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Task Force Musketeer
Forward Operations Base (FOB) Nijrab, Kapisa Valley, Afghanistan, August
26, 2012. It is almost 06h00 PM. The sun is slowly setting under the
horizon, for the night comes early in Afghanistan. Sitting on the FOB’s
small gravel tarmac are a couple of Airbus Helicopters SA-342 Gazelles, a pair
of EC-665 Tiger attack choppers and a lonely EC-725 Caracal transport
helicopter. In a scream of its Turbomeca Astazou turbine, a single
SA-342 slowly takes off, before suddenly banking forward and
disappearing swiftly over the FOB’s walls, into the darkness of the
surrounding mountains. A Tiger follows seconds later, scrambling from
the tarmac in a huge cloud of brownish dust. All night long, helicopters
come and go, disturbing my sleep. Four to six French choppers were
permanently deployed at Nijrab in those days, conducting transport,
recce and escort duties in support of the logistics convoys crossing the
Kapisa valley, as part of the French withdrawal from Afghanistan. These
helicopters were part of the Bataillon d’Hélicoptères (BATHELICO: Helicopters Battalion), the
unit then in charge of operating all rotary wing assets deployed by
France in Afghanistan.
Helicopters and Afghanistan In the days of the war between soviets and mujahedeen,
helicopters already played a key part in all military operations. The
Mi-24 Hind and Mi-8/17 became the stalwarts of all combat operations
conducted by the Soviet and Afghan military. Over a decade later, in the
late 1990s, commander Massoud employed a handful of Hip and Hind in his
fight against the Taliban, the helicopters providing critical air
support and logistical back-up in most offensives. When Taloqan fell in
2000, a couple of battered old Mi-17s were all that Massoud’s forces
could field to provide ammunition resupply and medical evacuation…
Nowadays, after over 13 years of western military presence in
Afghanistan, the situation can hardly be compared. All major roads have
been rebuilt allowing for sustained ground traffic. Nevertheless,
travelling by road remains a hazardous business with insurgents
conducting frequent improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on all
major axis with the consequence that ISAF troops only travelled in
convoys, aboard armored vehicles and not before the area they were
preparing to cross had been cleared of all potential threats by
engineers. The remaining NATO forces deployed under Operation Resolute
Support are still experiencing the same difficulties as we write. Moving
by convoy also requires that fire support points be established all
along the way, that a quick reaction force be available at a moment’s
notice to bring in reinforcements in case of ambush and that aircraft
are in the air, providing top cover… It is also a slow business and
reaching a FOB such as Nijrab, in the Kapisa valley, took around five
hours from Kabul when a helicopter departing from Kabul International
Airport (KAIA) did it in less than 20 minutes… Helicopters are therefore
essential means of transportation, both fast and safe except during
takeoff and landing, for they are hardly exposed to any kind of real
threat from the insurgency, which still lacks any sophisticated
anti-aircraft weapon to this day.
An unforgiving
environment Afghanistan is a nightmare for any helicopter operator.
The country is mostly mountainous with the capital Kabul sitting 1800
meters high, surrounded by even higher mountains. The ubiquitous dust of
the summer is so thin it gets everywhere. Luckily it isn’t as sticky or
abrasive as the proverbial African laterite and a carefully scheduled
maintenance is enough to prevent excessive wear to the engines. The sand
filters mounted on the turbines still need to be checked twice as often
as anywhere else though (except Mali and other Saharan countries) and it
is also necessary to thoroughly inspect and clean certain valves on a
much more frequent basis. The blistering heat prevalent from May to
October every year in Afghanistan affects drastically the performances
and operational capabilities of all helicopters, even the sturdy Russian
models… In summer the hot and high environment of the Kabul area and
surrounding valleys is the worst possible combination for helicopter
operations. French choppers, flying between KAIA and Nijrab or Tagab
operated at the very limits of their capabilities. Back in 2012, the
Gazelle, Caracal and Cougar taking off from Kabul would be limited to a
minimal useful load while, thankfully, the Tiger attack birds found
themselves much less affected by the altitude and heat due to their
powerful engines. Also, the type of missions conducted by these combat
helicopters in Afghanistan mostly required the sole use of their 30 mm
canon, with the result that Tiger helicopters would fly without any
external load and consequently with a fair amount of engine power in
reserve. A brief history of the
BATHELICO
French military forces have been involved in Afghanistan since
2001, from the earliest days of the US campaign, finally settling in
Kabul as part of the newly established ISAF. While jet fighters were
deployed early on, helicopters were to be found lacking until 2006, when
the nutshell of a rotary wing detachment was finally established in
Kabul with two French Air Force (Armée
de l’Air) EC-725 Caracal. These two helicopters, belonging to the
Air Force’s EH 1/67 Pyrénées Squadron, arrived in November and were immediately engaged
in transport, reconnaissance, MEDEVAC and CSAR operations. On September
2007 the French Army Aviation (Aviation
Légère de l’Armée de Terre) took over from the Air Force with two
AS-532 Cougar belonging to the 1er
Régiment d’Hélicoptères de Combat (RHC: Combat Helicopters Regiment)
from Phalsbourg 1., which
themselves were both replaced on April 2008 by a new pair of Caracal
from the Pyrénées. Back in
2007, the newly elected French President, Nicolas Sarkozy had pledged to
strengthen significantly the French military presence in Afghanistan,
with French troops switching from security duties to combat missions and
deploying to new areas of the country, namely the Surobi and Kapisa
valleys. The Uzbeen ambush, in Surobi, on August 18 and 19, 2008, cost
the life of ten French soldiers, pressing home the reality of the war in
Afghanistan. The French Air Force’s Caracal were heavily mobilized in a
number of support flights in the combat area where the troops were being
pinned down by the Taliban.
