbook addresses the topic in detail.

5-18. Effective liaison among organizations enables the assessment process. A liaison officer (LNO) works for their parent command. While advisors often conduct liaison between US and PN units, this liaising should not be misinterpreted as the advisor being an LNO to the FSF unit. The advisor team should always have the ability to talk with the country team, relevant US government agencies, or coalition forces to help resolve conflict. However, advisors can become too focused on being a coalition LNO rather than their primary duty of developing their FSF counterparts.

5-19. Advisors report to their higher HQ when submitting required assessments of the FSF, as part of the assessment role, and they coordinate use of enablers as part of the assist role. Submission of FSF operational plans would not justify the advisor’s designation as a liaison. In the advise role, the advisor makes sure those plans are tactically sound and that they effectively mitigate risk. If the advisor sends a copy of the FSF plan to their US or coalition headquarters, they either are directed to do so or are doing it in support of a unified effort. The advisor’s roles will change over time as the FSF progresses in skill development. The goal is to increase proficiency and decrease the roles provided by the advisor until no further assistance is required.

SUPPORT ROLE

5-20. In a support role the advisor or advisor team may be expected to provide actual capabilities to facilitate the FSF accomplishing their mission. The advisor team will require additional personnel, equipment, and specialized skill sets to accomplish this role. Examples of common support tasks are:

- Fires and fire support coordination – The FSF may not have its own fire support capabilities and may not be able to use coalition fires without the appropriate communications package or skills. When given appropriate authority, advisors can provide access to these fires and coordinate their effective use.
- Logistics – FSF may need to rely on coalition aircraft, vehicles, equipment, medical support, or resupply that is beyond their capability or capacity. The advisor team can be the link to provide assets. However, advisors must refrain from becoming the logistics planners and coordinators for their FSF counterparts. The advisor's effectiveness decreases when performing this role.
• Communications – The advisor may have communications equipment that the FSF does not have and his ability to communicate with the FSF increases the effectiveness of the unit. However, over reliance on advisors for communications support can also turn them into radio operators if not properly augmented.

• Close air support (CAS) – The FSF may not have the capability to provide or direct CAS. If the advising team is tasked to fill this role it must be trained or augmented to perform the task.

• Military information support operations (MISO) – The FSF supported unit may not have broadcast platforms or printing capability. When operating under appropriate authority, advisors may link FSF units with US assets in order to help them generate products that support PN as well as US and coalitions’ inform and influence activities.

• Additional support tasks exist for advisors that are assigned to executive and generating elements. These tasks might include acquisition, transport and transfer of US equipment, or the drafting and publishing doctrine to name just a few.

ADVISE ROLE

5-21. The primary advise role can be broken down into three tasks: teach, coach, and advise. The definitions for the three tasks; teaching, coaching, and advising are described in Figure 5-4 above.

TEACHING

5-22. Teaching means to provide instruction or education to FSF to develop the skills or knowledge necessary to do a particular job.

• Training is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks or the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.

• Educating consists of teaching concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad range of applications. The advisor has to be ready to teach and coach concepts and knowledge as necessary.

5-23. A teacher is responsible for ensuring that the student (FSF) is capable of conducting a task or series of tasks.
COACHING

5-24. Coaching is to assist a counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The distinctive feature is that the recipient assumes more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required. Coaches help the unit develop training plans to improve and maintain skills.

ADVISING

5-25. Advising means to provide the advisor’s counterparts with expert opinions, advice, or counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge and through a mutually developed bond of trust. The distinctive feature is that the recipient is responsible for making the decision while the advisor provides only advice.

5-26. Under the SFA “train” task, the instructor’s responsibility ends with the completion of the training. When working with foreign forces, trainers equate to instructors where as advisors support the FSF leaders in making decisions by providing sound advice. The FSF leader is responsible for training his unit and leading it as it operates. Since the advisor is there to aid the FSF leader, this means that advisors must be able to teach (train & educate), coach (devise programs to develop and maintain skill proficiency) and advise the leader as to how he or she might best accomplish the mission without the aid of an institutional trainer.

5-27. Both trainers and advisors of FSF must have a cultural understanding and ability to communicate with their counterparts, but it is the advisor that is directly tied to helping the FSF achieve specific mission objectives.

ADVISOR SKILLS

5-28. Advisors need to possess a variety of individual and collective skills in order to properly perform their assigned mission. Therefore, advisors should initially be selected based on subject matter expertise. However, tactical proficiency does not equate to proficiency as an advisor. Modern-day military advisors must be able to both teach and advise FSF. In order to do this, they must be knowledgeable and proficient in the tactics, techniques, and procedures relevant to the operating environment, and have the skills to effectively impart knowledge. Beyond this, they have to operate effectively within cultural settings that can be very different in behavior and language from their own. They may also be able to advise the FSF in the areas of intelligence, communications, operations, and logistics. Some advisors may be required to call in US supporting arms (e.g., artillery, air support, or coordinates both air and ground casualty evacuation). Finally, advisors should be proficient in basic combat skills, advisor skills, and situation specific skills. Figure 5-5 illustrates these subsets of individual skills. Chapter 10 addresses advisor selection and training in greater detail, while Chapter 9 provides an expanded collection of best practices for advisors. SFA planners must understand these advisor concepts in order to develop SFA plans and orders that are grounded in sound principles and proven techniques.

5-29. As stated in the introduction to Chapter 5, many of these advisor skills relate only to combat advisor situations. The permissive- or non-permissive nature of the operating environment, the overall force protection levels in the partner nation, and the GCC or SDO’s guidance will all play a role in determining the requirement for combat skills as part of the overall SFA mission. In many cases, advisors will travel to and from the partner nation aboard commercial aircraft and reside in hotels for the duration of their mission. The CCDR commander is the ultimate authority for force protection as well as pre-deployment training requirements for advisors deploying into the GCC’s area of responsibility.
Employ

INDIVIDUAL ADVISOR SKILLS

- Subject matter expert (SME) skills. SME skills are defined as those skills learned through experience, education, or training. Selecting someone that does not have the correct subject matter expertise does not automatically result in mission failure, but it puts that individual advisor at a severe disadvantage.

- Combat skills. Common skills (e.g., land navigation, radio operation), warrior skills (e.g., weapons proficiency, call for fire procedures), and survival skills (e.g., combat lifesaving) are often required for advisors. Combat skills should be refreshed during pre-deployment training. These skills are critical to an advisor due to the isolated and independent nature of the mission.

- Advisor skills. Advisor-specific skills fall into two sub categories: enabling skills and developing skills.
  - Enabling skills include understanding human nature and communicating across cultures, building rapport, influencing, and negotiating. Successfully employing these enabling skills will set the conditions for advisors to move forward with their mission.
  - Developing skills are the main advisor tasks of teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisors use these skills to develop the capabilities of the FSF.

- Situation-specific skills. These skills are determined based on the operational environment and the specific mission and include cultural understanding and language.

OTHER EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADVISORS

5-30. Force generation during employment and the integration or reintegration of replacement personnel and equipment are a consideration which must be planned for and addressed as an element of employment. The US Army Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is an effective example to model FSF force rotations. Force generation planning improves both the efficiency and effectiveness of deployed or employed security forces.

CASE STUDY

In the early days of the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army was severely degraded, losing 77 percent of its combat power in the first month of fighting. The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) hastily reorganized the remnants of the ROK Army into four divisions, and on 9 August 1950, received approval from Far East Command to grow
the ROK Army into a ten-division army. While the reconstruction process was going on, US military advisors had to cope with keeping the ROK tactical units in the war. The bulk of the KMAG effort had to be devoted to combat operations to stiffen the ROK Army’s resolve and improve their combat capability.

The ROK units were usually stationed in the more mountainous areas along the front where communications were difficult. Most of the advisors had to operate independently of KMAG and Eighth Army headquarters and had to rely heavily upon their own judgment and resourcefulness. They normally advised on levels from one to three times higher than those commensurate with their rank, experience, and responsibility, and the success or failure of a Korean unit seemed to be theirs alone. Isolated as they often were by distances, poor roads, and long periods of bad weather, KMAG had no sure means of supplying them with rations and other necessities. Advisors ate Korean food for protracted periods and borrowed clothing, gasoline, and tentage where they could. Since their numbers were small, they sometimes maintained around-the-clock schedules for days on end, unable to get even a few hours of unbroken sleep.

The language was a barrier. While experienced advisors used techniques learned from previous experience, new advisors had to depend entirely upon the interpreters furnished by ROK Army headquarters or their counterparts’ knowledge of English. Parallel communication networks had to be set up because of language problems and because ROK Army communications were “unreliable, slow, and dangerously insecure.”

KMAG advisors learned that ROK replacements were going into battle without knowing anything about their weapons or what was expected of them. So, they initiated a short course of instruction at the division level in weapons and basic tactics. By demonstrating, drawing sketches on the ground, and using sign language, they showed new men how to fire their weapons correctly. Similarly, they demonstrated a few principles of fire and movement, which made a tremendous difference in the division’s efficiency.

The Growth of KMAG

At the beginning of the war, KMAG was a Department of the Army administrative unit with 180 officers and 290 enlisted. There were five officers and three enlisted at the ROK division level. KMAG was re-designated as an Army operational unit and put under Eighth Army control. The group’s primary mission was to assist the ROK Army and to maintain liaison between Eighth Army headquarters and the Koreans, thereby keeping General Walker informed about the ROK Army’s activities and capabilities, and insuring that his directives were carried out.

KMAG shared headquarters with the ROK Army in Taegu and maintained contact with Eighth Army headquarters through liaison officers. For the logistical support of the group, KMAG drew supplies directly from Eighth Army agencies.

The Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK) sought to reduce the size of KMAG headquarters and incorporate the advisory group as a fifth EUSAK general staff section (G–5). The KMAG commander protested this move, pointing out that the group had operational as well as supervisory responsibilities. KMAG advisors, scattered in the field, often had to be supported logistically by unorthodox methods, and on occasion advisors had to take virtual command of ROK Army units and tactical situations. For these reasons, KMAG advocated a substantial headquarters to support its field personnel. Furthermore, KMAG considered
Employ its mission would continue after the war and that it would have to “start out from scratch” at a later date if it were reorganized radically to conform to a temporary situation.

KMAG also urged General MacArthur to relieve it of the responsibility for advising the Korean Coast Guard. US naval personnel had taken over the advisory functions formerly discharged by Department of the Army civilians under KMAG, so General MacArthur transferred the Coast Guard advisory responsibility to the US Commander of Naval Forces, Far East.

Because of the large number of casualties in the ROK units and the loss of experienced soldiers, KMAG’s Table of Distribution was increased to 559 officers and men, and advisors would be sent down to the regimental level in the ROK Army. Principal deficiencies still existed in the field artillery, ordnance, and signal sections; all required additional personnel.

Two officers and one enlisted man had been enough to take care of the ROK Army’s artillery requirements in peacetime. The revised situation called for 18 officers and 18 enlisted men, on the basis of two officers and two enlisted men for each ROK division artillery battalion, and for the ROK Army headquarters artillery section.

The ordnance section’s original allotment of seven officers and 20 enlisted men had been adequate when the ROK Army’s ordnance, supply, and maintenance installations were concentrated in the vicinity of Ascom City. Now that ordnance activities were greatly expanded and dispersed, many more ordnance advisors were needed. KMAG’s need for additional signal specialists was greatest of all.

Since operationally the advisory group was concerned with ROK forces approximately the size of a United States corps, it was of the utmost importance that an adequate communications system be an integral part of the KMAG organization. The quota of eight officers and 66 enlisted men authorized under the prewar table of distribution was completely inadequate to meet the conditions under which the advisory group was operating and could expect to operate in the foreseeable future. ROK Army signal troops, moreover, had little chance of improving while the few signal advisory personnel at KMAG’s disposal had to be used to maintain and operate its own communications system. The revised table of distribution called for a signal section of 16 officers and 177 enlisted men, which was considered the minimum number required for maintaining both the control and information facilities needed by the advisory group.

As KMAG’s responsibilities increased during July and August, it became clear that the US Military Advisory Group would operate more efficiently as a major subordinate command of Eighth Army than as a combined EUSAK staff section and operating agency. Not only were control and the logistical support of field advisors increasingly difficult because of rugged terrain, inadequate communications facilities, and great distances between ROK units, but experience also showed that the ROK Army needed many more US advisors. Therefore, KMAG drew up another table of distribution (T/D). The newest T/D restored the administrative functions assumed by Eighth Army headquarters, provided advisors down to the battalion level and more advisors to most other advisory sections, and called for a total of 835 officers and men.

The intervention by the Chinese communists in November 1950 caused the advisory group to review even more fully the problem of its organization. KMAG could not go on, as it had been, frantically juggling personnel in order to provide the minimum essential advisory supervision for the ROK Army. KMAG prepared new T/D based on ten ROK divisions and two corps headquarters, authorizing a total of 1,013 personnel. This would bring KMAG’s strength up to a reasonable figure and, it was hoped, rectify once and for all the weaknesses of the organization. At full strength the group would be able to furnish advisors...
to all ROK Army tactical and technical units. It would be possible to assign advisors to all
ROK Army schools and training installations in sufficient quantities without diverting
personnel from other advisory duties. Communications within the group would be more
efficient, and signal advisors would be able to devote themselves exclusively to the
improvement of ROK Army signal personnel. In addition, the new T/D would make possible
better administrative and logistical support to KMAG personnel. This change was
approved and became effective on 20 March 1951.

KMAG-assisted ROK Army units fought valiantly and established themselves as a combat
capable military. The ROK Army continued to grow from 376,000 personnel in 1952 to
over 576,000 personnel in 1953. This increase also led to an increase in KMAG advisors
to 2,866 personnel by the end of the war. KMAG continued to advise the ROK Army as
fighting stalled in July 1953, ultimately leading to a cease-fire agreement on 27 July 1953.

One unique program that was created was the Korean Augmentation to the US Army,
commonly referred to as KATUSA. This program continued throughout the duration of the
war, and is still in use today in South Korea. A benefit of this program was ROK Army
soldier immersion into the customs and doctrine of the US Army. When KATUSAs rotated
back to ROK Army units they took with them an appreciation for the American way of
waging war, and influenced the ROK Army to adopt the technology and systems that made
the US Army successful.\textsuperscript{18}

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\textbf{KEY “EMPLOYMENT” POINTS} \\
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\textbf{ANALYSIS} \\
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\item 5-31. The ROK Army was crushed early in the war and held together by the individual efforts of its
advisors. These advisors became instrumental in turning the instantly created units into a fighting force.
Because the South Korean units bypassed training in the generating stage, those responsibilities were
pushed onto the advisors. Clearly, the advisors had to teach, coach and advise.
\item 5-32. EGO: KMAG eventually split its responsibilities and established a branch that would generate
and then advise the South Korean generating function.
\item 5-33. Authorities: US operations in Korea were under UN mandate and appropriate US legislation
authorized US activities. Korea was declared a police action and not a war but was prosecuted as a
war.
\item 5-34. Programs: The US used security assistance programs to include excess defense articles, which
were covered under the military assistance program.
\end{itemize}
\hline
\textbf{TASKS} \\
\begin{itemize}
\item 5-35. Organize: The South Korean government controlled the organization and structure of their Army.
They would create divisions in as little as 24 hours as the North Koreans were rushing to Pusan. This
\end{itemize}
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Analysis and tasks of the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA).}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{18} Based on material from Chapters VII and VIII, Army Historical Series, Military Advisors in Korea:
KMAG In Peace And War, MAJ Robert K. Sawyer, Center of Military History, United States Army,
Employment process meant that units with no training, limited equipment, and minimal experienced leadership were being pressed directly into combat with the expected results. The US provided advisors to the functioning South Korean government which actually had to leave the country in order to continue functioning.