On August 18, taking aboard a number of commandos from
the elite CPA N°20 (Commando Parachutiste N°20) and a medical team, two
EC-725s take-off from KAIA at the end of the afternoon, heading straight
for Sper Kunday, in the Uzbeen valley, where the French troops are still
pinned down despite the arrival of reinforcements and sustained air
support. The commandos are put down at the site to secure the DZ and
protect the medical team which also disembarks. Both choppers then
take-off again in an unsuccessful attempt to pinpoint enemy positions
and are fired at by the Taliban in the process. After dropping a medic
back at the DZ, the two Caracal head back for KAIA where they arrive at
nightfall for a “hot” refueling, also taking aboard 16 soldiers which
are spread between both helicopters. Within 13 minutes of landing, both
aircraft are back in the air, heading for Uzbeen. En route to the DZ,
they are ordered to drop their embarked troops in the vicinity of the
Tora FOB, following an alert that the base has been fired at (this will
later prove to be a false alert). The CPA N°20 commandos then request a
MEDEVAC as a first group of wounded soldiers are about to arrive at the
DZ. Four French soldiers and an Afghan are eventually embarked along
with an Air Force medic while the military surgeon remains on site to
take care of any incoming casualty. Within 18 minutes, the wounded are
dropped at the French Military Hospital at the Warehouse base, in Kabul.
The choppers then take aboard a CPA N°30 TACP team and refuel quickly at
KAIA, soon taking to the air again, first heading for the DZ where the
medic and TACP group are dropped and then landing at Tora, where the
EC-725s remain on standby. Soon, they are called out for a new
MEDEVAC and head for the DZ where eight wounded (seven French, one
Afghan) are loaded aboard, along with the surgeon. The helicopters head
once again for Kabul where the casualties are disembarked and
immediately fly back to the DZ to drop off the surgeon, recovering yet
another wounded in the process and delivering him to the Czech Military
Hospital at KAIA before refueling again. Now flying in the middle of the
night with NVGs, the two EC-725s fly back to the contact area with
reinforcements aboard. Just after dropping them off they receive a
MEDEVAC request and head back for the DZ where 6 wounded are embarked
along with the medic and surgeon. Flying conditions are hard and
landings extremely tricky due to the dusty environment. The casualties
are transported back to the hospital at Warehouse and then the two
choppers proceed to KAIA for another refueling. Another MEDEVAC is
requested but not before a group of troops is moved from the bottom of
the valley to the top of Sper Kunday. The wounded are taken back to
Warehouse. By then both helicopters and their crews have been on
continuous operation for the past 12 hours. Despite their tiredness, the
men volunteer when a request is made for helicopters to airlift the
bodies of the dead French soldiers killed during the ambush. Along the
way, another group of soldiers is transported from Tora to Uzbeen.
Immediately after, the two EC-725s land at the DZ to embark seven bodies
which are flown back to Warehouse. The emotion is at its peak for the
crews as they fly away with their fallen comrades. By 12 AM on August 19
a final flight is conducted to evacuate the remaining bodies from
Uzbeen. The aircraft finally cut their engines at 0210 PM following a
total of 14 hours of operation including seven hours of flight per
aircraft (five of them at night 2.
The Uzbeen tragedy highlighted the urgent need for a major strengthening of the French airmobile assets in Afghanistan. By late 2008, the number of French helicopters based in Afghanistan would have tripled with the arrival of an extra Air Force EC-725 and three Army Aviation SA-342 Gazelle. In December, the Détachement Alat des Opérations Spéciales (DAOS: Army Aviation Special Operations Detachment, now the 4ème Régiment d’Hélicoptères de Forces Spéciales or 4ème RHFS) finally deployed to Afghanistan, with two Caracal coming in to take over from a pair of Air Force EC-725s. This was the first operational deployment of the ALAT’s own Caracal. The year 2009 would see the arrival of two Army Aviation Cougars and, most importantly, on July 26, of three Tiger HAP attack helicopters, on their first ever deployment to a combat zone. This decision was in part the result of a major lobbying effort from Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters) to have the French Army finally field the Tiger in Afghanistan, a highly demanding combat area where it would be possible to evaluate the chopper’s capabilities in a fully operational environment. The aircraft’s crew, all hailing from the 5ème RHC deployed to Afghanistan on July 13 and spent the following 13 days getting acquainted with the specifics of the mission in Afghanistan, including the Rules of Engagement (ROE). They also helped set up the Tiger module pending the arrival of the aircraft. As soon as the helicopters arrived efforts began to ensure their full operational readiness within the shortest possible timeframe. As early as August 15, all three EC-665 were ready for combat operations following an intense on-site training process and two live firing campaigns. Five days later they took part in their first combat sortie in support of the ongoing national elections. In the course of the flight the two aircraft in the air also had their baptism of fire after being targeted by a 14,5 mm machine gun which they promptly neutralized with 68 mm rockets. 3.
The continued strengthening of the French helicopter
fleet in Afghanistan resulted in the establishment of a helicopter
battalion (BATHELICO), in order to ensure the efficient management and
maintenance of an 11 helicopter strong fleet. The BATHELICO was to be
known as Task Force Musketeer to the rest of the ISAF. Over the
following years the fleet fluctuated, reaching its greatest number in
October 2011, with 15 aircraft: four Tiger, five Gazelle, three Cougar
and three Caracal.
In Afghanistan, the French pilots resorted, among
others, to a typically French flying pattern known as “vol tactique” (tactical flying), flying 30 feet from the ground at
100 knots, thus making it very difficult for the enemy to detect an
incoming helicopter, the aircraft’s silhouette and engine noise being
muffled by the ground. It would also be highly tricky for any insurgent
to get a clear shot at a chopper flying in such a way. This flight
pattern was also put to great use by the French during the war in Libya
and more recently, in Mali. It was originally intended to make up for
the Gazelle’s lack of armor. Regarding night flying, the reader should be reminded that in aviation, nights are identified according to their degree of darkness from very clear (level 1) to pitch black (level 5). While all NATO Air Arms are capable of flying in night levels from 1 to 3 only a select few have crews whose training allows for flying in levels 4 or 5. The French Air Force and Army Aviation are among these few and this ability proved a critical asset in Afghanistan. 4.
Another new operational concept developed and
implemented in Afghanistan was the mixed patrol combining a Gazelle and
a Tiger helicopter. This concept When the Musketeers
fire in anger The Tiger’s arrival in Afghanistan meant that the BATHELICO’s air support missions were to take a new dimension. With this new bird at hand, the Musketeers finally had an aircraft designed from the onset for combat duties and attack missions, one which could offer sufficient protection to the crew and wield some serious firepower at the insurgents in the shape of 68 mm rockets and 30 mm canon shells. The TF Musketeer fifth mandate, during the summer of 2011 saw exceptional activity and an unprecedented amount of combat actions for the French helicopters which were heavily involved in air support operations to the benefit of the ground forces. The bloodiest year for the French forces in Afghanistan was 2011 with 25 soldiers killed in action. The summer was by far the tensest period and saw the French forces deployed in Kapisa and Surobi engaging in combat like never before. As far as helicopters were concerned the operational tempo was as intense as that of the ground forces. Between May and August 2011 alone, 400 combat missions were flown. From June to October some 130 Close Combat Attack (CCA) missions were conducted, 67 of which saw the helicopters involved open fire… This surge in air support operations was a direct result of the strategy implemented at the time by the Task Force La Fayette (the French combat component in Afghanistan) which focused on aggressively tracking and engaging the enemy into the "green zone" where combat would be highly brutal and take place at extremely short ranges. This pattern of contacts made the job much tougher for all supporting assets which would be limited in their firing possibilities by the very close proximity of civilian inhabitations, which resulted in a much higher risk of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) in case of a miss. The danger of a friendly fire incident was also constant due to the overlapping nature of the contacts between French troops and insurgents and it is worth remembering that most support shots were aimed at targets located within less of 100 meters from friendly forces… Another recurring duty taking place during this summer was the destruction of High Value Targets (HVT): primarily vehicle-born IEDs (VBIEDs) before their being employed. Usually, local intelligence would allow to determine the location of a VBIED and an operation would be put together, usually mobilizing a drone, an immediate extraction (IMEX) component with transport helicopters and the strike patrol combining a Tiger and a Gazelle, the later in charge of using a HOT missile (which thanks to its precision limited the danger of CIVCAS) to neutralize the VBIED. 6. Sometimes ground forces would be involved too, with a JTAC among them to help confirm the target's location.