5-36. Train: Because training was omitted in the generation process, advisors picked up South Korean units that were barely functional. Individual and unit training had to occur in between combat missions.

5-37. Equip: The US was actually rebuilding and equipping its own forces at the same time it was recreating the ROK Army. Priority went to US units, but eventually the US was able to adequately equip both forces.

5-38. Rebuild and build: The US primarily focused on operational construction but as the war went on, it assisted the South Korean government with the development of its facilities for its generating function.

5-39. Advise: The US had large numbers of US forces in the war but did not “partner” as has been done in more recent conflicts. The US used its advisor program to bolster the capabilities of the ROK Army. The KATUSA program is one of the few recent examples where the US incorporated foreign soldiers into US units to aid in the development of the FSF.

**GOALS**

5-40. The US had to field a South Korean army and make it functional at the same time that it was conducting combat operations. South Korea had not been a priority before the invasion but it became apparent that a viable functioning military force would need to be created if the South Korean government was to remain sovereign over its territory.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS - EMPLOYMENT**

5-41. As discussed in this chapter and demonstrated in the case studies, the employment of FSF during SFA operations requires considerable planning and appreciation for the situation in which the FSF will be employed. If improperly executed, employment of unprepared forces can lead to US and FSF frustration, low morale in the FSF, unnecessary casualties, and set back the SFA effort. Table 5-1 provides sample questions to help the planner determine employment requirements relative to the situation and, current and desired FSF capacity and capability levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Initial Planning Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How capable is the FSF?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What level of commitment is the US willing to make?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How organized and effective is the threat?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much time is available before the FSF must show results?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How willing is the FSF to be placed under the control of another organization?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What funds are being used?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there restrictions applied to US advisors?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What levels will the US be working at? (JTF, corps, division, brigade, battalion, company…)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will we be working with the executive, generating and operating functions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the significant differences between the cultures of the US and the FSF?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many of the FSF speak English?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many US personnel speak the native language of the FSF?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6
Transitioning Foreign Security Forces

“As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take will be irreversible... we’ll get one shot at transition, and we need to get it right. “

General David Petraeus (COMISAF’s Testimony to Congress, March 15, 2011)

As with Chapter 5, this chapter, Transitioning Foreign Security Forces, is a necessary element of any SFA handbook. Most SFA missions do not require the US to generate and employ an entire FSF, and then transition control to the partner nation. In most cases, such as the examples from Taiwan and South Korea, the SFA mission runs its course when responsibility is transitioned to the partner nation and the mission is terminated. However, the US usually sustains a relationship with the partner nation following transition. Transitioning ought to be considered as a necessary process and not an abnormal phase of SFA. It is important for SFA planners to consider when and how FSF are to be transitioned, and to make the necessary preparations to facilitate that transition and set the PN up for success.

TRANSITION

6-1. For the purposes of this planning guide, transition is the process of relinquishing responsibility for security operations from US forces to another force, preferably the PN. A well planned and executed transition is central to a successful and decisive to a SFA mission and is especially important when the partner nation government and the FSF is engaged in hostilities. Regarding SFA, transition starts from the moment US forces start working with the FSF and does not wait until the beginning of Phase V of an operation.

6-2. Within each security force, each EGO function element will have its own time line and its own requirements for transition. During the course of SFA activities, a point will be reached on each line when the US will relinquish the aspects of the EGO functions it has been performing and the FSF will assume those functions, becoming less and less dependent on the US or other nations. Figure 6-1 illustrates, transition is a process, not a product; the goal is for the PN to continuously assume greater and greater levels of responsibility for security both prior to and following any formal transition of authority until the PN is in complete control of all the EGO functions. In some cases, especially during peacetime, the US may have extremely limited responsibility and subsequently transition may be quick and relatively simple. The transfer of additional rifles to a nation that already uses that model rifle would be such an example where the US has very limited responsibility and the transition would be extremely short in duration.
6-3. Each EGO function has unique peculiarities that must be taken into consideration regarding how a specific function transitions. Subsequently, EGO functions normally transition at different rates of speed.

EXECUTIVE FUNCTION

6-4. The executive function transitions differently than the generating or operating functions. In the extreme cases where a foreign government does not exist, such as in the case below with Iraq, the US or the international community would establish some type of caretaker government. The PN, in the case of Iraq, set up an interim government until they established their permanent government. Once the PN government was established, sovereignty transitioned abruptly from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqis. This transition was based on political considerations rather than proficiency which is a common occurrence for transitioning the executive function. Further development of the executive function from that point on was primarily through advisors.

GENERATING FUNCTION

6-5. Transition of the generating function is the most controllable transition. Forces working with the generating force normally have less interaction with the general populace, require smaller numbers of trainers and advisors, and usually perform tasks that can be scheduled. Because force generation primarily takes place outside of combat, US forces can more frequently use SA programs from the start to finish of capability development.

6-6. Train the trainer. One of the basic ideas behind transition of the generating force is “train the trainer.” Instead of creating infantry battalions, the US would help the FSF establish an infantry training center where they could train their own infantry battalions. This method is not always possible as the situation may require the rapid simultaneous creation of multiple FSF infantry battalions. However, as soon as the situation permits, the planners should program the PN trainers to be generated.

6-7. Crawl-walk-run approach. The second major construct to affect the generating function is the crawl-walk-run concept. The first iteration will normally be to generate a cadre of qualified PN training personnel. Then the FSF trainers will be incorporated as instructors with ever increasing
responsibilities. Eventually, the FSF instructor will have full responsibility for the program. While training is but one aspect of force generation, the “crawl-walk-run” model also applies to every other aspect as well, to include recruitment, force management, and even strategy and policy development.

**OPERATING FUNCTION**

6-8. Like the generating function, the operating function normally follows a gradual transfer of authority and responsibility which is determined by the PN’s improvement in capability and capacity. US forces gradually shift responsibilities to the developing FSF unit using two different methods: Dedicated Advisors and Unit partners.

**Dedicated Advisors**

6-9. Dedicated advisor units primarily go through the teach, coach, advise process and is less regimented than unit partnering efforts. Advisors may shift from teaching, to coaching, to advising and then back to coaching in a very short period of time based on the assessed abilities of the FSF to carry out individual and collective tasks. However, as the PN unit and its assigned personnel develop and are assessed as becoming more proficient, the advisors will do less and less teaching and coaching and more and more advising. Eventually, the advisors will not be needed and they will be reassigned. Additionally, since advisors cannot perform the FSF unit’s mission if the FSF unit is unwilling or unable to do so, the risk factor for mission failure is greater but the speed of development may be faster as the PN responsibility spans all the aspects of the joint or war-fighting functions.

**Unit Partners**

6-10. Parallel unit partners are normally paired with similar units. This pairing will start at the same echelon such as a US infantry brigades being paired with a PN infantry brigade, and possible thinning up so that one brigade may now be paired with the PN division. During the transition in Afghanistan, the concept of “thinning up” was employed to gradually reduce the coalition’s presence, starting at the lowest echelons of command, such as infantry kandaks or police district headquarters.

6-11. Because of unit size and the corresponding spans of influence as well as logistical footprints, large unit transition is normally deliberately planned for and has semi-rigid timelines. Because there are sufficient coalition assets to complete operational mission requirements, the risk for operational mission failure is decreased, but FSF development may occur at a slower pace because of over-zealous coalition commanders doing too much of the work or because PN commanders may become dependent on the coalition forces.

6-12. Transition for integrated unit partners occurs through redeployment of the US personnel as a group or it could occur gradually by changing billet identification codes and backfilling coalition positions with PN personnel as the coalition members individually rotate out so that over time the PN unit is the only one with personnel assigned. If coalition and US personnel are reassigned as a group, it will leave a large number of shortages and two depleted PN units may need to be merged together and run through a force generation cycle before they can be employed.

6-13. In some cases, transition of security responsibilities will be functional, rather than geographically based. For instance, the US may transition complete responsibility for security in a given area of operation (possibly a district or province) to the PN security forces. In another instance, the US may transition certain warfighting functions, such as maneuver or protection to the PN, while retaining the lead in other functions, such as sustainment or intelligence.

6-14. To illustrate the transition of responsibility, Figure 6-2 depicts the battlespace owner (BSO) - battlespace integrator (BSI) - battlespace enabler (BSE) model based both functionally and geographically. This is an operational force example where the US has been partnered with the dual
mission of developing the FSF while at the same time conducting operations. This construct could be applied to the generating force where the PN may take lead responsibility for training while the coalition maintains lead on equipping, or to the executive where the PN forms its own policies but allows the coalition to lead on budgeting. This model works whether the operational force is responding to traditional warfare, irregular warfare, or a stability operation.

6-15. Transition seldom occurs uniformly by SFA stages or by operational phase. Some coalition units will in all likelihood be involved in generating FSF while others are involved in employing FSF. The following paragraphs and illustrations show how FSF transition can occur with SFA stages occurring simultaneously across several different operational phases.

6-16. During Phase-III (dominate) of operations (Figure 6-3), US forces are employed to create a security bubble that allows the population to go back to the population centers. The U.S. force partnered with the PN security forces in this instance has the preponderance of combat capability and is designated the battle space owner (BSO), responsible for controlling all matters of security in their assigned areas. This includes the FSF and other potential coalition partners. The potential exists for the PN security forces to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population while improving their competency by assigning them to missions where they will likely interact with and be seen by the public. They could be put in the lead of a partnered clearing operation of a population center, or tasked
with providing security in a previously cleared area in order to hold and reestablish governance based on the individual unit’s proficiency assessment.

Enabler Support: Assets and effects that the PN does not possess or have immediately available, but are required in order to gain or maintain superiority over a threat. Enablers include such things as C2 support, joint fires, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, engineer support, logistics support, and medical evacuation. As the PN security forces’ operational effectiveness improves and operational reach increases, the requirements for these enablers will decrease.

6-17. At some point during Phase IV (Figure 6-4) the FSF will become capable of taking on the security responsibility of sectors of their country. The objective of the SFA mission is for the FSF to assume responsibility for security. This may occur geographically, sector-by-sector, or it may occur functionally with the FSF taking the lead by individual warfighting function. For example, the FSF may first take the lead in providing for its own force protection followed by the lead for maneuver, then intelligence, mission command, fire support, logistics, and so forth. In some cases the security force may be capable in some of the war fighting functions, but not all. This is where the BSO can transition to a battle space integrator (BSI) by continuing the partnering relationship while putting the capable FSF in the lead with enabler support and while still being able to conduct direct action when needed. This is a significant shift in operations and should be based on the security situation in the area, and the proficiency of the FSF. In recent experiences in Afghanistan, the transition of security responsibility
to the PN began at the battalion level: the U.S. brigade continued its role as the BSO while its subordinate battalions were battle-space integrators with their partnered units.

6-18. During Phase V (Figure 6-5), the transition from U.S. security responsibility to the FSF requires the employment of a dedicated SFA force, whether it is an infantry brigade combat team working with a PN division as part of the operating function, or mobile training team developing a non-commissioned officer academy as part of the generating function. Force generation provides the FSF with a foundation of organized, trained, and equipped units, but advising the FSF during employment helps the FSF become proficient and sets the stage for redeployment of U.S. forces, leaving behind a capable, confident, and committed FSF that is able to protect the territorial sovereignty as well as internal security of the host nation on an enduring basis.
These examples show that transition occurs for each EGO function independently. If the PN is not able to perform a specific function during a contingency, the coalition will have to conduct those functions while simultaneously developing capability and capacity. The coalition will probably use large units and advisor units and not all of the units will transition at the same time. In order to keep up with the changing conditions, the units conducting SFA may need to change their organization and tasks to include their level of involvement to ensure the PN continues to develop. The following case study shows how the Coalition in Iraq adapted in order to keep the development process moving.

**CASE STUDY**

**Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I)**

This case study provides an operational perspective as to a SFA transition model from Phase IV to Phase V to Phase 0. It illustrates events that began with preparing Iraq to assume full responsibility for internal and external security, to a phase where US objectives sought to enable the Iraqi government to provide for their own security (Phase V). In parallel, this case study illustrates how OSC-I facilitated US strategic shaping objectives through normalized SA and SC activities to establish Iraq as a regional partner (Phase 0).

To meet post OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and OPERATION NEW DAWN(OND) operational objectives in Iraq, and to lay the foundation for meeting longer term US national security objectives within...
the region, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), in partnership with the Department of State (DOS), established the Office of Security Cooperation Iraq (OSC-I). The primary role of the OSC-I is to carry out security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) activities, where Iraq as the partner nation (PN) government conducts its own security operations as a sovereign nation and works through normal US DOD and DOS channels to leverage US-provided SA and SC programs.

In effect, OSC-I has an expanded role to balance the transitional effects from the large-scale DOD led SFA activities that occurred during OIF and ODF with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) inclusive of the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police forces. This large-scale SFA development included the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior (Iraqi MoD and MoI), their supporting institutions, and the operating forces across each respective ISF. To improve Iraq’s long-term ability to provide for its own security and function as a US regional partner, OSC-I activities focus on essentially “equipping and training the trainer” within the ISF.

Unlike its predecessors, the Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the US Forces Iraq (USF-I) Iraqi Training Assistance Mission (ITAM), who exercised proponency for all ISF development from 2004-2010, OSC-I focus areas include those SC and SA solutions that provide the Iraq military increased capacity. In contrast, the US Mission Iraq (USM-I) retains primary lead for most aspects of transformation of Iraqi Police (IP) and its supporting institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase IV</th>
<th>Phase V and Phase 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>USF-I ITAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>2012-Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizational, the structure of OSC-I enables it to function across both SA and SC domains as it carries out military engagements, advisory roles, and implements foreign military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) cases to include the training and assistance aspects of these cases. Likewise, other SA programs provide training and education opportunities within DOD schools and leader development programs located in the US and abroad for Iraq military, civilians, officers, and NCOs. In context to SC activities, OSC-I carries out a broad array of tasks to meet USCENTCOM theater campaign plan (TCP) and country level objectives. All four US military Service headquarters (USA, USN, USAF, and USMC) provide individual augmentees (IA) to fill OSC-I staffing requirements, to include advisors within the senior advisor group (SAG). The US Air Force serves as the executive agent (EA) for the OSC-I organization.