One of the most memorable missions carried out by the
BATHELICO at the time was perhaps the CCA flights conducted in support
of the paratroopers of Battle Group Raptor on July 12, 2011, in the
aftermath of the suicide attack that took place in the hamlet of Joybar,
in the Kapisa valley. The troops were providing security for a Shura
when an insurgent dressed as an Afghan policeman reached a position
occupied by men of the Groupe Commando Parachutiste (GCP: French Para-Commandos with
Pathfinder capabilities) and blew himself up, killing five (one of them
actually an Army photographer) and injuring many more. Only moments
after the explosion, a combined Gazelle-Tiger helicopter patrol was
already coming in and hitting the insurgents which had opened fire in
the immediate aftermath of the suicide bomber’s attack. The helicopter’s
swift intervention rapidly quelled the ambush and allowed for the rapid
evacuation of the wounded and the proper withdrawal of the remaining
French ground forces in the area. During the night of July 13 to July
14, a combined patrol of Afghan Police and French Special Forces was hit
while operating in the valley of Alassay. The contact lasted for several
hours with the French and Afghan troops being pinned down by the enemy
and therefore unable to safely disengage. Called to the rescue, a pair
of Tiger HAP blasted the insurgents, finally allowing part of the
friendly forces to withdraw. A French Navy SF lost his life in the
course of the operation. A couple of months later on September 7, a new
combined French-Afghan operation was to end up in a fully-fledged battle
against the Taliban. The French and Afghan troops were conducting a
sweep of an area in the vicinity of the village of Mobayan when all hell
broke loose. The French paratroopers of the
1er Régiment de
Chasseurs Parachutistes (RCP: Regiment of Parachute Hunters) were
aggressively engaged by the enemy while covering the scheduled
withdrawal of their afghan counterparts. The French soldiers met with
devastating enemy fire and found themselves blocked, with no possibility
whatsoever of a safe extraction. The Musketeers were soon overhead,
Tiger patrols coming in on strafing runs against enemy positions.
Despite the heavy air support, the insurgents didn’t flinch and
continued opening on the paratroopers. The helicopters were hampered in
their attacks by the very close proximity of the Taliban and the
friendly forces. In the meantime, a small column of fresh troops from
the 1er RCP was attempting to link up with the isolated
French paratroopers so as to finally allow them to withdraw. This proved
impossible and the defenders were still some meters away from their
rescuers. With choppers still in the air and hitting the Taliban
continuously, the isolated French soldiers finally made a run for it,
one of them having to carry a wounded Army dog in his arms. This
operation saw the death of an officer of the
17ème Régiment du Génie Parachutiste (RGP: airborne
engineers), killed at the peak of the battle and many wounded troops,
some of them quite severely… A journalist who had been accompanying the
patrol was also wounded, albeit lightly. Air support to logistics
convoys was another recurring task for the helicopters of the TF
Musketeer. On this summer of 2011, almost every convoy would be hit by
the enemy, with sometimes quite aggressive and large ambushes. French
choppers would either be on call ready to take off and intervene or
already in the air, overflying the column, ready to suppress any enemy
threat. Throughout the summer of 2011, there wasn’t a day where the
French helicopters were not called in support of the ground forces…
The TF Musketeers’ pilots devised a number of methods
and proceedings to reduce the scope of the threat continuously posed by
the insurgency in Afghanistan. Among these was of course the very low
altitude and high speed “tactical flight” but also, quite on the
opposite, high altitude flying, to keep well clear of any small arms’
range and allow the crew to gain a broader view of the operational area,
these patterns being used depending of the environment the helicopters
found themselves flying in. Stationary flight was all but banned and all
support fire was delivered in strafing runs, always in pairs, with one
aircraft covering the other and so on. The Tiger's roof-mounted SAGEM Stryx
or the Gazelle's Viviane sight was always used in fire support missions so as to maximize the
accuracy of the rounds fired. In the case of the Tiger however, the crew could still fire back if
under attack by locking onto the target with their THALES TopOwl
helmet’s integrated sight alone. BATHELICO 2012, the
withdrawal
At the time of my visit, in late August 2012, the BATHELICO was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Xavier Mouret, an ALAT Puma pilot from
the 1er RHC of Phalsbourg. The battalion had a strength of 138 men and
women then and fielded 13 aircraft: five Gazelle, four Tiger, two Cougar
and two Caracal, one of them belonging to the Air Force. The personnel