OSC-I mission requirements and authorities reside in Title 10, Title 22, and overseas contingency operations (OCO) budgeting. For example, as part of a previous year’s DOD’s OCO budget request, it states “The OSC-I will conduct the full range of traditional security cooperation activities such as joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior level visits and other forms of bilateral engagement. Additionally, the OSC-I will conduct security cooperation activities in support of the ISF to include providing academy instructors; ministerial and service level advisors; logistic and operations capacity building; intelligence integration; and interagency collaboration. The OSC-I is the critical Defense component of the US Mission Iraq and a foundational element of our long-term strategic partnership with Iraq.”

Figure 6-6 on the next page illustrates an example of the OSC-I organizational structure to enable it to operate across its SA and SC mission domains in context to respective SA and SC stakeholders. Organizationally, OSC-I operates within the SC and SA domains and employs an appropriate J-Staff to support planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

One of the core capabilities within the OSC-I organizational structure is its senior advisor group (SAG) that provides direct access to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Iraqi Army. The SAG provides OSC-I a senior level advising capacity to advise and assist Iraqi executive level decision-makers and staff.

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KEY "TRANSITION" POINTS

ANALYSIS

6-20. The OSC-I provides a critical capability in carrying out US strategic objectives related to Iraq participating as a regional partner. OSC-I provided USCENTCOM a means to effectively transition from OIF/OND-focused objectives to setting the conditions for broader US shaping activities through normalized SA and SC activities.

6-21. EGO: OSC-I operates across the full range of ISF executive, generating, and operating functions. At the Iraqi MoD level, OSC-I, through its SAG and other engagement activities, remains connected at the highest levels of the Iraqi government. Within the ISF generating functions, OSC-I influences the development of Iraqi training institutions (e.g. schools and centers) and provides training and education opportunities (e.g. international military education and training (IMET)) to professionalize the ISF abroad through SA programs paid for by Iraq. For the ISF operating function, OSC-I, through engagement activities and mil-to-mil contacts via military engagement teams (MET), interacts with ISF key leaders to improve command and staff functions.

6-22. Authorities: OCO funding supports the OSC-I organization and its staff. However, Title 10 programs support specific OSC-I requirements. For example, US Army Central Command (ARCENT)
Chapter 6

draws upon its Title 10 military to military and traditional CCDR activities authority to provide METs and traveling contact teams to conduct Iraqi leader engagements and to conduct leader seminars. For example, the US Army provides training assistance teams through contracts to execute specific SA casework across the Iraqi Army, and coordinates training and education opportunities for Iraqi military personnel.

**TASKS**

6-23. **Organize**: ISF organization and structure development is an Iraqi MoD function. OSC-I senior advisors may provide advice on modernizing organizational structures and processes as the Iraqi government acquires advanced weapons systems requiring organizational changes within the ISF operating and generating force domains.

6-24. **Train**: Training tasks within the OSC-I mission set include implementing available SA programs that facilitate training requirements within the ISF. For example, as the government of Iraq purchases certain weapon systems (e.g., vehicles) from the US, associated new equipment training may be included (see the very small aperture terminal (VSAT) example below). In most Iraq FMS cases, contractors normally carry out the training tasks.

6-25. To professionalize ISF officers and NCOs, the IMET program provides opportunities for key leaders to train abroad (e.g., US Army War College, etc.). Additionally, US METs provide key insights and advice to ISF key leaders on how to improve their training programs. For example, in 2012, to support an OSC-I operational requirement, ARCENT organized and deployed METs to OSC-I in order to support ISF staff planning requirements.

6-26. **Equip**: As part of a broader generation effort to improve major weapons systems within the Iraqi Army and the Air Force, OSC-I coordinates and provides oversight over various FMS and FMF cases to the government of Iraq. Currently, there are 479 separate FMS cases valued at $14.8 billion: 166 are pending cases valued at $2.3 billion, 152 are active Iraqi-funded cases valued at $11 billion, and 161 are closed cases valued at $1.5 billion. Of the closed cases, 85 were funded with $750 million from the Iraq Security Forces Fund (US money) and 76 were Iraqi-funded cases valued at $750 million. They currently have 73 cases in development. As it relates to FMF funding, this includes $850 million, with $566 million obligated and $284 million still available. FMF has been mostly spent on maintenance and contract, logistics, and support cases.

6-27. In 2013, SA activities via Title 22 included the sale of 18 F-16IQ Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. Other examples of FMS cases include VSAT operations and maintenance services and associated equipment, parts, training, and logistical support and full body scanning system vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training, and logistical support. Of note, equipment fielding and training for these and other SA cases occur through contractors.

6-28. **Rebuild or build**: Construction projects aim to improve ISF training institutions, such as military schools and centers that enable the ISF to sustain all aspects of training and leader development within its officer and NCO corps.

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21 Ibid
6-29. **Advise:** This task normally occurs through normal mil-to-mil engagements within SC and may occur with certain SA programs where development is occurring as opposed to training and education tasks. For example, advising is a core function within the SAG within the OSC-I.

**GOALS**

6-30. The OSC-I will conduct the full range of traditional security cooperation activities such as joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior-level visits, and other forms of bilateral engagement. Additionally, the OSC-I will conduct security cooperation activities in support of the ISF to include providing academy instructors; ministerial- and service-level advisors; logistic and operations capacity building; intelligence integration; and interagency collaboration.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS - TRANSITION**

6-31. Table 6-1 provides sample questions to help the planner determine transition timelines and requirements relative to the actual and desired FSF capacity and capability levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Initial Planning Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What standards must be met to transition to the next level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which functions are being transitioned and when?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will US forces transition up?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will US forces transition by sector?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What kind of organization will exist after any surges?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the police force transition at the same time as the military?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7
Sustaining Foreign Security Forces
Sustain Stage

In this chapter, the concept of “sustaining” foreign security forces does not refer to logistical or combat service support “sustainment” of the FSF. Sustain encompasses all of the programs, activities, and efforts the GCC uses in order to maintain and extend the effects of SFA activities conducted during generate, employ, and transition, FSF development stages.

SUSTAIN

7-1. Sustaining refers to the process of extending the progress achieved in FSF development. The sustainment stage that follows programming and resourcing, generating, employing, and transitioning (PGETS) signifies the termination of the contingency operation, and the resumption of steady-state TCP activities. Bear in mind that not all FSF development efforts occur during a conflict. Therefore, the sustainment stage of FSF represents the nexus between SFA as part of a contingency operation, and steady-state SFA activities. The key take-away is that PGETS does not necessarily move in lock step with the Joint operations phasing model (See Figure 7-1). Any SFA activity from programming and resourcing to sustaining could take place during any operations phase (0-V).

Figure 7-1 Operational Phases and Notional SFA Stages
7-2. For the FSF, the key point is responsibility. Sustaining efforts ensure that the progress achieved in developing the FSF’s executive, generating, and operating functions are maintained with the major difference being the FSF has the responsibility for the execution and maintenance of the EGO functions. Being responsible for EGO does not mean the FSF must conduct every aspect of every function. They can still purchase training or equipment from other nations rather than manufacture it or conduct it themselves.

7-3. It is a common fallacy to think the FSF must be able to maintain its capabilities indefinitely without any further assistance. This argument overlooks the fact the US military is able to sustain itself, yet it does not produce its own tanks, planes, ships or the repair parts for these items. The majority of all military equipment is purchased from private industries. It is the ability to acquire the equipment, other systems, and trained personnel, and then integrate and maintain these factors within the force structure that indicates the FSF can sustain itself.

7-4. This leads to another fallacy regarding funding. During the Sustaining phase, the FSF may initially be dependent upon foreign aid to function. If the FSF’s government can obtain sufficient grant money to fund its force, it may be able to sustain its forces during a contingency at a level higher than it could normally afford. Depending upon grants or loans to fund one’s security force is always risky and can only be seen as a temporary contingency measure. Eventually, the FSF will have to be sized and equipped at a level its government can sustain from its own resources. This does not mean that the PN can’t expand or re-allocate its national resources to deal with a threat, and then shrink once the threat is passed.

7-5. Sustaining as part of PGETS differs from sustainment (providing logistics to a FSF). Sustain represents US efforts returning back to routine military engagements and security cooperation activities whereas sustainment might be represented by a common user logistics (CUL) agreement, where the US may be providing fuel as part of a multi-national operation. The US provision of logistics does not indicate that SFA is in any particular stage. The US can provide logistics in an operation where it is conducting SFA but it can also provide logistics where no SFA is being conducted. A NATO HA mission is an example where the US might be providing logistics and no FSF development is occurring.

7-6. In some cases, the partner nation may be dealing with a crisis, but the US may choose to support the PN by providing SA via Title-22 programs only. The US does not always commit major units in a direct supporting role or a direct combat role. SC is thought to be a peacetime activity and a majority of the programs are used during times of peace. However these same programs can be used during conflict as well. The stipulation for SA is that the US personnel will not be placed into combat. There is no stipulation that the FSF units that are trained and equipped under the SA program be barred from combat. Para. 7-8 discusses security assistance in greater detail.

7-7. Security cooperation. Security cooperation is conducted for any one, or a combination of three purposes to promote US security interests: to build mil-to-mil relationships, to build PN capability and capacity, or to gain peacetime or contingency access to the PN (to include over-flight rights, infrastructure, etc). SFA refers to the activities to build FSF capability and capacity, but building capacity may also improve relationships and enable the US to gain access during peacetime or conflict. Security cooperation activities are the main elements to a TCP. Contingency operations branch from the TCP but do not automatically cancel the continuation of the same security cooperation activities. During a contingency, the security assistance programs may be increased rather than terminated or suspended. As Figure 7-1 illustrates, there is a complex relationship between SFA and SC activities and contingency operations. However, the desired end-state of any contingency operation is a return to Phase-0 including the sustainment of FSF capability and capacity in order to prevent future crises.

7-8. Security assistance programs and activities. SA programs support the OTERA tasks and allow the US to generate or enhance the security capabilities of other nations. It does not authorize US units
to conduct operations for other nations. A foreign security force can’t send a letter of request under FMS or FMF to buy, rent or lease a US combat brigade to conduct combat for that nation. It can contract the US to help it generate a capability where the US may organize, train, equip, build or rebuild, and even advise the executive and generating force. Conceivably, under SA, the US could be contracted to provide advice for a foreign operational force but only at a level that would not put US advisors in direct combat.

7-9. Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The USG may sell, grant, or lease defense articles and services to a country or international organization only if the USG determines that the prospective purchaser is eligible. Defense articles or services may be sold from DOD stocks, or the DOD may enter into contracts to procure defense articles or services on behalf of eligible foreign countries or international organizations. The FMS system is used when the requesting nation has its own funds to purchase equipment or services from the US, or when it receives US or international financing to purchase those articles. When a requesting nation uses its own funds, it is not dependent upon the budget climate of the United States, although it still must gain political approval from Congress for the sale. The Leahy Amendment requires that funds, training, or services made available by this act may not be provided to any unit of a FSF if there is credible evidence that the unit committed gross human rights violations unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the congressional appropriations committees (House and Senate) that the foreign government is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the FSF to justice. The President and Congress can waive certain restrictions if they decide the situation warrants such a waiver.

7-10. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Elements of the US defense industry may prefer that a sale be made commercially rather than using FMS procedures. When a defense contractor receives a request or proposal from a country and prefers DCS, the contractor may request that DSCA (Strategy Directorate) issue a DCS preference for that particular sale. Direct commercial sales is similar to FMS in that the President and Congress can still stop a DCS if they feel that the transfer of technology associated with the product would be detrimental to US security or that the purchase might cause instability in the region of destination. Countries may prefer to deal directly with the defense contractor because it may be faster or cheaper to deal with the company for items that are not currently in the US inventory, and it could be faster than amending an existing FMS case or writing a new one.

7-11. Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF provides US financial assistance to the PN to use for the purchase of US defense equipment and services via the FMS system. However, when using FMF, the requesting nation is subject to the availability of US funds and the US budgetary process. Normal planning time to obtain and use FMF is about two years. It is normally allocated for a specific purpose and requires detailed coordination across multiple agencies. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) provides detailed, step-by-step guidance for the submission of FMF, as well as FMS proposals. The SAMM can be accessed online at http://www.samm.dsca.mil/. SFA planners must maintain detailed case files and conduct methodical, thorough turn-over procedures with their successors because most FMS and FMF cases will not come to fruition until after the planners have changed assignments.

7-12. Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Under certain circumstances, the US will give away excess defense articles. While there are some associated costs and stipulations, EDA is one of the few cases where DOD can “give” its equipment away. This is usually a very good opportunity to equip FSF at a low cost to the receiving nation. The Military Departments (MILDEPs) determine which items they carry in excess, and after surveying requirements by potential recipient countries, recommend an allocation of excess assets to the EDA coordinating committee. The committee, co-chaired by DSCA and the DOS Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, with representatives from the Department of Commerce and regional and functional policy offices in DOD, agree on a final allocation.
of the articles. Equipment which has been transferred from the Military Departments to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service is also available for transfer through the EDA program.

7-13. International Military Education and Training (IMET). International military education and training is another SA program that allows personnel from other countries to attend training and education at US training bases. These individuals return to their countries and often achieve important positions in their organizations. This is a relatively low cost, long term effort that has had numerous positive outcomes. For example, as of 2013, the US Army Command and General Staff College has produced 241 international graduates that have gone on to legitimately attain their nation’s highest military rank and have respectably influenced the character of their forces.

7-14. Personnel Exchange Programs (PEP). There are several exchange programs that exist which allow for a reciprocal exchange of instructors, staff officers, and trainers. These programs are fairly fixed but the expansion of such programs can enhance cross-cultural understanding. As an example, the US Navy conducts a personnel exchange with 20 different nations to such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Turkey, South Korea and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{22}

7-15. Exchange of training and related support. The AECA, Section 30A authorizes the President to provide training and related support (for example, transportation, food services, health services, logistics, and the use of facilities and equipment) to military and civilian defense personnel of a friendly foreign country or international organization. Such training and related support are provided through the MILDEP (as opposed to the combatant commands). Unit exchanges conducted under this authority are arranged under international agreements negotiated for such purposes, and are integrated into the TCP of the relevant combatant commander. Recipient countries provide, on a reciprocal basis, comparable training and related support; however, each country is responsible for paying their students' transportation and living allowances. The related reciprocal training and support must be provided within one year. Requests for unit exchanges are forwarded to the appropriate MILDEP with an information copy to DSCA.

7-16. Joint Exercise Program (JEP). The US conducts joint training exercises with partner nations to improve US unit capability and interoperability. Such exercises also improve the capability of foreign units if the exercise is set up properly. Funds can be allocated for exercise related construction of temporary facilities and some funds can be used to reimburse certain costs to the supporting foreign governments. Such exercises should emphasize unit collective capabilities. Examples would include Exercise COBRA GOLD, a joint-combined exercise with Thailand designed to improve US-Thai combat readiness and joint-combined interoperability.

7-17. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). SOF has been specifically authorized by law to spend some of its funds to meet its own training requirements through the training of foreign forces. This training must still be approved by the ambassador and the CCDR, but has the potential to facilitate FSF training at no cost to the receiving nation.