detached from the 1er RHC was tasked with operating and
maintaining the Gazelle as well as providing part of the technicians for
the servicing of the Tiger helicopters and the command structure for the
entire BATHELICO. The Tiger were flown by a mix of pilots belonging to
the Luc French-German School, the ALAT’s 5ème RHC (which also
provided the balance of the maintenance crews for the type) and 4ème
RHFS (Helicopter Regiment of Special Forces, descendent of the DAOS, a
unit combining Army Aviation and Air Force aircraft and crews). The
Caracal module was run by the 4ème RHFS and a detachment from
the Air Force’s EH 1/67 Pyrénées
squadron. The 5ème RHC was also in charge of operating the
Cougar transport helicopters, providing both crews and maintenance
technicians. A service tech from the Australian Army Aviation was also
attached to the TF Musketeer’s Tiger module, with a pilot expected to
take over within the following months. A
Commando Parachutiste N°30 (CPA-30: Airborne Commandos) ten men team
was deployed as part of the BATHELICO, for Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR) purposes. Aside from acting as reserve in case of an incident
which would require the deployment of a CSAR team on the ground, the
CPA-30 group also had a single escort personnel aboard all Caracal and
Cougar flights. By mid-September 2012 a fifth Tiger was dispatched from
Pau to temporarily boost the combat potential of the BATHELICO at a time
where the withdrawal process was picking up more speed and the increase
in logistics convoys demanded more air assets for top cover. With FOB
Tagab finally handed over to the ANA, the TF Musketeer started also
withdrawing, all five Gazelles being shipped back to France in October
2012 along with a single Tiger. In December, two Tigers, a Cougar and a
Caracal were also returned to France. This also meant the end of the
BATHELICO which was transformed into a simple helicopter detachment with
two Tigers, a Cougar and a Caracal. Finally, early in February 2013, the
two remaining Tigers left Afghanistan with the single Cougar and Caracal
remaining there until early March. They continued operating, providing
MEDEVAC services in support of the French Military Hospital of KAIA and
while the initial plan was to have them in Afghanistan at least until
April, the pressing need for more helicopters in Mali resulted in an
earlier withdrawal.
At the time of my visit to the BATHELICO, the
Musketeers were on their seventh mandate. To prepare for it the
personnel headed for Afghanistan had gone through a rigorous
Mise en Condition avant Projection (MCP: Preparation prior to
deployment) in France for a period of six months. The final step into
this preparation was a major exercise known as “Bearnistan”
which took place in South Western France and allowed for all standard
mission patterns in Afghanistan to be run: escort, air support,
reconnaissance, MEDEVAC, etc. A great emphasis was placed on night
“tactical flight” training using NVGs and on high mountain operations.
The MCP also allowed for the development and cementing of interaction
and cooperation between the crews coming from the 1er RHC and
those of the 5ème RHC and 4ème RHFS.
The French withdrawal throughout 2012 from Afghanistan
didn’t result in any reduction in the activity of the TF Musketeers,
quite the opposite in fact. The increase in logistics convoys resulted
in a greater number of requests for air support, in the shape of
reconnaissance or escort flights. Whether on call or on station the
Tiger-Gazelle duo would be the one in the air most of the time. The
ageing roof sight of the SA-342 Gazelle Viviane is still a highly
efficient sensor and in Afghanistan it proved often ideal for
observation and reconnaissance duties, easily pinpointing potential
enemy concentrations or movements. The Tiger’s 30 mm canon turned out to
be the most suited weapon for operations in Afghanistan, offering deadly
accuracy therefore limiting to a minimum the dreaded danger of CIVCAS or
friendly fire incidents. The French helicopters were also frequently
called in support of the Afghan National Army (ANA) ground operations,
acting in more than one occasion as a key deterrent against the
insurgents. MEDEVAC missions were very frequent, be it in support of
French forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF: Army and
Police) or occasionally, to the benefit of wounded civilians which would
then be ferried to the French HMC (Role 3 Military Hospital of KAIA).
Transport duties were the last major responsibility of the BATHELICO’s
fleet, mainly to ferry support personnel such as Joint Terminal Attack
Controllers (JTAC), Special Forces or VIPs and Commanding Officers for
staff meetings. All missions would be flown in duos, transport
helicopters being generally escorted by a Tiger of a Gazelle, while air
support and reconnaissance flights would see a pair of Gazelle flying
together or two Tiger or a mix of the two types depending on
availability. The latter was always high despite the intense rhythm of
operations and would stand at between 80 and 90%.