CASE STUDY

“Colombia is perhaps the best example of the inherent value of security assistance to the region. Once on the brink of falling to a powerful insurgency, Colombia is now a leader

Colombia

The US has maintained a steady program of support to Colombia for over 50 years. The war against drugs and its supporting programs as well as the war against terror and its respective programs have been used to assist the Colombian government in combating insurgency and criminal activity. US interests in Colombia increased in the 1980s and 90s with US efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs through interdiction and destruction of the drugs at their source.

Starting with Plan Colombia, the US increased its interagency approach with an increase in military and civilian support. It can be argued that the majority of money was given to the military and too little was given to developmental programs. Regardless, the overall control of US activities in Colombia has remained under control of the US embassy. The US has not resorted to conducting a military contingency operation.

The US continues to support Colombian efforts by providing equipment, training and repair parts for major systems such as the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters which are used by the Colombian military and the police. These programs are conducted under counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and security cooperation authorities and programs.

Colombia has improved in its capabilities to the point that it is now conducting SFA to other countries in and outside the region. The US was able to continue support to a government long enough to see positive results. Had the US sent in large numbers of US forces, it would have found itself the target of the insurgency, it would have destroyed legitimacy of the Colombian government, and it would still have to conduct SFA in order to build up a security force so it could depart.

As part of Plan Colombia and its predecessors, the US has used numerous programs to support its SFA activities. The concept of SFA did not create new programs to do new tasks. SFA uses existing programs connected by a plan to achieve distinct objectives.

FMS and DCS. The Government of Colombia began purchasing Blackhawk helicopters through the FMS program. Purchases by FMS require the purchasing nation to use its own funds. The most recent Blackhaws were purchased via FMS

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23 Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, CIP International Policy Report: The "War on Drugs" meets the "War on Terror," Center for International Policy, February 2003
with three aircraft going to the Colombian Army, three more going to the Colombian National Police, and one going to the Colombian Air Force. The purchase was announced 5 August 2010 with the delivery being completed on 2 March 2013. The delivery was completed several months ahead of schedule.

The FMS process began well ahead of the 2010 announcement and will actually not finish until all associated training involved with the case is completed. The Colombian government had the option of conducting FMS or DCS. Because there was training and other logistical support involved, the Colombians selected to bundle it under a FMS case. This case involved the US Army Aviation and Missile Command, the Army Security Assistance Management Directorate, Army Contracting Command, the US Embassy in Colombia, USSOUTHCOM, the US Congress, the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, the Colombian Ministry of the Interior and Justice, and the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Colombia now has the fifth largest fleet of Blackhawk helicopters in the world with more than 100 in use.

EDA. The Colombians received excess defense articles in 2009 which is another SA program that is available. The US transferred 14 J-69 engines, five JPS-70 radar systems and repair parts, and four T-37B aircraft worth about $24 million dollars at no cost to Colombia. Under the rules of EDA, all items are to be in operating condition at the time of transfer. The receiving nation must pay for repair costs to make the items operational if they are not in that condition prior to the transfer. The receiving nation must also pay transportation costs. EDA is generally a low cost option to obtain equipment that the US has deemed obsolete. The major problem with EDA is that it is subject to the availability of items currently in the US inventory. Once they are gone, they are gone and the US military will not be able to supply parts in the future.

IMET. Many countries use their IMET dollars to obtain training in conjunction with equipment sales. Colombia used some of its IMET dollars to obtain Blackhawk pilot training, crew chief training and mechanic training. For countries with smaller security forces, it is possible to maintain a capability such as crew chief by consciously sending one or two personnel to US courses. An advantage to IMET is that the students either pass an English proficiency test or receive language training so that they can attend the follow-on course. They also are versed in US doctrine, processes and procedures and can help with interoperability during multi-national operations.

Personnel Exchange Program. This program uses Title 10 money and exchanges US personnel on a one for one basis with the partner nation. In Colombia, the US sends officers to teach at the Colombian Lancero School and the Colombians send personnel to teach at the US Army Ranger School. These programs host extremely small

25Ibid
29Crichton, Jane, U.S. Army Military Personnel Exchange Program in Colombia strengthens armies, Army.Mil, May 25, 2011,
numbers but produce true subject matter experts. Both countries are exposed to the language, culture and doctrine in a manner that can't be achieved through any other program. To achieve the greatest effect, the follow-on assignments of these individuals are critical.  

JCET. US Special Operation Forces, especially US Army Special Forces, have been conducting training in Colombia dating back to the 1960s. This training has been codified in law and allows SOF units to deploy to other countries and train foreign forces. The skills taught to the FSF are not prescribed. This training requires agreement by the team, the FSF nation, the US embassy, and the CCMD. Because this is training, US SOF forces will not train where combat is expected. JCET has occurred in Colombia even though there is an active insurgent threat, but the training has not occurred in the area where the insurgents are active. JCET allows for some training benefit to the FSF, but they are usually of limited scope and duration.

CCMD and JCS exercises. The US conducts training exercises with Colombia and other countries in the region. In 2012, Colombia participated in Red Flag for the first time. The Colombians bought eight fighter aircraft and several tanker aircraft. This exercise has little to do with counterinsurgency. It is all about providing regional security in the Southern hemisphere. Other exercises that the US and Colombia have recently participated in are Fuerzas Commando which brought in military and police teams to compete in counter-terrorism tactics and techniques, and Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (FA HUM), a disaster preparedness series of exercises, seminars, and conferences to improve the collective ability of the US and its partner nations to respond effectively and expeditiously to disasters. The exercise series allows an opportunity for US and partner nation security forces to train together to prepare for natural disasters.

Counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs. The US specifically allocates money for CN and CT, which can only be spent for activities related to countering these threats. Because the insurgents in Colombia have been identified as a terrorist group and they receive much of their funding related to the sale of illegal narcotics, the US has been able to link these programs to Colombia’s efforts to defeat their insurgents.

Plan Colombia is a Colombian plan, which the US would label as an internal defense and development plan (IDAD). Subsequently, the US-Colombian action plan on regional security cooperation would be the US FID plan. DOD’s part of this plan would be security cooperation because the US is not conducting arrests, combat raids, or


advising tactical units during combat. Some of the SC activities occur in Colombia and would be considered nation assistance while some of them occur in the US so they would not be nation assistance. Some of the activities, such as Red Flag are not designed for internal threats, so they would not be FID.

SFA links all the US activities designed to develop the Colombian forces regardless of what they are called, so they build toward a better capacity that meets the mutual objectives of the US and Colombia.

KEY “SUSTAINING” POINTS

ANALYSIS

7-18. To date, the US has been able to avoid employing US combat forces into Colombia. It has used a “whole of government” approach over a period of many years to help the Colombians develop their security forces. DOD and the Drug Enforcement Administration have worked together to develop a significant security capability that blends military capabilities with law enforcement functions. Experience has shown that establishing a secure environment is paramount to enabling social and economic development. The government, however, needs to have independent oversight over the conduct of its security forces in order to minimize the potential for human rights abuses. Ultimately, the security forces must be protectors of the people and not just protectors of the government. Mechanisms that help prevent human rights abuses include:

- A sense of professionalism in the security forces.
- A higher loyalty to the state and its people than to a form of patronage.
- Security forces that are controlled by elected entities that can be removed by the people.

7-19. Executive, generating and operating functions:

- Executive. The US did not have to generate an executive function in Colombia. The key was to advise the existing organizations to change the character of the security forces from one that was designed on a patronage system to one based on merit.
- Generating. The US worked with the generating forces of Colombia to develop schools and a curriculum to support combating the threats that existed in Colombia. These efforts have achieved success to the point that Colombia is an exporter of generating capability.
- Operating. The US has provided direct support (minus combat) to operations in the form of logistics, intelligence, communications and transportation. The US has also provided law enforcement support but did not conduct arrests.

TASKS

7-20. Organize. The US helped the Colombians with the organization of their forces. Colombia created special police battalions with arrest authority that could function as battalions to conduct raids to disrupt the source of financing for anti-government groups.

7-21. Train. The US deployed trainers to train Colombian security forces so that the forces could be employed against the internal threats to the country. More importantly, the US worked to improve the institutions so that the Colombians could independently sustain the generation of their forces.

7-22. Equip. Colombia has the capability to manufacture much of its own equipment. The US provided some sophisticated equipment such as Blackhawk helicopters, which is significantly more affordable to the purchasing nation than building their own platforms.
7-23. Rebuild or Build. It was not necessary for the US to construct or rebuild the facilities needed by the Colombians.

7-24. Advise. The US provided advice to the Colombians in the executive, generating and operating functions. This does not imply that the US was leading or directing the Colombian security forces. The US was able to provide advice to coordinate US and Colombian efforts to work towards eliminating a common threat.

GOALS

7-25. The US had several objectives in supporting the development of the Colombian security forces. The US and Colombia share common goals regarding the independence of Colombia, the security of the region, and the elimination of illegal drug production, trafficking and consumption. It is imperative that Colombia have a stable government that supports the sustainable development of its people and it would be best for the Colombians to maintain control of their own security. To those ends, the US has been working with the people of Colombia to overcome any local and transnational threats by enabling the Colombians rather than employing US forces to directly combat the threats. Direct employment of US forces as an operating force is not a desirable choice by Colombia or the United States.

7-26. Over many years, the US has used numerous DOS, DoJ, and DOD programs to steadily build capability and capacity in Colombia. This has been in conjunction with development efforts in other sectors. Even though this method has not been without controversy, the alternatives of ignoring Colombia when it had requested US assistance or sending in large numbers of US forces to stabilize the country would not have been acceptable.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS - SUSTAIN

7-27. Table 7-1 provides sample questions to help the planner develop PN sustainability with regards to a FSF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Initial Planning Considerations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the FSF have its own reliable source of funding?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the FSF want to build closer relationships with the US?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Is the FSF involved in environmental protection, disaster relief, counter-drugs, counter-terrorism, or peacekeeping activities?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Is this a GCC priority country?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the US Ambassador’s plan and what SC programs does he support?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the country had issues with human rights abuse?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the FSF have schools with US equivalents?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What State National Guards are partnered with the country?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What military systems are being replaced in the US inventory?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What countries are upgrading old US equipment with newer equipment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What security programs are being conducted by other US agencies?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>What security programs are being conducted by other countries?</td>
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Chapter 8
SFA Assessments

This chapter provides an overview of best practices and considerations for assessing the capabilities and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions, as well as assessing the effectiveness of US or coalition SFA efforts. The science of operations research and systems analysis provides SFA planners and advisors a depth of options for measuring the performance of foreign security forces against a variety of frameworks. The content of this chapter also enables SFA planners to support key leaders’ decision-making processes with respect to SFA campaign plan design, implementation, and evaluation.

“As development of plans that include [Security Force Assistance] (SFA) activities should include specific and measurable objectives and assessment criteria.”
Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 2013

INTRODUCTION TO SFA ASSESSMENTS

8-1. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process involves the deliberate collection and analysis of current data in order to comprehend possible outcomes, and how those outcomes influence courses of action. More specifically, assessment helps JFCs determine progress toward achieving objectives, and the relevancy of current tasks and objectives to reaching the desired end-state. It helps identify opportunities, mitigate threats, and recognize needs for course correction, thus resulting in timely and efficient modifications to plans and orders. This process of continuous assessment allows planners to monitor performance of discrete actions (measures of performance [MOPs]) and to determine how the MOPs relate to measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to ensure achievement of the objectives. Figure 8-1 shows the inextricable relationship between planning and assessment.

![Figure 8-1 Relationship Between Planning and Assessment](image)
Chapter 8

Benefits of Assessment

8-2. Decision support. Effective assessment of a FSF identifies gaps in their capability and capacity development, and may help answer the following questions:

- How do we move the FSF from its current state to the desired state?
- Is the FSF making progress?
- Is the SFA campaign plan effective?
- Is FSF progress a result of the SFA campaign, or is it due to other factors?
- Does the plan require modification?
- Is course correction required in order to accomplish objectives?
- Are current objectives infeasible and requiring modification?
- Do the conditions defining the desired end state require modification?

8-3. Facilitate incremental improvement as well as bold shifts. Assessment enables incremental improvements to the commander’s operational approach and the campaign or contingency plan. The aim is to understand the problem and develop effective actions to address it. Incremental improvements may take the form of course corrections in order to stay on the path described by the plan. If such corrections are not feasible, or unlikely to produce the desired effect, a bold shift to the overall design of the SFA plan may be necessary to ensure that outcomes more closely resemble expectations. Once the JFC fully understands the problem and determines criteria for success, they identify the related information requirements that indicate success or a lack thereof. Assessment that puts emphasis on understanding the operational environment will ease the process of developing alternate courses of action when the current plan is in friction with reality. Proper assessment may help reveal alternate approaches, which become the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent adjustment.

8-4. Provide relevant information. Assessments provide information to decision makers regarding need for SFA activities, as well as their design, implementation, outcome, and cost-effectiveness. A number of actors, to include the senior defense official (SDO), GCC-level contact teams, and advisor teams may conduct assessments of the PN executive, generating, and operating functions in support of the theater campaign plan (TCP) or the Ambassador’s integrated country strategy (ICS). The assessment framework employed is situation dependent, but may relate to the DOTMLPF-P framework, the joint warfighting functions, or some other construct. The important thing is that the chosen assessment framework be appropriate for the type of FSF organization, and that the SFA force applies the framework consistently over time. Ultimately, the assessment framework tailored to the specific parameters of the TCP and the FSF will drive the design of the SFA campaign plan, as well as development of metrics that measure progress over time.

Assessment Misconceptions

8-5. The most common misconception regarding assessment is that the process serves only to inform higher headquarters regarding the progress of the SFA mission. In fact, assessments provide the greatest value to the advisors on the ground, in contact with the FSF on a daily basis. Given the scarce allocation of resources and time, advisors must establish priorities that support the overall SFA campaign plan. Constant, continuous assessment of the FSF allows the individual advisor or advisor team to determine the priority of effort over the duration of the mission, as well as SFA tasks that can be designated as a lower priority in the near term. By re-assessing at regular intervals, advisors can re-direct their efforts as the SFA mission progresses. Another misconception is that the scope of the assessment is limited to the FSF organization. In fact, assessment should enhance understanding of the operational environment itself; thereby shaping lines of effort that fit the needs of the FSF organization as well as the greater operating environment. Finally, there is difficulty in quantitatively assessing certain factors, particularly when attempting to assess nuances, patronage, and motivation of FSFs and
their leaders. A well-designed assessment framework combines quantitative as well as qualitative metrics.

**WHO CONDUCTS ASSESSMENTS?**

8-6. All elements supporting SFA activities should conduct assessments. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) conducts strategic assessments in coordination with the country team to determine what overarching gaps in capability or capacity exist within the context of US interests, objectives, and goals. This strategic assessment forms the basis for the SFA plan and for future, more detailed assessments by SFA elements. Once the current status assessment is in place, and the desired end state has already been determined, the next step is to assess the ways and means by which to move from inception to completion (see Figure 8-2). Following an understanding of the PN’s unique security considerations and associated requirements, the FSF assessment takes place in terms of the tasks required of the FSF, the conditions the FSF will operate under, and the minimum standards required for achieving successful outcomes. Personnel at all levels from the GCC to the individual advisors play a critical role in assessment.