The CPA-30 in
Afghanistan
The Commando
Parachutiste N°30 is a French Air Force unit based at Mérignac
BA 106 Air Force Base, near the city of Bordeaux, in South Western
France. It is an elite outfit specializing in CSAR operations, a
type of mission for which it is one of the leading forces in the
whole of Europe. The Commando has some 250 personnel on strength and
is divided into three companies. All members of the CPA are fully
trained and highly proficient paratroopers, being also qualified
JTACs, allowing them to direct air strikes on ground targets when
needed. CSAR remains their first assignment though. The CPA-30 first
deployed to Afghanistan in 2006, when the first French helicopters
arrived in country. From 2010 on, the CPA deployed in the
summer to Afghanistan while the winter saw first the ALAT’s
Pelotons de Reconnaissance et
Balisage (PRB: specialized platoons trained in locating and
preparing LZ for helicopters, dissolved in 2011) and then the French
Army’s Groupe Commando de Montagne (GCM: Mountain Commandos) take over. The
CPA-30 detachment that was deployed in 2012 comprised ten men: a
radioman, a combat surgeon, a machine gunner armed with a 5,56 mm FN
Minimi, a sniper equipped with a .338 Lapua Magnum Sako TRG-42
rifle, a detachment leader (a captain) and his deputy, a team leader
and his deputy and two riflemen. In Afghanistan the primary mission
was Personnel Recovery (PR) although the commandos would also
be available if necessary for JTAC duties. If operating on their
own, the team would have at least six men on the ground. While there
was always at least one commando aboard every transport helicopter
flight, MEDEVAC sorties would see two men embarking to provide
additional security and assistance to the medic and surgeaon aboard,
since all commandos are fully trained in field medical assistance.
The detachment equipment included a full range of HF and VHF radios
for communication with ground forces and aircraft, a ROVER 5
terminal for transmitting live images and footage to coalition
aircraft, an ANPQ-4 laser designator for marking targets, Panasonic
CFU1 Toughbook laptop computers and OB-70 NVGs. The standard weapon
was the 5,56 mm H&K 416 assault rifle and PAMAS G1 9 mm pistol. All
men carried a bulletproof Eagle Industries CIRAS vest.
French Helicopters in Afghanistan
GAZELLE: Five SA-342M Gazelle Viviane were deployed in Afghanistan where they conducted recce and close air support missions. While the Gazelle can carry up to four HOT wire-guided anti-tank missiles when operating in France, the type’s weapon’s load was limited to only one of these when flying in Afghanistan. The HOT would not be mounted at KAIA to avoid further degrading the already limited performances of the Gazelle in the Afghan summer. Instead it would be installed on the machine at Nijrab, the FOB’s lower altitude allowing an easier take-off than in Kabul. The SA-342s deployed in Afghanistan were all fitted with the AS-550 Fennec main rotor’s blades, the latter allowing greater sustainment in flight. Also, the Gazelle’s maximum take-off weight was boosted from 1900 kg to 2100 kg. The roof mounted sight incorporates a laser rangefinder and heat seeking camera. The latter was seldom used in the Afghan summer mainly because the heat reverberation of the day didn’t allow for a sufficient differentiation between the temperature of a human body and that of its rocky surroundings. Thankfully the optical day sight offers excellent capabilities and provides an image whose quality is close to that of the Tiger’s Stryx sight. In Afghanistan, the Gazelle optical sight was an essential tool for observation, recce and positive identification of targets before engagement. When flying in Afghanistan, the crew would be limited to the pilot and the crew chief, also acting as weapons’ operator. With a ground temperature around 35°C the helicopter would be flying at the very edge of its power, with an endurance not exceeding 1h20 minutes. In case of engagement, a Gazelle could fire its single wire guided HOT at a distance of up to 3800 meters. The missile is very precise and proved to be highly efficient when fired against afghan compounds whose thick dried mud walls are notorious for stopping most rounds even .50 cal. The HOT was also great against light vehicles or to hit caves were the insurgents frequently took refuge. Maintenance was run on scheduled hourly cycles, certain additions having been made to take into account the specificities of the afghan environment. Turbines would be washed every five hours of flight and polished every 12 hrs. Every 25 hours, besides running a standard engine inspection, the mechanics would check the compressor’s blades with an endoscope for signs of wear. On 10 June 2011, an SA-342 went down in a storm while escorting an AS-532. The pilot was severely wounded while, tragically, the aircraft commander, Captain Mathieu Gaudin died in the crash. His death was the only loss of life experienced by Task Force Musketeer. In over 5000 missions in Afghanistan, the Gazelle fleet of the BATHELICO logged in excess of 7000 hours of flight and fired more than 60 HOT missiles (a figure that must be compared to the 431 HOTs that were fired during the war in Libya by the French Gazelle)... Maximum speed:
310 km/h
TIGER:
The EC-665 attack helicopter, better known as the Tiger, made its
combat debut in Afghanistan in 2009 and has since been engaged over
Libya, Somalia, Mali and Central Africa. The Tiger was the only
aircraft in the TF Musketeer not to suffer too significantly from
the hot and high environment of Afghanistan. Thanks to its powerful
engines and due to the fact that most missions were flown without
any external loads (the canon alone being enough in the majority of
air support duties) the aircraft’s endurance remained 2hrs 30 mins.