![Figure 8-2 Initial Assessment, Continuous Assessment, and Desired End State](image)

**WHEN ARE SFA ASSESSMENTS CONDUCTED?**

8-7. As depicted in the figure above, assessment is a continuous process. The stages of Plan, Generate, Employ, Transition, and Sustain (PGETS) of SFA all require assessment. Initial or baseline assessment plans are formulated at the beginning of the plan stage in order to:

- Establish a basis for the SFA plan, where to begin building FSF capability and capacity
- Ensure proper resource allocation for the plan per the assessments conducted to evaluate gaps and requirements for the FSF (See Figure 8-1).

8-8. In many instances, information needed for baseline assessment is already available in a variety of forms, to include open-source media, other assessments and reports archived by the country team, DOD and national intelligence capabilities, and from reports generated from previous engagements. The
earlier an assessment plan is established, the smoother the transition process in later phases. Assessment was introduced in Chapter 3, with studies of SFA impact on the fiscal environment, and continues throughout each phase.

8-9. Assessment plays a large role in understanding the operational environment. Developing a comprehensive assessment plan that accounts for the physical and environmental conditions is necessary. Analyzing the degree to which the joint force understands factors such as geography, human intelligence (HUMINT), language, and culture helps determine what role the FSF can play in enhancing this knowledge. Knowledge results in a better understanding of the environment, which supports development of sound courses of action (COAs). In the transition and sustain stages, advisors must assess factors such as the attitude of the population towards the FSF as it works toward sustainable independence. Similarly, the relationships between FSF counterparts and US advisors must be iteratively assessed in order to capture trends, best practices, and data relating to program effectiveness. During the sustain stage, operational FSFs are assessed for their ability to maintain the capability and capacity developed during the preceding stages. The most effective way to optimize these factors is to begin as early as possible in the operational or theater campaign planning process.

- Conducting a baseline assessment, followed by periodic re-assessments, determines the feasibility of progress towards objectives that will lead to the desired end state. These objectives should cover the existing capacity of the FSF to meet its country’s internal and external security requirements.

- Assessment should also determine whether the PN is a security importer or potential security exporter of FSF capabilities in order to determine an appropriate role for the PN in future multinational or coalition operations. Assessing the current capacity of a FSF to contribute to the internal security in a potential insurgency environment and the capacity to defend the PN’s sovereignty from incursion by an outside force is essential.

SCOPE

8-10. Assessments should include all FSF executive, generating, and operating functions; each provides insight as to the will and ability of the FSF to generate, employ, and sustain itself. Through a baseline assessment of the FSF, to include its duties and responsibilities, planners can determine which OTERA tasks are required to build capability and capacity levels within the FSF.

8-11. Assessments of the FSF against a desired set of capabilities will assist in developing an OTERA-based plan. Assessment continues throughout FSF development to measure the effectiveness of SFA activities and programs, and levels of FSF developmental efforts. Figure 8-3 compares the assessment requirements between operating and generating forces.
8-12. Assessment precedes, guides, and follows every SFA activity. Assessment entails three distinct tasks: continuous monitoring of the situation and the progress of the operations; evaluating the operation against MOPs and MOEs to determine progress relative to the mission; and reporting as appropriate.

- Monitoring - Continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation for the purpose of data collection
- Evaluating - Using criteria and data analysis to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists
- Reporting - Identifying changes possessing sufficient merit and recommending them to the commander or making adjustments within delegated authority

8-13. Effective assessment requires criteria for evaluating the degree of success in accomplishing the mission. MOPs and MOEs express these criteria.

**DEVELOPMENT**

8-14. Environmental considerations. Understanding the operational environment is essential. Figure 8-4 on the following page outlines key questions to keep in mind when developing an assessment. Understanding the non-linearity of the operational environment in which SFA is applied leads to grasping the inherently unpredictable nature of the problem. Sophisticated analysis methods inherent in operational design methodology allow assessments to occur within the scope of these problems.
Therefore, it is better to gain knowledge of the complex environment than to attempt to generate lines of effort based on unrealistic predictions.

**MONITOR**

8-15. SFA planners must ensure that the monitoring (or data collection) process within a COA is consistent as the plan solidifies. Even if the MOPs and MOEs take new forms, sudden shifts in data collection methods will yield analysis that is akin to comparing two completely different data sets.

8-16. Automated data collection and monitoring processes, may support standardization in a way that mitigates human error. In order for analysis to be complete and correct, the data must be accurate. Consider existing or legacy assessment tools from previous campaigns and consider whether these tools can be enhanced so that data can exist with a higher level of fidelity than that which has been provided.

**EVALUATE**

8-17. Forecasting or predicting outcomes is not the only desired result of assessment. While forecasting plays a role in terms of informing commanders on a plan’s progress so that they can look ahead, assessment is more valuable when it enables decisive action within a course of action. Challenges to effective assessment of SFA efforts include a “general absence of quantifiable measures of effectiveness and performance; in lieu of objective standards, assessment hinges on taking a long term view of exercises.” (Marine Corps Center for Lessons-Learned report on TSC exercises conducted by MARFORPAC, April 2013).
MOPS AND MOES

A measure of effectiveness (MOE) is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment, tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, an objective, or the creation of an effect. It measures the relevance of performed actions.

A measure of performance (MOP) is a criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment.

8-18. SFA MOPs should be assigned against a well-defined set of standards relating to the FSF that may reflect a number of possible frameworks as described in paragraph 8-4 (DOTMLPF-P framework, the joint warfighting functions, or some other construct that is appropriate for the type of FSF organization being assessed). SFA MOEs measure the effectiveness of the unit conducting the SFA developmental tasks of OTERA. It is important to understand that MOPs and MOEs are not interchangeable, but they may nest within one another. MOPs correlate to specific MOEs in order to determine the optimal levels of effort for objective achievement. A careful analysis of the relationship between MOPs and MOEs reveals the need to shift COAs if the current plan is inefficient, or is not producing the desired effects.

8-19. One example of a MOP-MOE relationship is the assessment of civilian relationships with PN security forces, particularly as these forces begin to undertake operations independently. Determining relationship strength is difficult to quantify, while other military capabilities are quantifiable, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects. However, parameters such as the dynamic interactions between friendly forces, adaptable adversaries, and populations make assessment difficult, but certainly not impossible. Assessing the effectiveness of actions taken to convince a group to support their central government is very challenging, but tools that measure human terrain exist in the form of surveys, focus groups, and other data collection methods.

8-20. As planners assess complex human behaviors, they draw on many sources, including both analytical and subjective measurements. Assessments facilitate the creation of effective MOPs when assessing FSF capability and capacity development. JFCs must provide guidance on what to assess and to what level of detail. Do the metrics used to evaluate a professional army apply to a police force? Depending on the situation and the echelon of command, assessment may be a detailed process (formal assessment plan with dedicated assessment cell or element), or an informal process that relies more on the intuition of the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staffs.

MOPs Matter

A practical example of the dangers of not paying attention to the effects of MOPs exists in the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system that had been the primary metric for measuring Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capabilities from 2005 to 2010. According to a June 2010 audit of the CM by the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), flaws of the CM included overstated operational capabilities of ANSF units due to the subjective nature of the system, and a lack of indicators for sustained, independent operations. Correlation of the MOPs that existed in the CM rating system to appropriate MOEs could have highlighted the flaws and the need to address them. Another significant flaw in the CM system was that it inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF development. ANSF units that received top CM marks (CM1 – capable of independent operations) led to minimization of mentor efforts. Since ANSF units disliked the prospect of losing ISAF support and all the benefits that came with it, they had little motivation to achieve a rating of CM1. Proper analysis of CM-based
MOPs and their relationship to MOEs indicating sustainable independence would lead to the mitigation of the effect of disincentives.\textsuperscript{35}

**MILESTONES AND OBJECTIVES**

8-21. While conducting assessments, planners must take full advantage of modern collection technologies and use this information to make any needed adjustments to the current plan. This includes an evaluation of the feasibility of objectives and milestones as they relate to the desired end state (DES). If constraints of the environment affect progress, then the milestones and objectives warrant adjustment.

**MEASURES AND EFFECTS**

8-22. The indicators in the figure are appropriate measures of a FSF’s force structure. The next step is to measure the effectiveness of the partner army to establish an optimal makeup for the structure. Figure 8-5 illustrates the linkage between measures and effects.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8-5}
\caption{MOPS, Desired End State (DES), and Effects}
\end{figure}

**REPORT**

8-23. Typically, security force assistance assessments consist of a multi-step process. First is the assessment of the need for the effort. Once the need is established, the next level is the assessment of the design and a proposal theory of effort to meet that need. The third step is to assess the process and

\textsuperscript{35} Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, 30 July 2010.
implementation of the effort. Once assessed, the process and effort implemented leads to a completion of the outcome and effect assessment. As an after action report (AAR) and feedback for future operations, the last level is the assessment of cost effectiveness of the effort.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE
For more information on SFA assessments, see the JCISFA SFA Assessment Handbook, 1 Jul 2015
Chapter 9

Best Practices for SFA

Successful SFA planners combine their understanding of US policies, authorities, and resources to write plans and orders that nest within the Theater Campaign Plan and the Ambassador’s Integrated Country Strategy. However, the execution of these plans and orders falls to the Service components tasked with the SFA mission. Effective SFA planners must thoroughly understand the best practices for the execution of SFA tasks in order to draft plans and orders that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, and complete.

GENERAL

9-1. As stated in the prologue, this handbook serves as a desktop reference for SFA planners at all levels. This chapter provides concepts and field-tested best practices for SFA, highlighting the linkages between planning and execution of security force assistance activities.

9-2. Planning and execution linkages. Military personnel from the Services’ respective conventional forces, special operations forces, members of the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW), and contractors will ultimately prepare for, execute, and assess the plans developed by country team, the security cooperation office (SCO), combatant command (CCMD), Service Component Commands (SCCs), or Joint task force (JTF) level SFA planners. While many SFA planners may have previously served in duty positions where they advised foreign security forces, this is not always the case. As such, all SFA planners should be familiar with some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures most commonly employed by advisors in the execution of the SFA objectives.

9-3. SFA missions require strong interpersonal skills. Advisors may conduct SFA activities at the executive, generating, or operating functions; they may be assigned to a partner nation defense ministry, training institution, or a tactical-level unit. Advisors may work at any of these levels in support of PN land, air, maritime, paramilitary, or even cyber-security organizations. SFA personnel assess the PN organization’s people, processes, and technology, and then advise select individuals as to how to improve or sustain these capabilities. At times, advisors may advise collectively across multiple organizational constructs.

9-4. The most successful advisors execute the SFA developmental tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA) by engaging with their FSF counterparts in a personal manner, whether their actions take place in an individual or group setting. Successful advisors understand the human dimension of SFA. SFA planners must develop concepts and plans that set the individual advisors up for that success by anticipating the interpersonal or cultural challenges and friction points that the advisors will face, and then preventing or mitigating these challenges to the greatest extent possible during the planning phase.
A DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ADVISOR

9-5. From the senior military officer or US Government civilian advising their executive counterparts at the ministerial level, down to the junior officers and non-commissioned officers advising FSF across various operating environments (i.e. in non-combat and in combat), most day-to-day advisor activities can fit within broad categories: advise, support and liaison with all three being required to assess. Assess is a common requirement regardless of the role. A number of more narrowly defined tasks fall within these three categories. The most effective SFA planners develop specified tasks that focus the advisors toward the accomplishment of well-defined objectives. Most SFA missions require advisors to advise, support, and provide liaison with their counterparts in order to accomplish the stated objectives as seen in Figure 9-1.

![Common Advisor Roles Diagram](image)

**Assess**

9-6. Chapter 8 of this handbook provides a detailed discussion of assessment of FSF, as well as the assessment of SFA activities and programs. Properly scoped assessment activities clearly reflect the FSF’s essential tasks for each function (executive, generating, and operating) described as functional requirements for respective FSF organizations.

9-7. The broadly defined needs of the partner nation or the operating environment typically narrow the focus of assessment. For example, if the partner nation is engaged in combat operations against an external threat or insurgent groups, the scope of the assessment will differ from an assessment framework employed in a country that is at peace with its neighbors or does not face an insurgency. Similarly, the operating environment and the maturity of the host nation’s government institutions may
affect how the FSF executive and generating force enterprise operates. Assessment activities are comprehensive across the FSF and the campaign, and usually exceed any single advisor’s capability. In the course of working directly with the FSF, advisors engage in the following assessment activities: evaluate, monitor, and report.

Evaluate

9-8. Ideally, advisors evaluate their FSF counterparts against a clearly defined standard or checklist. SFA planners at all levels can enable advisors to evaluate their counterparts more efficiently and effectively by developing clearly defined SFA objectives, metrics, and standardized support forms that make evaluation and assessment simpler, and the resulting data more useful. Often, the FSF will already have its own doctrine, standards, processes, or programs whose context an advisor must understand and from which to evaluate.

9-9. Standardization of metrics and assessment report formats across the CCMD, JTF, or OSC would make it easier for advisors to assist each other in determining best practices and a shared understanding of what “center mass” looks like. Standardized capabilities metrics for FSF units by type (i.e., army versus police) also might allow advisors to develop and refine their own team-level campaign plans so that their SFA efforts remain focused on the partner unit’s most urgent developmental needs. At this time, there is no standardized assessment framework, so advance research into best practices among the CCMDs will provide a number of options for a suitable assessment framework.

Monitor

9-10. In certain circumstances, the advisors in the field support the CCMD or JTF commander’s ability to visualize and understand the operating environment by providing accurate, up-to-date information on the FSFs’ capabilities, limitations, and intentions.

9-11. Mali is an example that illustrates how advisors could have, but perhaps did not keep the USAFRICOM commander fully apprised of the situation, particularly with respect to the intentions of the Malian armed forces prior to the coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Amadou Toumani Toure in March of 2012. The US had been working with the Mali security forces for years but failed to prevent the coup which caught USAFRICOM by surprise and precipitated a military incursion led by the French to reestablish order in the country.

Report

9-12. A disconnect can occur between the assessment of the FSF and the reporting requirements needed by a higher headquarters. For example, during the latter phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT) was designed as a format for partner units and advisor teams (SFAATs) to submit reports on the overarching abilities of their Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) counterparts. The CUAT, however, was not designed to be a detailed assessment framework that replaced all other specific assessment tools. In short, if the SFAATs only assessed the metrics that were listed on the CUAT, they would be neglecting the evaluation of other critical developmental areas within the ANSF.