Also, unlike the Gazelle which could barely take off with a single
HOT, if needed the Tiger could fly with a full load of 30 mm shells
and a pair of 68 mm rocket launchers, although in that case,
endurance would be severely reduced… Its maximum take-off weight was
increased from 6,1 tonnes to 6,4. Originally, only the crew’s seats
were armored but for Afghanistan, extra armor plates were added
externally on each side of the cockpits and internally, on the
floors and at the front, offering protection against 7,62 mm rounds.
Also, the lower part of the aircraft’s main fuel tank is
self-sealing. Dust filters were added to the turbine’s air intakes
prior to deployment in Afghanistan, both fitted with a sand cleaning
ventilator. Both the pilot and the crew chief/weapons operator are
equipped with Thales TopOwl helmets. These are fitted with side
mounted NVGs, the helmet’s visor acting as a screen on which the
image is projected. The TopOwl has an integrated helmet mounted
sight which can be coupled to the Tiger’s Nexter M781 30 mm canon.
When this is done, the canon simply follows the pilot’s head move
allowing for reflex shooting on any target the crew lays its eyes
on. The crew chief/weapons operator is seated in the rear cockpit
and can rely on the roof mounted Stryx sighting system and its
optical/IR sensors to locate and engage targets. The footage
captured by these sensors can be directly projected onto the
TopOwl’s visor if needed. The Stryx’s accuracy is a great asset to
ensure positive identification of any target before opening fire.
The Tiger offers excellent crew protection in case of crash, as the
February 2011 accident in Kapisa showed. The aircraft went down due
to a storm and impacted the ground with the tail section being
severed. The crew walked out unharmed and the wreck was eventually
recovered by a US Chinook. Despite its weight, the EC-665 is more
maneuverable than the much smaller Gazelle and much easier to fly
thanks to its fly-by-wire controls and rigid main rotor. The Tiger
fleet’s availability in Afghanistan stood at over 80% and in any
case when undergoing maintenance, an aircraft would not spend more
than a week in the hangar before taking to the air again. All
servicing was conducted by a maintenance platoon dedicated to attack
and recce helicopters servicing. In the case of the Tiger this
process was simplified by the integrated maintenance software that
monitors the aircraft and its components and recommends a specific
intervention when needed in such a way that servicing is no longer
done strictly on an hourly basis but when and as needed. A total of
seven Tiger HAP was fitted with the full range of improvements for
operations in Afghanistan (armor, dust filters, etc), although they
were never all simultaneously deployed to the country. The Tiger
proved itself as a key asset in the air support and escorting role,
giving the French forces in Afghanistan a new deterrent. It was also
the sole attack helicopter at their disposal which could stay in the
air for over two hours and deliver such deadly accurate fire, thanks
to its cannon. Also, while a Gazelle would be left unarmed after
firing its single HOT, the Tiger would still have plenty of ammo
after firing a 30 mm burst against a target. Despite its very high
sophistication, the Tiger also proved its ruggedness by “sleeping”
outside while on the FOBs. All in all, in three years of presence in
Afghanistan, the French Tiger carried out 2600 missions, logging
some 4215 hours of flight and firing no less than 19 000 rounds of
30 mm canon ammunition and some 420 68 mm rockets…
Maximum speed:
320 km/h
COUGAR :
By the summer of 2012, the Musketeers were still operating a pair of
AS-532 Cougar. The type proved itself as a major transport tool,
providing critical air mobility to the French troops deployed on the
Afghan field. The two examples still on strength at the time both
belonged to the ALAT’s 5ème RHC and like all helicopters
deployed in Afghanistan had received a number of improvements
designed to increase the crew’s protection and the aircraft’s
survivability. Side mounted armor plates had been fitted outside the
cockpit, supplementing the pilot and copilot’s armored seats and the
aircraft’s armored floor. Exhaust shrouds were also installed to
reduce the Cougar’s IR signature. A 7,62 mm MAG was mounted on each
side door of the helicopter for self-protection. All AS-532s are
fitted with flares and chaff dispensers although in Afghanistan
these weren’t yet wired to any kind of ECM or missile alert sensor
(an upgrade program is currently underway and modernized helicopters
are now deployed in Mali), thus making it necessary for the crew to
spot any incoming missile and release the decoys timely. Between the
weight of the extra kit installed and the afghan “hot and high”
environment, the Cougar would find their useful load dreadfully
reduced. So much so that with a 35°C ground temperature, a crew of
two pilots, one mechanic, two gunners and a commando only four
passengers could be taken on board (as opposed to 20 in France)…
Despite these limitations the Cougar has performed very well and
proved its worth in the transport and MEDEVAC role.