9-13. SFA planners at the CCMD or JTF levels must develop more comprehensive report formats, or ensure that advisor teams understand that the required reports only query representative bits of information, and that the advisor teams must conduct more exhaustive assessments of their counterparts in order to evaluate their own intermediate SFA goals and objectives.
ADVISE

9-14. SFA planners can recommend a number of different approaches to advising FSF personnel, and these approaches can be arranged along a continuum spanning from a very hands-on, active, or direct approach, to a more indirect, demand-based approach. The technique or approach employed by the advisor should reflect the developmental needs of the FSF unit, and the SFA stage currently in action (generate, employ, transition, sustain).

- Advisors assisting or leading the effort to generate FSF might directly teach basic military skills.
- During the employ stage, advisors might coach their counterparts in order to enable them to achieve improved performance, while allowing the FSF to assume greater responsibility for their own growth and development.
- During the transition stage, advisors may guide their counterparts as the partner nation assumes the lead role for a particular function, and the advisor serves more as a background resource for the FSF leaders as required.
- During the sustain stage of SFA, US general purpose forces or special operations forces may conduct combined training as part of a combatant commander (CCDR)-directed bilateral or multi-national exercise CCIF or JCET.
- During any stage of SFA, FSF leaders could come to the United States to train at a US military training center as part of the international military education and training (IMET) program.

9-15. SFA planners must design SFA activities that target the developmental needs of the FSF, while allowing advisors to focus their training efforts on the partner’s zone of proximal development. This term relates to the set of skills that the student or partner nation counterpart is incapable of learning on their own, but can learn with the help of the teacher or advisor. Accurate, up-to-date assessments of the FSF capabilities will inform the SFA planner’s efforts to design and develop programs or activities that target the partner nation counterpart’s zone of proximal development. Many benefits of this framework include maximum efficiency of SFA efforts, while not offending FSF personnel by appearing to advise and train at a level above or below their proficiency level.

Footnote: The zone of proximal development is the difference between what a learner can do without help and what he or she can do with help. In the context of SFA, advisors should focus their efforts on those activities that FSF can accomplish with their assistance, dedicating less time to those activities that the FSF can already perform and sustain, or those activities that are beyond the capacity of the FSF to perform.

For a detailed explanation of a wide variety of field-tested advisor techniques and principles, refer to the Air-Land-Sea Application Center’s Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces (Advising) (FM-3-07.10, MCRP 3-33.8A, NTTP 3-07.5, or AFTTP 3-2.76).

SUPPORT

9-16. The United States assists partner nations in a number of ways, from nation assistance programs to humanitarian assistance, to security assistance (SA), among others. JP 1-02 defines security assistance as:

“The group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and
9-17. The SFA planner must ensure that the design of the SFA campaign plan both supports and constrains the individual advisor. The CCMD supports the advisor by providing timely delivery of resources to the partner nation so that the SFA campaign plan can proceed efficiently, while not causing the FSFs’ leaders to lose faith in the United States. As the advisor executes the campaign plan, he, the country team, the CCMD, and representatives from the DSCA must practice communications synchronization by not over-promising and then under-delivering any form of assistance. When the process is not followed, or intermediaries in the process do not follow through on tasks with alacrity, these situations often create an untenable position for the advisor; this must be avoided at all costs.

9-18. During the course of most SFA missions, but particularly within the operating function, FSF personnel make numerous requests or demands of their US advisors, particularly early in the advisors’ rotation in theater. Most partner nation requests are for either materiel support or for enabler support. Materiel support examples include all classes of supply, from major end items (new vehicles, night vision devices, etc.), to consumables such as fuel and water. Examples of enabler support might include fire support (close air support, artillery, or electronic warfare); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support; aerial medical evacuation support, or vehicle repair and other forms of corrective maintenance. In all cases, the advisor must ask three critical questions prior to entertaining FSFs’ requests for support:

1. Do my counterparts really need this materiel or capability to accomplish the mission?
2. Is there any way the FSF could procure or acquire this resource or capability using their own systems, processes, or methods?
3. Can the FSF sustain this system or capability over the long term?

9-19. Effective SFA planners support the advisors in the field by providing unambiguous parameters regarding what types of support are and are not available. Advisors are obligated to provide honest, candid assessments of the FSF’s support requirements based upon the mission and a careful, deliberate analysis of the three questions outlined above. Supporting agencies such as DSCA, theater support commands, or US military organizations operating in theater must anticipate the FSF’s support requirements, be familiar with the CCMD’s SFA campaign plan, and provide responsive support and assistance to the advisors and their FSF counterparts.

LIAISON

9-20. Please reference liaison role as mentioned on page 5-7.

PLAN – PREPARE – EXECUTE – ASSESS FRAMEWORK

9-21. The plan-prepare-execute-assess framework is part of the advisor’s daily battle rhythm. The Army’s operations process described in ADRP 5-0 nests with the joint operations planning process (JOPP) described in JP 5-0, as well as the joint exercise life cycle (JELC), and provides a suitable framework for the process of planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing operations, to include SFA missions. While this framework is useful at the country team, CCMD, or JTF levels, it applies equally well at the advisor team level. CCMD-level SFA planners must provide the advisors or SFA force with the appropriate inputs that allow the advisors to conduct this iterative process, while nesting all SFA activities within the intent of the TCP or the JTF-level OPORD.
PLAN

9-22. Successful advisors begin development of team- or unit-level campaign plans immediately upon notice of the pending SFA mission. Advisors continue to refine and develop the plan prior to and during the SFA mission in order to achieve the theater commander’s intent, as well as to continually re-focus the efforts of the SFA force as the FSF develops and progresses throughout the course of the SFA mission. The quality of the guidance and inputs provided by the country team or CCMD-level SFA planners will have a direct and significant impact on the SFA force’s ability to plan for the mission.

9-23. Advisors integrate inputs that include guidance from higher headquarters, open-source, unclassified, and classified research products, and briefings on the FSF unit to be advised. The team continues to build on their understanding of the FSF by reviewing after-action reports and corresponding with advisors who have previously worked with that particular FSF organization, or perhaps an adjacent or similar unit. If the advisor team is able to conduct a pre-deployment site survey, the knowledge gained will further enhance the veracity of the team leader’s estimate of the situation. This estimate informs the development of the team or SFA force’s mission statement, as well as essential tasks that support the theater commander’s intent.

9-24. Upon arrival in country, the team builds rapport with their FSF counterparts and then conducts an initial assessment of their FSF counterparts to determine the FSF capabilities and capacity, and all associated gaps that exist between current capabilities and the theater commander’s desired end-state. This initial assessment allows the team leader or SFA force commander to complete his or her plan and issue a complete OPORD to the rest of the SFA force.

9-25. Subsequent periodic assessments of the FSF provide critical information that informs the preparation of required reports to higher headquarters. More important, these assessments allow the team leader to re-evaluate and adjust the team’s focus of effort. Based on these subsequent assessments, the team leader or SFA force commander issues a fragmentary order (FRAGO) that essentially sets new priorities and states new task statements to the SFA force based upon the FSF’s most recent developmental milestones and requirements. The process of assessing the FSF at periodic intervals and issuing FRAGOs throughout the duration of the SFA mission sustains the productivity and effectiveness of the SFA force.

9-26. The term key leader engagement (KLE) has no doctrinal definition, but typically refers to planned meetings between senior USG officials or SFA personnel and senior partner-nation government officials, military officers, or senior tribal or religious leaders. Country team or CCMD-level security cooperation and SFA planners should develop a strategic framework for KLEs, and establish standardized templates that allow advisors to document and submit KLE reports. These reports will inform CCMD and national-level intelligence agencies’ efforts to better understand the human terrain of the operating environment. These reports will also enable CCMD-level civil affairs and information operations planners to better coordinate their objectives and strategic communications themes and messages.

PREPARE

9-27. The success of the SFA mission depends not only on the preparation of the SFA force for deployment, but also on the preparation of the SFA force for each and every discrete SFA task and engagement with their FSF counterparts. SFA planners enable the SFA force to prepare for their specific tasks by coordinating or reviewing all administrative, logistical, and legal considerations prior to deployment.

9-28. Based upon the CCMD-level SFA objectives and associated plans, the SFA force must prepare for the mission by assembling the necessary resources required to accomplish their assigned SFA developmental tasks. CCMD-, Service- or national-level agencies may have partner nation doctrinal
references translated into both English and the host-nation language available. If the SFA mission requires additional technical or niche subject matter expertise not resident within the team or SFA force, these capabilities need to be integrated, or relationships established to facilitate reach-back capability. The onus for facilitation of these support relationships falls on the CCMD-level SFA planners, or the Services providing the forces if the request for forces (RFF) clearly states the requirement.

9-29. SFA forces may perform a single function in support of developing FSF capabilities and capacity, such as training indigenous forces on a specific skill set, or working side-by-side for extended periods with a mid- to senior-level bureaucrat at one of the partner nation’s government ministries. In other cases, SFA teams may work with a particular FSF unit, tasked with developing capabilities and capacity across the war-fighting functions and DOTMLPF. Regardless, SFA personnel should begin their workday hours, not minutes, prior to linking up with their counterparts. No SFA mission will achieve the greatest possible effect without detailed planning, preparation, and rehearsals prior to each event, and always with the full participation and cooperation of the interpreters supporting the event.

9-30. Doctrinally, the commander’s intent statement is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military endstate that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. Discrete SFA events are no different. For example, if the SFA force leader wishes to call on his or her FSF counterpart for purely social or rapport-building purposes, this meeting must be planned, briefed, and war-gamed with all participants present, especially the interpreters. The SFA force leader briefs the group on the purpose of the meeting (“We are going to call on Colonel Mahmoud to express our congratulations on his promotion.”). The SFA leader then briefs the group on key tasks (“We’re going to knock, walk in, shake his hand, and tell him we’re happy to hear of his promotion. We’re going to give him this 12-pack of orange Fanta. We’re going to hang around for about 15-20 minutes watching soccer on TV. Finally, we’re going to get up to leave, telling him we have a busy day tomorrow, again expressing our congratulations.”). The SFA leader briefs the desired end-state for the meeting, or contingency break contact criteria (“We stay for 20 minutes max, unless he begs us to stay; then it’s on-call. Ali, (interpreter) if you get the sense that Col Mahmoud is not in the mood for visitors, you give me the signal and we quietly depart.”). All meetings with indigenous personnel, no matter how routine or trivial, should be planned in this manner. After a while, this becomes a routine and the advisor team is able to brief by exception, but planning, rehearsals, and briefs must always occur, driven by a simple commander’s intent statement.

9-31. SFA planners must maintain an up-to-date understanding of all administrative and legal matters pertaining to the deployment of personnel to countries within the GCC area of responsibility. Increasingly, official passports and Visas are required for US personnel participating in overseas SFA missions whenever travel includes any commercial mode of transportation. In all cases, SFA personnel will require country clearances (authorizations permitting DOD personnel to travel to a given country), usually at least 30 days prior to deployment. Approval authority for country clearances is typically delegated by the US Embassy Chief of Mission (CoM) to the senior US defense representative (USDR) in country for coordination with the host nation. Submission of country clearance requests is an SFA unit (or parent unit) responsibility via the designated activity at the SFA unit’s home base, station, or post.

9-32. The United States’ final redeployment of all forces from Iraq in December of 2011 was driven largely by the inability of the Iraqi and United States governments to negotiate a status of forces agreement (SOFA). A SOFA, a memorandum of agreement (MOA), or some other negotiated bilateral agreement will stipulate the terms of US presence as well as the legal status of US personnel and property inside the territory of the host nation. While a SOFA may provide significant legal protections to individuals and preservation of command authorities, MOAs often do not. SFA planners as well as
Chapter 9

SFA force leaders must thoroughly understand the unique legal terms governing the SFA force’s presence in the host nation.

9-33. In some cases, SFA personnel operating within the host nation may deploy as part of a larger formation providing all functions of sustainment via organic logistics capabilities. In other cases, advisor teams or SFA personnel may be partially or almost entirely dependent on the host nation for sustainment and support. Mutual Logistics Support Agreements (MLSAs) – formal bilateral agreements stipulating terms for the reciprocal provision of logistics sustainment, services, and support – may play an integral role in the exchange of logistics support between US and partner nations (both the host nation as well as other coalition partners). Similarly, Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) are negotiated bilaterally between the US and allies or partners, and stipulate conditions for reimbursement in order to allow the exchange of common sustainment functions, to include most classes of supply, as well as transportation and other logistics functions. Successful SFA planners anticipate the SFA force’s support requirements and conduct all coordination, particularly with respect to the address of legal and pecuniary matters. Each Service has additional material available for further information on preparing for deployment.

EXECUTE

9-34. Advisors or SFA force personnel execute their SFA tasks based upon the planned objectives for each event, relying on sound judgment, intuition, and continuous re-assessment of the operating environment. A more complete summary of techniques and considerations for the execution of the SFA mission can be found in the Air-Land-Sea Application Center’s Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces (Advising) (FM-3-07.10, MCRP 3-33.8A, NTTP 3-07.5, or AFTTP 3-2.76).

ASSESS

9-35. Chapter 8 of this handbook covers assessment of FSF capabilities, as well as assessment of SFA program effectiveness. However, assessment is a continuous process that permeates every aspect of SFA at every level. Following every SFA task or event, the advisor team should conduct an assessment of what has just taken place, looking first outward at the operating environment, and then inward at individual and team performance. The observations gathered during these assessments should be documented, archived, and circulated as appropriate for the mission.

9-36. Post-event assessments with an outward focus are called debriefs. The concept of the debrief is to assemble all SFA force personnel who were present at the specific event, to include interpreters, along with SFA force intelligence and knowledge management experts, and re-construct the event for the purpose of recalling and documenting any observations that may increase the SFA force’s understanding of the FSF and the operating environment. Particular note should be made of unexpected events, the presence mysterious or unfamiliar personnel, or changes to the FSF, good or bad, which might merit consideration as the SFA force plans its next SFA event or task.

9-37. Post-event assessments with an inward focus are called after-action reviews (AARs). The concept of the AAR is to assemble all participants in the SFA event to discuss ways that the team could perform its mission better. Participants in the AAR must practice sturdy professionalism by providing candid feedback to others, while remaining receptive to constructive criticism. The overall objective is for the team or SFA force to be a learning organization that always strives for improved performance and greater mission effectiveness. The AAR usually takes place immediately following the debrief. Team standard operating procedures should establish the format and rules of engagement for debriefs and AARs that welcome and respect inputs from all personnel, regardless of rank or duty position.
TECHNIQUES FOR ESTABLISHING RAPPORT

9-38. Advisors or members of the SFA force establish rapport with their partner or host-nation counterparts in order to establish interpersonal relationships built on trust and mutual respect. These relationships contribute to the overall set of favorable conditions for the subsequent conduct of all SFA developmental tasks. Although these relationships exist primarily between the advisor and his or her counterparts, SFA planners design, resource, and constrain the SFA mission in ways that dramatically affect the nature of these relationships.

UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT THE PARTNER NATION’S CULTURE

9-39. Understanding the partner nation’s culture begins with knowledge. Successful advisors read as much as possible about the host nation’s geography, history, dominant religions, political system, society, and culture throughout the preparation phase of the SFA mission. Knowledge is a foundational component of understanding that the advisor gains through a dedicated effort to know more about the area into which he or she will deploy. SFA planners contribute to this understanding by framing the SFA problem in ways that orient the advisors to the most important cultural considerations.

9-40. The advisor’s understanding of the host nation’s culture enables him or her to use discretion during interactions with FSF or other indigenous personnel, and apply cultural understanding to forge strong bonds of trust and friendship that support the mission. Advisors must understand that even though many FSF or indigenous personnel may keep a straight face during interactions with their advisors, a demonstrated lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the advisor, regardless of his or her best intentions, can poison the relationship between the advisor and his or her counterparts, placing the SFA mission at risk.

9-41. SFA planners at the CCMD or JTF levels enable advisors to increase their cultural effectiveness in several ways. First, all requests for forces (RFFs) the CCMD submits to the Services via the Joint Staff and the Service component commanders must clearly state all language, regional expertise, and cultural (LREC) training requirements in specific detail. From a CCMD perspective, the Services can only be expected to provide advisors or SFA forces that meet the minimum LREC qualifications, so all RFFs must be very explicit in terms of the requirements. Another proven technique for CCMD and Service cooperation is for the advisors or SFA force to be provided the interpreters they will deploy with at the beginning of the pre-deployment training cycle. The bonds of trust between advisors and their interpreters forged during pre-deployment training will enable the individual interpreter to better serve the SFA force as a cultural advisor as well as linguist during deployment. Finally, the CCMD must “push” lessons learned and other useful information to the advisors or SFA force prior to deployment, and the CCMD should prioritize pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) activities in order to better prepare the advisors for deployment.

9-42. Direction or guidance designed in part to prevent US Service-members from engaging in behaviors that could jeopardize relations between coalition forces and the host nation (e.g.: do not enter mosques, no proselytizing, etc.) can be used. However, from an SFA planner’s perspective, this kind of restrictive guidance should complement and reinforce a much larger program of language, regional expertise, and culture pre-deployment training.

CONVEY OUR PERSPECTIVE, CULTURE, AND VALUES

9-43. Every advisor or any other member of an SFA force contributes to the CCMD’s inform and influence activities (IIA), whether they realize it or not. Whether or not those contributions support the CCMD or Ambassador’s overall strategic communications plan in a positive manner is another matter. FSF and other indigenous personnel are typically very eager to engage US personnel on matters of personal interest, as well as political issues of the day. Most indigenous personnel have a lot of
questions about the United States and American culture. Advisors and other SFA personnel should be open and forthcoming with their counterparts in order to generate goodwill and to build rapport, but should also exercise discretion. SFA planners at the CCMD and country team levels, in coordination with public affairs and information operations planners, must establish clear parameters that help guide SFA personnel in their interactions in order to present the United States, our policies, and perceived intentions in the best possible light. Pre-deployment language and culture training should highlight specific subjects that are best avoided.

Guidance addressing the above considerations could be presented in the following sections of the theater campaign plan (TCP) or JTF-level operations order (OPORD): Annex C, Appendix 11 (rules of engagement) and Annex J, Appendix 3 (military information support operations)

GAIN A BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOCAL RELIGION AS PRACTICED BY THE FSF COUNTERPARTS

9-44. Some partner nations’ public institutions are completely secular (e.g., Turkey, Singapore), while other partner nations’ dominant religions guide the affairs of all public institutions, to include the military (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan). The commander’s battlefield area assessment (CBAE) should identify all relevant religious and cultural considerations, and frame those considerations within the context of the CCMD’s operational objectives.

9-45. Successful SFA planners integrate religious considerations into the TCP or OPORD in order to meet the desired end-state. For example, while the JTF is in the process of generating a foreign security force (recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and building or ROTEB), does the plan articulate tasks to the SFA force to support the FSF in the recruitment and vetting of indigenous religious personnel into the FSF? Does the organization of the FSF determine the appropriate distribution of these personnel? Do training plans for the FSF take into account daily or weekly religious events (prayer times, days of Sabbath, and religious holidays)? As the SFA force assists in the building of infrastructure, are appropriate religious facilities such as temples, mosques, or chapels integrated into the plan? Annex F, Appendix 2, Tab D addresses religious support, but this pertains mainly to religious services and associated support to the troops assigned to the JTF. The said religious considerations and their implications throughout the ROTEB and OTERA frameworks must be translated into specified tasks throughout the TCP or JTF-level OPORD as required in order to set the stage for successful SFA activities.

9-46. As stated above, cultural understanding is absolutely essential in order to build rapport. Indigenous religious beliefs and practices often form the backbone of the partner nation’s culture. In such cases, ignorance of basic religious customs and dogma creates an impenetrable barrier between the advisor and his or her counterparts. SFA planners must coordinate the required resources and subject matter expertise to complement the Services’ religious or cultural pre-deployment training considerations.

DO NOT CRITICIZE, USE THE INDIRECT APPROACH

9-47. Advisors and other SFA personnel attempt to affect change in their counterparts’ job performance by providing counsel, expertise, and advice. However, nobody likes to be told that they are doing something wrong. The danger of making direct, albeit constructive criticism of FSF counterparts’ actions is often greater than most US personnel realize because the US military culture is direct and often critical, whereas many cultures with whom we interact use an indirect face saving approach. Advisors must exercise great discretion when addressing performance shortfalls or suggested improvements with their FSF counterparts. Techniques that work with one individual may be received
poorly by another. Advising the FSF using an indirect approach, if that is what they are used to, may seem to be a slower process at first but it will work better in the long run. Therefore, SFA planners must build a flexible timeline in order to accommodate the challenges individual advisors may face with respect to institutionalizing enduring change within FSF organizations.

**EAT WHATEVER THEY EAT**

9-48. In many cases, advisors or other SFA personnel will live alongside their FSF counterparts, sharing daily routines and eating some or all of their meals together. When the FSF personnel offer their American advisors something to eat, their culture may make this more significant than American culture. Therefore, refusing or even politely declining an offer to break bread with FSF counterparts should be considered carefully as it could be taken as a grave insult. However, eating local faire sometimes comes with certain risks which must also be considered. Some foods may be prepared with ingredients such as peanuts that might cause allergic reactions in some personnel. SFA planners must consider appropriate medical and health support when developing options for the overall structure and footprint of the advisor team or SFA force.

**HUMAN INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES**

9-49. If the partner nation’s security forces were a model of military efficiency that is sustainable and self-sufficient, then no SFA activities would be necessary. The well planned SFA mission is designed to move the FSFs from where they are now, to where we would like them to be in order to better support US national security objectives. The advisor’s effective application of human influence techniques with his or her host nation counterparts is the decisive operation of the SFA mission. Bear in mind that the operations process framework also applies when planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing each and every meeting with FSF counterparts.

**THE ADVISOR’S TOOLKIT**

9-50. Human influence techniques are to the advisor’s toolkit what the saw, hammer, and square are to that of a carpenter. Research shows that the following sources of power and influence are essential to the advisor’s ability to affect personal or institutional changes within the FSF: legitimate authority, reward authority, coercive authority, referent authority, and expert authority.36

- **Legitimate authority** derives from rank or position. Since FSF personnel are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and since the United States generally conducts SFA at the invitation of a sovereign state, the advisor will have a very limited ability to influence his or her FSF counterparts through legitimate authority.

- **Reward authority** is the ability to reinforce desired behavior in others through rewards. Since the specific parameters for material assistance to the FSF are established by specific funding sources and authorities, the ability to reward FSF counterparts is usually limited to praise and approbation. The ability to leverage an approving nod to one’s counterpart in order to induce a desired behavior can be considered a high art, but one that can be trained and cultivated in the advisor.

- **Coercive authority** is the ability to induce desired behavior through overt or implied threats of negative consequences. Coercion may occasionally induce compliance, but never commitment from one’s FSF counterparts. Never use threats of force or violence against members of the FSF.

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or other indigenous personnel. Threatening behavior against one’s counterparts will usually result in anything from poor FSF performance to consequences for the advisor under the UCMJ. This behavior could also trigger violence against the advisor at the hands of FSF personnel (sometimes referred to as the “insider threat”).

- Referent authority is the power of charisma. Some people just seem to have charismatic, attractive personalities, while others seem less so. Attempting to cultivate charisma within oneself may seem difficult or futile. However, there are steps advisors can take to make themselves more likeable to their counterparts. Start by making a serious effort to learn and speak the FSF’s native language, even just a few words, phrases, and informal pleasantries. Even more important, every advisor is capable of reading up on the local culture as practiced by the FSF, and showing sincere respect for their customs, traditions, and mores. Demonstrating sincere gestures of respect toward the FSF is the best way to enhance one’s referent authority.

- Expert authority is the advisor’s best strategy for generating influence over his or her FSF counterparts. People take comfort in knowing that they are receiving guidance from someone who truly knows what they are doing. Furthermore, the advisor’s tool-kit with respect to reward and coercive authority is usually very limited, while the limits of the advisor’s ambition, work ethic, and natural abilities define the advisor’s ability to cultivate expert authority.

**Enabling Techniques**

9-51. The following maxims represent a mindset and a way of doing business that sets the conditions for mission success while dealing with FSF personnel, as well as local nationals. Examples of enabling techniques include rapport building, influencing, and negotiating. The following maxims should guide and shape the application of those enabling techniques.

- “By, with, and through.” The ultimate goal is to develop FSF to conduct independent operations as a legitimate part of the host nation government.
- “Empathy leads to understanding.” While the advisor may or may not agree with them, he or she must be able to identify with the situation, feelings, and motives of the FSF. This ability to identify with the FSF will make it easier for the advisor to understand the requirements of the FSF.
- “Success is built upon personal relationships.” In order to influence FSF leaders the advisor must establish a relationship built upon mutual respect, trust, and understanding.
- “Advisors are not ‘them’.” Planners must remember that the advisor is not part of the FSF. The advisor’s task is to establish a relationship, and then influence FSF leaders to change their attitudes and values in order to enable them to conduct independent operations in the future.
- “You will never win...nor should you.” Successful advising is about the FSF achieving their tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. If the FSF “wins,” the advisor is successful.
- “Advisors are not commanders.” Advisors provide command and control over only the subordinates within their advisor team. They do not command or lead elements of the FSF.
- “Advisors are honest brokers.” Advisors provide honest assessments of FSF capabilities both to FSF leaders as well as to the SFA force’s higher headquarters.
- “Live within shades of gray.” Advisors operate between two cultures and systems. They must be able to operate within the “grey” area that overlaps both cultures while maintaining legal, moral, and ethical standards of both. Because of the great autonomy and independence advisors have, the advisor mission calls for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and intellect.
- “Talent is everything, but understand rank.” Many FSF organizations often reward rank with little consideration for talent or competence. Advisors will frequently advise FSF leaders who are senior in rank; two ways around obstacles associated with rank are relationships and talent. Competent advisors who develop and nurture a positive relationship with FSF leaders will find rank less of an obstacle.
• “Make do.” Advisors will rarely have all of the resources and support they want. The advisor’s presence alone is a step in the right direction, be creative and do the best with the personnel and resources available. CCMD-level SFA planners have an obligation to resource advisors or the SFA force in a way that provides the requisite capabilities and support required for a successful SFA mission.

• “FSF ‘good enough’.” Advisors do not need to develop within their FSF counterparts the same set of capabilities resident within similar sized US or U.K. military organizations. They need a set of capabilities that is equal to the task at hand.

• Illegal, Immoral or Unethical Behavior by the FSF. Advisors are required to report activity that they observe or become aware of that is illegal. Consult with the Judge Advocate General’s office (JAG) for what is reportable. Some activities that US forces would consider corrupt may be a cultural difference but advisors should verify practices that appear to be illegal, immoral or unethical.

JOINT AND INTERAGENCY TRAINING AND EXERCISES

9-52. Combatant commanders should schedule joint and interagency SFA coordination training as a part of routine staff training and joint, interagency, and multinational exercise participation; during live, simulated, or virtual training or rehearsals for a specific operation; or as part of war-gaming exercises in support of a specific contingency plan.

9-53. The training audience for large-scale SFA training exercises should include the JFHQ staff, supporting Service and functional component commands, international or coalition partners, and representatives from other USG agencies. These joint training exercises should focus on identifying and assessing military and USG agency SFA capabilities and core competencies, as well as identifying procedural disconnects. Such training also builds personal relationships and interoperability factors critical to success in SFA.
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Chapter 10
Selection and Training of Personnel for SFA

“You can surge troops and equipment, but you can’t surge trust. That has to be earned.”

Maj Gen Larry Nicholson, Garmisir, Afghanistan, 2009

Over the past decade, innumerable analytical studies of SFA missions undertaken by US military as well as civilian personnel have all shared one common thread: proper selection and training of personnel for the SFA mission is fundamental to success. Personnel selection and training is not just a unit or even a Service-level responsibility. CCMD-level SFA planners must work with the Services or the other applicable capabilities providers to optimize effective personnel planning, preparation, and employment.

INTRODUCTION

10-1. The combatant commander must determine the requirements for a given SFA mission in terms of the overall capabilities required of the unit or personnel who will perform SFA. In accordance with their Title-10 responsibilities, Services providing the forces for deployment must ensure the adequate preparation of individuals and units comprising the force for employment by the CCDR in the execution of the SFA mission. The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment.

Definition of the term advisor: For the purposes of brevity and clarity, the text within this chapter refers to all personnel who perform SFA tasks as “advisors.” The five categories of SFA tasks include organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA). While personnel who perform SFA tasks could be classified as generalists or specialists in one or more of the SFA tasks, this text will employ the term “advisor” to refer to anyone directly participating in any SFA mission.

SFA SELECTION, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING

10-2. Depending on the nature of the SFA mission, CCMD-level planners must clearly identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes that the advisors must possess in order to accomplish the designated OTERA tasks successfully.

10-3. Rigorous vetting and selection of advisor personnel by the Services is critical to ensuring that those personnel directly engaged in SFA possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with foreign military personnel, often for extended periods without respite.

FUNCTIONAL SKILLS

10-4. Identification of personnel with the required technical or functional skills is the critical first step in forming advisor teams, or selecting individual augments for SFA missions. For example, if the
mission requires a physician to advise FSF doctors on trauma medicine, the supporting Service cannot fulfill the requirement by sending a physician’s assistant (PA) or a nurse. Likewise, if the requirement is to form, train, and equip an SFA team to advise an FSF artillery battalion, the team as a whole must have the collective capabilities required to develop that echelon and type of FSF unit along all lines of DOTMLPF. Additionally, the senior members of that SFA team must meet the rank and grade requirements identified by the CCDR in order to build rapport and a healthy dynamic between the advisors and the FSF artillery battalion commander and his staff.

10-5. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this text, the SFA tasks will take place in support of the executive, generating, and operating function categories of the FSF. As such, personnel or teams designated to advise the FSF must have the requisite expertise to advise their counterparts within those categories. The supporting Services must ensure the training and educating on all requisite force generation functions required for the SFA mission. In other words, personnel assigned to develop the FSF’s supporting institutions need to know how these types of organizations operate; knowing how to shoot, move, and communicate is not enough, nor is it the point in this specific case. The trend for the Services to draw a vast majority of its advisor personnel from the operating forces complicates requirements where tactical expertise does not equate to institutional-level competence.