Maximum speed:
278 km/h
CARACAL:
The EC-725 was the
first French helicopter in Afghanistan, back in 2006, and was also
the last, in 2013. Like the Tiger, Afghanistan was the type’s first
operational deployment and its baptism of fire. The Caracal has also
been the French Air Force’s only helicopter type to operate in the
country in all 13 years of French presence in Afghanistan. In August
2012, two EC-725 were attached to the TF Musketeer, one of them
belonging to the ALAT, the other to the Air Force. The two choppers
on strength in 2012 were fitted with equipment specifically intended
for operations in Afghanistan. Among those were externally mounted
side armor plates on the cockpit and exhaust shrouds for the
turbines. Unlike the Cougar, the EC-725s are fitted with an active
self-protection package comprising a full range of sensors and ECM
devices all of which are wired to a series of flares and chaff
dispensers which are automatically activated when needed. All
Caracal are armed with a pair of cabin mounted MAG 7,62 mm machine
guns firing on both sides of the aircraft. Like the Cougar the
EC-725s suffered from the increase in weight due to the additional
equipment installed in Afghanistan and were affected by the high
temperatures and altitude at which operations took place. Thus their
useful load is as reduced as that of the AS-532s. Unlike the latter
however, the EC-725s are all fitted with a chin mounted FLIR turret,
which turns them into effective observation and surveillance
platforms, a most useful capability when operating in support of the
French Special Forces with whom they frequently and discreetly
worked with in Afghanistan. The EC-725 was frequently employed in
MEDEVAC and transport duties. As part of the withdrawal from FOB
Tora in Surobi, the Caracal were used to airlift supplies with their
underbelly sling. The maintenance of the Caracal was carried out by
a maintenance platoon dedicated to the servicing of all transport
helicopters in the BATHELICO. It comprised both Army Aviation and
Air Force personnel and also worked on the Cougar. The alterations
made to the standard servicing process due to the afghan environment
mainly comprised a more frequent cleaning of the engine’s sand
filters and of certain specific valves. The compressors’ blades
would also be carefully inspected on a much more frequently
scheduled basis to prevent excessive wear from dust exposure. Maximum speed:
324 km/h
Cet article est dédié à la mémoire
de mon ami Yves Debay.
Je remercie l’équipe du centre de
presse de Warehouse et tout particulièrement la Lieutenant Charlotte M
pour son aide précieuse dans la réalisation de ce reportage. Mes plus
vifs remerciements au Colonel Mouret et à l’ensemble des personnels du
BATHELICO pour leur disponibilité. Enfin, je remercie le Colonel
Burkhard de l’EMA, sans qui ce reportage n’aurait tout simplement pas pu
se faire.
Books: - Captain Brice
Erbland, "Dans les griffes du Tigre", Les Belles Lettres, 2013. - General Yann
Pertuisel, "De
la terre, par le ciel : Récits de combats Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire,
Libye", Economica, 2014 - General André
Martini, "L'Histoire de
l'Aviation Légère de l'Armée de Terre (1794-2014)", Editions Lavauzelle,
2013
- Lieutenant Charline Redin, "Afghanistan,
regards d’aviateurs", SIRPA Air, 2012
Magazines:
- Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°22, COMALAT,
January 2012
- Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°21, COMALAT, January 2011
- Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°20, COMALAT, January 2010
- Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°19, COMALAT, January 2009
- Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°18, COMALAT, January 2008
These can be downloaded in PDF here:
www.alat.fr/page1989a.html
Second Lieutenant Guillaume Roland & Second Lieutenant
Antonin Tisseron under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Remy Porte,
"L’emploi des hélicoptères en contre-insurrection, quels enjeux pour
quelles menaces ?", Cahiers de la Recherche Doctrinale, Centre de
Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, January 2012
[1]
Captain Zinutti,
"Les rotors de la nuit afghane"
page 22 and 23 in
Revue d’Information de l’ALAT,
N°18, COMALAT, January 2008
[2]
P120 to 125 in Lieutenant Charline Redin, "Afghanistan, regards
d’aviateurs", SIRPA Air, 2012
[3]
"Dossier
Engagement de l’ALAT" page VII in
Revue d’Information de l’ALAT, N°20,
COMALAT, January 2010
[4]
Captain Zinutti,
"Les rotors de la nuit afghane"
page 22 and 23 in
Revue d’Information de l’ALAT,
N°18, COMALAT, January 2008
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Books about Afghanistan
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