10-6. Often, selection of the right personnel for the SFA mission implies a de-selection of the wrong personnel. A significant percentage of US military personnel demonstrate exceptional professional merit; they are competent, courageous, and dedicated to the profession of arms. However, not all of these personnel have many of the personal traits that make an effective advisor: empathy; the ability to work through FSF counterparts; patience; the ability to generate influence without formal authority; and the ability to work in ambiguous situations. No matter how competent they are in their branch or occupational specialty, avoid selecting personnel who cannot adopt these principles, as well as personnel who do not show a genuine interest in other people irrespective of cultural differences.

FORMAL SCHOOLING

10-7. SFA skills should be integrated into professional military education (PME). Formal PME, from basic non-commissioned officer (NCO) schools to the War College levels should integrate SFA skills into their curricula. By educating leaders at all levels in SFA skills appropriate for their rank and level of responsibility, the Services can enhance the baseline of SFA knowledge among all Servicemen and women. This in turn will improve the effectiveness of mission-specific SFA training, while reducing the length of time required for SFA pre-deployment training programs.

10-8. Services need to have some method of tracking individual and collective SFA skills. The advisor selection process can be much more efficient and streamlined if the Services and other USG agencies identify, track, manage, and certify individuals who possess all or a portion of the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes required to perform SFA tasks. Department of Defense Directive 5160.41E makes the Defense Language Program (DLP) responsible for the “management of regional and language capabilities.” Leveraging the DLP and Service-level language, culture, and advisor skills databases when selecting personnel for advisor duty can significantly improve SFA mission performance, while potentially reducing the amount of time and resources required to train advisors.

10-9. The building-block approach is a method to SFA selection and training. Figure 10-1 illustrates a building-block approach to SFA selection and training. The logic of this approach assumes that technical or tactical competence in a given field, coupled with the professional values of integrity, duty, selfless service, loyalty, respect, honor, and courage, form the bedrock foundation of the US military, and make it worthy of emulation. The ascending levels within the pyramid in Figure 10-1 represents the advisor’s leadership and organizational competence that makes the advisor a personal example of the capabilities and attributes his or her FSF counterparts seek to develop. From the foundation to the apex lies a continuum of selection and training. Personnel are selected based upon their rank or
experience and technical competence, and those attributes are refined through training and education to prepare the advisor for his or her specific set of duties in a particular time and place.

**Figure 10-1 SFA Selection and Training Building Blocks**

**Profession:** "The development of formal qualifications based upon education, apprenticeship, and examinations, the emergence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline members, and some degree of monopoly rights."

Bullock and Trombley, The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought

10-10. Military or corporate professionalism. In the context of SFA, advisors represent the Armed Forces of the United States or their respective USG agencies, and should behave in a manner that reflects the highest standards of professionalism. “Formal qualifications based upon education” implies that the advisor demonstrate a level of competence that meets or exceeds a set of established standards, such as those established by the Services or USG agencies. The United States’ status as a world leader in technology, the rule of law, economic power, and military might confers upon the individual advisor a level of prestige that is theirs to lose the moment the advisor begins their interaction with his or her counterparts. Military or corporate professionalism is the foundational attribute that qualifies military personnel or members of the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to advise their FSF counterparts.

10-11. Technical or functional expertise. As stated above in paragraph 10-2, the CCDRs will determine the requirements for individuals assigned to SFA duty based upon rank, occupational specialty, and
other technical or functional qualifications. In rare instances, Services do not formerly codify or track certain qualifications, but in most cases, specific military occupation specialties, ratings, or skill identifiers define the technical or functional requirements for a specific job. In certain circumstances, the combatant commander may have a requirement for an advisor to perform a duty for which there is no US or Service equivalent, such as a Mi-17 instructor pilot. In such cases, the Services may have to select a candidate advisor based upon prior experience and exceptional performance, and then re-train him or her in the specific technical qualifications for the job. However, the Services’ respective advisor training programs cannot be the venue for technical or functional training. Selection criteria for SFA duty should normally include technical or functional expertise.

**ADVISE AND INFLUENCE SKILLS**

10-12. If technical or functional expertise represents the “science” of SFA, then human influence skills represent the “art” of SFA. However, there are ample scientific research papers and peer-reviewed studies that suggest that some individuals are innately perceptive in building rapport and generating influence, while others are not.

10-13. The “Myers-Briggs Type Indicator” (MBTI) and “The Attentional and Interpersonal Style” (TAIS) inventory are just two examples of personality assessment tools to identify personnel who might be better suited for SFA duties.

10-14. Consideration for personal preferences must also be accounted for when selecting personnel for SFA duties. Those who volunteer to be advisors often do so because they thrive in the SFA environment, and do not have a rigid “black-white” view of the operating environment.

10-15. Human influence techniques must be an integral component of any advisor-training program. Studies on power and influence in the fields of leadership and management show that power and authority are derived in five forms: legitimate authority, reward authority, coercive authority, referent authority, and expert authority. The ability of advisor personnel to generate influence with their counterparts may be the deciding factor in the success or failure of the joint force’s SFA mission.

10-16. Enabling skills are those human influence skills that set the conditions for mission success while dealing with FSF counterparts and local nationals. Examples of enabling skills include rapport building, influencing, and negotiating. These skills form a framework of techniques, best practices, and an overall mindset that will enable SFA mission success.

10-17. Developing skills are those skills employed at the interpersonal level to develop the capabilities of the advisors’ FSF counterparts. They include teaching, coaching, and mentoring. Teaching may be defined as providing instruction or education to the FSF in order to develop skills or knowledge required to do a particular job. Coaching may be defined as assisting the counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill through practice or building on previous teaching. Coaching differs from teaching when the FSF begin to accept more responsibility for success, while the advisor provides support or assistance as required. Mentoring involves providing expert opinions or counsel to assist the FSF in making decisions. Incidentally, the US military has moved away from the term “mentoring” with respect to SFA based upon episodic feedback from FSF leaders who reportedly find the term “mentor” patronizing. On the other hand, NATO doctrine embraces the term “mentor” as a sinew of the overall NATO SFA concept. Regardless, there are no hard and fast distinctions between or among these terms. Semantics aside, effective advisors understand and apply a continuum of developing skills ranging from authoritative to democratic based upon the situation at hand and the assessed developmental maturity of the FSF.

10-18. Negotiation skills are critical to mission success and must be included in SFA training. Most cultures outside of the United States view negotiation as a healthy aspect of relationship building.
Formal training in negotiation theory and practice will enable the advisor to cultivate a healthy transactional relationship with the FSF counterpart, without entering into unauthorized agreements.

**LANGUAGE, REGIONAL EXPERTISE, AND CULTURE**

10-19. Interpersonal communications and cultural awareness are critical to mission success across all OTERA tasks. Most SFA missions will take place in countries where a majority of the FSF personnel do not speak English fluently, and will not be able to furnish interpreters. Employment of contract linguists as interpreters is a viable way to facilitate communications between the advisors and the FSF. However, the selection of US personnel who speak the FSF language or training personnel to speak the FSF’s language yields numerous benefits.

- First, the language of a partner nation and its FSF is integral to its culture. US personnel who are native speakers of the target language have greater awareness of the FSF and host nation’s culture. Even non-native speakers who learn the FSF language through formal training will inevitably gain insights into the FSF and host nation’s culture because of the inseparable linkages between language and culture. In either case, greater cultural acuity on the part of the advisor will improve performance in the execution of the SFA mission.
- Second, elimination of linguists as the “middle man” may reduce misinterpretation of the message.
- Third, reducing the number of contract linguists required for the mission lowers costs and reduces the number of “boots on the ground,” leading to reduced force protection and life support requirements. Additionally, in a combat environment, contract interpreters are often prohibited from carrying weapons or conducting other combat-related supporting tasks.

10-20. All DOD personnel are screened upon accession for foreign language capabilities and regional expertise, and tested for proficiency; the results of those tests are permanently entered into the individual’s personnel record. Planners may submit a Request For Forces (RFF) to the GCC, which will then source the forces or will forward the RFF to the Services for sourcing.

**PERSONAL SECURITY SKILLS**

10-21. Deploying personnel must be capable of performing SFA across the range of military operations, throughout all operation plan phases. The CCDRs must define the threat conditions based upon the unique circumstances in the country where SFA will take place. In some instances, advisors may arrive in country via commercial airlines and stay in hotels due to the relative permissiveness of the operating environment or at the other end of the spectrum, combat advisors conducting SFA require extensive training in close combat skills, tactical combat casualty care, etc. In all cases, personnel deploying to conduct SFA must receive training in the following skills:

- SERE Level A, required for all advisors.
- Theater- and Service-specific force protection and anti-terrorism (FP/AT) training.
- Advisors identified as high-risk of isolation or high-risk of capture (HRI/HRC) must be SERE Level C qualified and current.

10-22. In order to conduct SFA across the range of military operations, SFA planners should also consider possible requirements for the following tasks:

- Understanding and application of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and practice
- Foreign internal defense (FID) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
- Mounted and dismounted movement TTPs (with FSF)
- Fire support planning and terminal control of supporting arms (surface-delivered fires, close air support, etc.)
- MEDEVAC planning and execution
• Tactical combat casualty care and emergency first aid
• Tactical communications (VHF, UHF, SATCOM, Blue Force Tracker, etc.)
• Preventive maintenance of combat vehicles and other major end items
• Individual and crew-served weapons employment
• Planning and coordination of sustainment (supply, transportation, maintenance, etc.)
• Planning for the conduct of personnel recovery operations.

10-23. The above list is not all-inclusive but is merely illustrative of the breadth and depth of the skill set that advisors may require when conducting SFA in a non-permissive environment.

FSF ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

10-24. FSF assessment and development represents the fusion of all OTERA tasks that may be conducted at a given echelon, within a given type of foreign security force. Techniques and procedures for assessment and development of a foreign air force’s airframe maintenance programs in a permissive environment will be different from the techniques and procedures employed to develop a foreign local police force while engaged in counterinsurgency operations against a determined foe. The guiding factor in training advisors to conduct FSF assessment and development is that all SFA tasks—organize, train, equip, rebuild or build, and advise—must be performed in such a way that supports the sustainable development of the capability and capacity of the foreign security force.

10-25. FSF assessment and development is a holistic concept. Personnel or teams conducting SFA must be able to assess FSF current capabilities, required capabilities, and identify institutional gaps. Advisor training and education must include the proper methods for measuring FSF capabilities at given intervals over time, and the application of this data to more effectively prioritize resources and efforts in the conduct of the SFA mission. Advisors must demonstrate the agility to continually refine their efforts across all SFA tasks in order to support the sustainable development of the capability and capacity of the foreign security force across varied functions or domains.
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# Glossary

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act of 1976</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>AFST</td>
<td>Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron</td>
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<td>AFSOAWC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>building partner capacity</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CbT</td>
<td>combating terrorism</td>
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<td>CCIF</td>
<td>combatant commander initiative fund</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CDDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCJO</td>
<td>concept for joint operations</td>
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<td>CEW</td>
<td>civilian expeditionary workforce</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>conventional force</td>
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<td>counter-insurgency</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Centers</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>Direct Commercial Sales</td>
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<td>DES</td>
<td>desired end state</td>
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<td>DIME-FIL</td>
<td>diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement</td>
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<td>DLOD</td>
<td>defense lines of development (UK)</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGO</td>
<td>executive, generate, and operate functions</td>
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<td>exercise related construction</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FIC</td>
<td>Fundamentals Inputs to Capability (Australia)</td>
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<td>Foreign Military Finance</td>
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<td>foreign security force</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant command</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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Glossary

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>intermediate military objective</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>joint combined exchanged training</td>
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<td>JCISFA</td>
<td>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>Marine Corps Service component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCSCG</td>
<td>Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>major combat operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>military construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVSCIATTS</td>
<td>Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operational security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTER</td>
<td>organize, train, equip, rebuild/build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTERA</td>
<td>organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Partnership Exchange Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGETS</td>
<td>plan, generate, employ, transition, sustain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRICIE</td>
<td>personnel/leadership/individual training, research and development, infrastructure/environment/organization, concepts/doctrine/collective training, information management and technology, equipment and support (CA and NZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>regionally aligned force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMM</td>
<td>Security Assistance Management Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>security cooperation</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>security cooperation office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>security sector assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMAGTF</td>
<td>Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASAC</td>
<td>United States Army Security Assistance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Advise - All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups. Activities such as assessment, provision of materiel assistance, and liaison with US or coalition enabling capabilities may all be inherent in advising FSF.

Coaching - Assisting the counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill through practice or building on previous teaching.

Equip - All activities to integrate materiel and equipment solutions into the FSF. Equipping the FSF usually includes procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management of all major end items, as well as the forecasting, procurement, and distribution of all classes of supply. Equipping the FSF requires a holistic approach that includes not only fielding of new equipment, but also operational readiness processes, maintenance management, repair, and recapitalization.

Executive Function - The executive function includes national-level organizations or key individuals responsible for developing national policy for the PN's security force. This guidance consists of policies, procedures, and authorities for the generation and employment of the operating force. All security forces apply some level of executive function, which empowers and guides the generating and operating functions. The national government’s departments or ministries that perform this function direct and develop national security policy and provide resources for the PN security forces. The executive function establishes, justifies, seeks authority from the legislature or the appropriate governing body the parameters for the generation of military forces and capabilities, and directs the employment of operating forces.

Foreign Internal Defense - Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. Source: JP 3-22

Generating Function - The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating function. The generating function supports the organization, training, equipping, and building of the PN's security forces. In situations where the FSF has been destroyed, disbanded, or is non-existent, the SFA force (US advisors) initially performs these tasks to promote development in the FSF. The assisting force helps the PN to identify, resource, and resolve capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) of the FSF.

Operating Function - The operating function employs military capabilities through application of maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and command and control during actual operations. Organizations or military units from the corps level down to the squad or equivalent that perform the actual security-related missions for the PN security force constitute the operating force. US or coalition forces may employ FSF organizations during partnered operations based upon the FSF’s war-fighting capabilities if the FSF is not capable of assuming the lead in security.
operations. Employment of PN police forces (when authorized), may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment, or any other activities that support the PN’s legitimate criminal justice or customs enforcement authorities.

**Organize** - All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and staffing functions. The acronym “OTER” (organize, train, equip, and rebuild) introduced in paragraph 1-5 describes the subset of tasks inherent in the initial organization of a nascent FSF.

**Rebuild** (or build) - All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities and supporting infrastructure. This may include bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

**Security Assistance** - Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. Source: JP 3-22

**Security Cooperation** - All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. See also security assistance. Source: JP 3-22

**Security Force Assistance (SFA)** - The Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.

**Teaching** - Providing instruction or education to the FSF in order to develop skills or knowledge required to do a particular job.

**Train** - All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction, implementation of training events, and leader development activities.
“Supporting the Warfighter and the Joint Force with critical SFA Knowledge”

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil